property damage claim in West Virginia

2024Ultimately, this Court held that “[a]n insurer cannot be held liable for punitive damages by its refusal to pay on an insured’s property damage claim unless such refusal is accompanied by a malicious intention to injure or defraud.” Id. at 324 , 352 S.E.2d at 74 , Syl.

2024Ultimately, this Court held that “[a]n insurer cannot be held liable for punitive damages by its refusal to pay on an insured’s property damage claim unless such refusal is accompanied by a malicious intention to injure or defraud.” Id. at 324 , 352 S.E.2d at 74 , Syl.

2022Co., 152 W.Va. 578 , 165 S.E.2d 379 (1969). 12 with an insurance company about a property damage claim. 11 There, we explained that there was neither conduct nor statements on behalf of the insurance company that could have reasonably been relied upon by the plaintiff in delaying the filing of his action: Motorists Mutual did not admit liability; it did not promise to pay any amount or to settle the claim; it did not say it would not plead the statute of limitations; it did not say that it would pay or settle when the personal injury claim was disposed of; nor did it request the plaintiff to r

2022Co., 152 W.Va. 578 , 165 S.E.2d 379 (1969). 12 with an insurance company about a property damage claim. 11 There, we explained that there was neither conduct nor statements on behalf of the insurance company that could have reasonably been relied upon by the plaintiff in delaying the filing of his action: Motorists Mutual did not admit liability; it did not promise to pay any amount or to settle the claim; it did not say it would not plead the statute of limitations; it did not say that it would pay or settle when the personal injury claim was disposed of; nor did it request the plaintiff to r

1997Further, during cross-examination, Belcher volunteered that a property damage claim had been made and paid on the demolished vehicle.” In syllabus point two of Jenrett v. Smith, 173 W.Va. 325 , 315 S.E.2d 583 (1983), this Court held that “ ‘[tjhough wide latitude is accorded counsel in arguments before a jury, such arguments may not be founded on facts not before the jury, or inferences which must arise from facts not before the jury.’ Syl. pt. 3, Crum v. Ward, 146 W.Va. 421 , 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961).” Any argument, in this case, that appellee Belcher drove the vehicle onto the railroad crossing

1997Further, during cross-examination, Belcher volunteered that a property damage claim had been made and paid on the demolished vehicle.” In syllabus point two of Jenrett v. Smith, 173 W.Va. 325 , 315 S.E.2d 583 (1983), this Court held that “ ‘[tjhough wide latitude is accorded counsel in arguments before a jury, such arguments may not be founded on facts not before the jury, or inferences which must arise from facts not before the jury.’ Syl. pt. 3, Crum v. Ward, 146 W.Va. 421 , 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961).” Any argument, in this case, that appellee Belcher drove the vehicle onto the railroad crossing

1997Where the insurance company has offered an amount materially below the damage estimates submitted by the insured, and the jury awards the insured an amount approximating the insured's damage estimates, the insured has substantially prevailed. [18] We also do not understand why the attorney representing the Fluhartys requested this medical examination by letter dated March 11, 1996, when the record indicates the plaintiff had accepted the Fluhartys' settlement offer on March 7, 1996. [19] Syllabus Point 7 of Marshall v. Saseen, 192 W.Va. 94 , 450 S.E.2d 791 (1994) states: Where an uninsured or

1997Where the insurance company has offered an amount materially below the damage estimates submitted by the insured, and the jury awards the insured an amount approximating the insured's damage estimates, the insured has substantially prevailed. [18] We also do not understand why the attorney representing the Fluhartys requested this medical examination by letter dated March 11, 1996, when the record indicates the plaintiff had accepted the Fluhartys' settlement offer on March 7, 1996. [19] Syllabus Point 7 of Marshall v. Saseen, 192 W.Va. 94 , 450 S.E.2d 791 (1994) states: Where an uninsured or

1997Further, during cross-examination, Belcher volunteered that a property damage claim had been made and paid on the demolished vehicle.” In syllabus point two of Jenrett v. Smith, 173 W.Va. 325 , 315 S.E.2d 583 (1983), this Court held that “ ‘[tjhough wide latitude is accorded counsel in arguments before a jury, such arguments may not be founded on facts not before the jury, or inferences which must arise from facts not before the jury.’ Syl. pt. 3, Crum v. Ward, 146 W.Va. 421 , 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961).” Any argument, in this case, that appellee Belcher drove the vehicle onto the railroad crossing

