property damage claim in California

2016Plaintiff does not address either basis in her appellate briefing. 8 order of the court.” “This provision is commonly invoked to challenge pleadings filed in violation of a deadline, court order, or requirement of prior leave of court.”6 (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528 .) We disagree that the property damage claim was within the scope of the court’s order because it related to the same “primary right” as the previously asserted cause of action.

1997EBMUD argued that the Anthonys’ property damage claim was excluded from coverage under relevant policy exclusions and the recent case of Waldsmith v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 693 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 607 ] and, thus, State Farm had no obligation to pay.

1997EBMUD argued that the Anthonys’ property damage claim was excluded from coverage under relevant policy exclusions and the recent case of Waldsmith v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 693 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 607 ] and, thus, State Farm had no obligation to pay.

1996Therefore, the first prong of the discoverability test is met.” ( 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1760 .) As to the second prong, “. . . we conclude it is possible the terms and conditions of the State Farm settlement agreement could be, or could lead to, admissible evidence.

1995Instead, Union Oil argues that “wrongful entry” as used in the personal injury provision, while not itself a defined tort, represents a “generic category of torts that includes trespass and waste.” Therefore, it maintains, we must construe the policy’s personal injury coverage, which is not subject to the pollution exclusion, to include the trespass or waste allegedly caused when Union Oil’s gasoline migrated into neighboring properties. 3 In a similar vein, Union Oil contends the gasoline contamination also constitutes a covered “violation of personal rights” within the meaning of the persona

1995Instead, Union Oil argues that “wrongful entry” as used in the personal injury provision, while not itself a defined tort, represents a “generic category of torts that includes trespass and waste.” Therefore, it maintains, we must construe the policy’s personal injury coverage, which is not subject to the pollution exclusion, to include the trespass or waste allegedly caused when Union Oil’s gasoline migrated into neighboring properties. 3 In a similar vein, Union Oil contends the gasoline contamination also constitutes a covered “violation of personal rights” within the meaning of the persona

1995Appellants rely on the California Supreme Court decision in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 ] to argue that respondent breached its duty to investigate facts and allegations extrinsic to the face of the Ferrando complaint in determining its duty to defend.

1995Appellants rely on the California Supreme Court decision in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 ] to argue that respondent breached its duty to investigate facts and allegations extrinsic to the face of the Ferrando complaint in determining its duty to defend.

1995Co., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1150 .) Very recently our Supreme Court followed suit and agreed that parties to a CGL policy could not reasonably expect that coverage would be expanded simply because a claim of emotional or physical distress is alleged as a result of an uncovered economic loss.

1995Reiterating that damage for loss of investment is not cognizable under the property damage clause of the CGL policy, we further held: “[S]ince Plaintiffs’ physical distress was induced by an uncovered economic loss it defies reason that bodily injury coverage would nevertheless independently obtain. ‘It would expand coverage of [CGL] policies far beyond any reasonable expectation of the parties to sweep within their potential coverage any alleged emotional or physical distress that might result from economic loss that is itself clearly outside the scope of the policy. [Citation.] ’ (Keating v.

1995Instead, Union Oil argues that “wrongful entry” as used in the personal injury provision, while not itself a defined tort, represents a “generic category of torts that includes trespass and waste.” Therefore, it maintains, we must construe the policy’s personal injury coverage, which is not subject to the pollution exclusion, to include the trespass or waste allegedly caused when Union Oil’s gasoline migrated into neighboring properties. 3 In a similar vein, Union Oil contends the gasoline contamination also constitutes a covered “violation of personal rights” within the meaning of the persona

1995In Rothtrock, supra, 233 Cal.App.2d 616 , the insurer settled a property damage claim arising out of an automobile collision, but did so by means that barred an insured’s claim for personal injuries from that collision.

1993(See, e.g., Senior Housing v. Nakawatase, etal. (1989) 192 Hl.App.3d 766 [ 139 Ill.Dec. 878 , 549 N.E.2d 604 ].) They assert, however, that the Shaffers’ respective claims for emotional distress were barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations.

1993(See, e.g., Senior Housing v. Nakawatase, etal. (1989) 192 Hl.App.3d 766 [ 139 Ill.Dec. 878 , 549 N.E.2d 604 ].) They assert, however, that the Shaffers’ respective claims for emotional distress were barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations.

1992We noted a contrary finding would have the effect of modifying the judgment to specify it included compensation for the property damage claim. (194 Cal.App.3d. at p. 1414.) After a review of the pertinent authorities controlling the vacation, correction or alteration of arbitration awards (see ante), we concluded the trial court lacked jurisdiction under these provisions to modify a final judgment entered on an arbitration award in this manner and reversed. ( 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1416 .) Similarly in this case, we hold it was impossible for the trial court to conclude the $35,000 arbitration a

1992We noted a contrary finding would have the effect of modifying the judgment to specify it included compensation for the property damage claim. (194 Cal.App.3d. at p. 1414.) After a review of the pertinent authorities controlling the vacation, correction or alteration of arbitration awards (see ante), we concluded the trial court lacked jurisdiction under these provisions to modify a final judgment entered on an arbitration award in this manner and reversed. ( 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1416 .) Similarly in this case, we hold it was impossible for the trial court to conclude the $35,000 arbitration a

1992Co. v. Vieira (9th Cir. 1991) 930 F.2d 696, 697-701 .) A Michigan Millers internal memo, dated May 29, 1987, noted that “this is the first type of claim that has been presented to our Company alleging loss of market value as a property damage claim” and directed assignment of an adjuster and commencement of an immediate investigation. 3 By separate correspondence, on June 8,1987, Michigan Millers wrote to MP&G and noted that it had received no response to its letter of May 20, 1987, but was assigning Associated Insurance Adjusters, Inc., to the case.

1991(Conservatorship of Edwards, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d 1176, 1184 .) Therefore, the Griffins’ act of settling could not prejudice the insurer and no cause of action against the Griffins could arise.

1984Companies, Inc., supra, 142 Cal. App.3d 46, 55 .) Hence, the record contains no admission of the insured's liability.