1997Where the insurance company has offered an amount materially below the damage estimates submitted by the insured, and the jury awards the insured an amount approximating the insured's damage estimates, the insured has substantially prevailed. [18] We also do not understand why the attorney representing the Fluhartys requested this medical examination by letter dated March 11, 1996, when the record indicates the plaintiff had accepted the Fluhartys' settlement offer on March 7, 1996. [19] Syllabus Point 7 of Marshall v. Saseen, 192 W.Va. 94 , 450 S.E.2d 791 (1994) states: Where an uninsured or

1997Where the insurance company has offered an amount materially below the damage estimates submitted by the insured, and the jury awards the insured an amount approximating the insured's damage estimates, the insured has substantially prevailed. [18] We also do not understand why the attorney representing the Fluhartys requested this medical examination by letter dated March 11, 1996, when the record indicates the plaintiff had accepted the Fluhartys' settlement offer on March 7, 1996. [19] Syllabus Point 7 of Marshall v. Saseen, 192 W.Va. 94 , 450 S.E.2d 791 (1994) states: Where an uninsured or

1997Further, during cross-examination, Belcher volunteered that a property damage claim had been made and paid on the demolished vehicle.” In syllabus point two of Jenrett v. Smith, 173 W.Va. 325 , 315 S.E.2d 583 (1983), this Court held that “ ‘[tjhough wide latitude is accorded counsel in arguments before a jury, such arguments may not be founded on facts not before the jury, or inferences which must arise from facts not before the jury.’ Syl. pt. 3, Crum v. Ward, 146 W.Va. 421 , 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961).” Any argument, in this case, that appellee Belcher drove the vehicle onto the railroad crossing

1995In Control Specialists, the court held “where two motor vehicles covered by the same insurance carrier collide, the nonnegli-gent driver may recover for damage to his vehicle under the negligent driver’s liability insurance and again under the property damage clause of his own insurance policy unless the nonnegligent driver’s policy limits such recovery.” The insurance carrier argued its policies were indemnity policies and “ Svere not intended’ to provide more than reimbursement to the extent of actual loss[.]” 228 Neb. at 644 , 423 N.W.2d at 777 .

1995In Control Specialists, the court held “where two motor vehicles covered by the same insurance carrier collide, the nonnegli-gent driver may recover for damage to his vehicle under the negligent driver’s liability insurance and again under the property damage clause of his own insurance policy unless the nonnegligent driver’s policy limits such recovery.” The insurance carrier argued its policies were indemnity policies and “ Svere not intended’ to provide more than reimbursement to the extent of actual loss[.]” 228 Neb. at 644 , 423 N.W.2d at 777 .

1994In Hayseeds, we began our analysis by recognizing the law set out in syllabus point 2 of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pitrolo, 176 W.Va. 190 , 342 S.E.2d 156 (1986): Where a declaratory judgment action is filed to determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insured under its policy, if the insurer is found to have such a duty, its insured is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees arising from the declaratory judgment litigation. *100 In Hayseeds, 177 W.Va. at 329 , 352 S.E.2d at 79 , we also went on to state the following proposition, which was the rationale behind Pitrolo

1994In Hayseeds, we began our analysis by recognizing the law set out in syllabus point 2 of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pitrolo, 176 W.Va. 190 , 342 S.E.2d 156 (1986): Where a declaratory judgment action is filed to determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insured under its policy, if the insurer is found to have such a duty, its insured is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees arising from the declaratory judgment litigation. *100 In Hayseeds, 177 W.Va. at 329 , 352 S.E.2d at 79 , we also went on to state the following proposition, which was the rationale behind Pitrolo

1957Va. 782 , 93 S. E. 2d 484, 485 , to have been barred by the failure of plaintiff in the first action to join the property damage claim with the claim for personal injuries in the first action instituted by the insured. *77 The issues in the instant suit were raised: (1) By plaintiff’s bill of complaint; (2) defendants’ plea in abatement and amended and supplemental plea in abatement; (3) defendants’ joint and several answer and amended and supplemental joint and several answer; and (4) plaintiff’s demurrer to defedants’ original, amended and supplemental pleas in abatement, and defendants’ joi