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10 Alaska opinions name it 1 courts 1973–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dunn v. Blumsteingreen2 sentences2013If it actually, purposely, or incidentally burdens the right to migrate, a state residency requirement discriminating against citizens who have been residents for a relatively short period is a durational residency requirement subject to strict scrutiny.7 The United States 4 (...continued) durational residency requirement burdening right to migrate is subject to strict scrutiny), with Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 , 328 n.7 (1983) (“A bona fide residence requirement implicates no ‘suspect’ classification, and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny.”). 5 The right to travel, or “the righ 2013Moreover, the suspect provision must be drawn with precision and must be narrowly tailored to serve legitimate objectives.33 The objective of AS 43.23.008(b) is to help ensure that only permanent, bona fide residents of Alaska 31 Former AS 43.23.008(b) (2007) (emphasis added). 32 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 350 n.20 (1972) (emphasis added) (defining a durational residency requirement). 33 Id. at 343 (“And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference.”). -38- 6 | 2 | 4 |
Hicklin v. Orbeckgreen2 sentences1980In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977), reversed on other grounds, 437 U.S. 518 , 98 S.Ct. 2482 , 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978), we invalidated a durational residency requirement as a prerequisite to obtaining jobs on the Alaska pipeline project. 1980In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977), reversed on other grounds, 437 U.S. 518 , 98 S.Ct. 2482 , 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978), we invalidated a durational residency requirement as a prerequisite to obtaining jobs on the Alaska pipeline project. | 1 | 3 |
Shapiro v. Thompsongreen2 sentences1980In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), the Court rejected a "past tax contributions" argument offered to justify a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits: [The state's] reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. 1980In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), the Court rejected a "past tax contributions" argument offered to justify a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits: [The state's] reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. | 1 | 2 |
Vlandis v. Klinegreen2 sentences1980A year after Dunn , in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 , 93 S.Ct. 2230 , 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973), the Court noted in *426 dictum that eligibility for reduced tuition at a state university could be premised on a durational residency requirement. 1980A year after Dunn , in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 , 93 S.Ct. 2230 , 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973), the Court noted in *426 dictum that eligibility for reduced tuition at a state university could be premised on a durational residency requirement. | 1 | 2 |
Sosna v. Iowagreen2 sentences1980Nothing that Mrs. Sosna "was not irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining some part of what she sought," 419 U.S. at 406 , 95 S.Ct. at 561, 42 L.Ed.2d at 544 , the court held that the state's interest in assuring that those seeking divorce be genuinely attached to the state was sufficient to sustain the durational residency requirement. 1980Nothing that Mrs. Sosna "was not irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining some part of what she sought," 419 U.S. at 406 , 95 S.Ct. at 561, 42 L.Ed.2d at 544 , the court held that the state's interest in assuring that those seeking divorce be genuinely attached to the state was sufficient to sustain the durational residency requirement. | 1 | 2 |
Heller v. State, Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence2024Heller v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69, 78 (Alaska 2013). | 1 | 1 |
Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopezgreen2 sentences2013Compare Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904 -05 & n.4 (stating (continued...) -30- 6849 durational residency requirement burdens the right to migrate,5 under federal constitutional analysis the State of Alaska is required to show that the law is necessary to further a compelling state interest.6 The distinction between a bona fide residency requirement and a durational residency requirement does not depend merely on the requirement’s purpose. 2013If it actually, purposely, or incidentally burdens the right to migrate, a state residency requirement discriminating against citizens who have been residents for a relatively short period is a durational residency requirement subject to strict scrutiny.7 The United States 4 (...continued) durational residency requirement burdening right to migrate is subject to strict scrutiny), with Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 , 328 n.7 (1983) (“A bona fide residence requirement implicates no ‘suspect’ classification, and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny.”). 5 The right to travel, or “the righ | 1 | 1 |
Martinez Ex Rel. Morales v. Bynumgreen2 sentences2013If it actually, purposely, or incidentally burdens the right to migrate, a state residency requirement discriminating against citizens who have been residents for a relatively short period is a durational residency requirement subject to strict scrutiny.7 The United States 4 (...continued) durational residency requirement burdening right to migrate is subject to strict scrutiny), with Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 , 328 n.7 (1983) (“A bona fide residence requirement implicates no ‘suspect’ classification, and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny.”). 5 The right to travel, or “the righ 2013Moreover, the suspect provision must be drawn with precision and must be narrowly tailored to serve legitimate objectives.33 The objective of AS 43.23.008(b) is to help ensure that only permanent, bona fide residents of Alaska 31 Former AS 43.23.008(b) (2007) (emphasis added). 32 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 350 n.20 (1972) (emphasis added) (defining a durational residency requirement). 33 Id. at 343 (“And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference.”). -38- 6 | 1 | 1 |
Stalland v. South Dakota Board of Bar Examinersgreen1 sentence1982Once admitted, a member of the bar is not required to remain domiciled in Alaska. 5 While the rule does not impose a durational residency requirement, 6 it nonetheless denies a nonresident attorney the right to practice law on a multistate basis and interferes with the practice of law by attorneys employed by multistate corporations. 7 Stalland v. South Dakota Board of Bar Examiners, 530 F.Supp. 155, 157 (D.S.D.1982); see Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266 , 422 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 , 397 N.E.2d 1309, 1312-13 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
In re Gordongreen2 sentences1982Once admitted, a member of the bar is not required to remain domiciled in Alaska. 5 While the rule does not impose a durational residency requirement, 6 it nonetheless denies a nonresident attorney the right to practice law on a multistate basis and interferes with the practice of law by attorneys employed by multistate corporations. 7 Stalland v. South Dakota Board of Bar Examiners, 530 F.Supp. 155, 157 (D.S.D.1982); see Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266 , 422 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 , 397 N.E.2d 1309, 1312-13 (1979). 1982Once admitted, a member of the bar is not required to remain domiciled in Alaska. 5 While the rule does not impose a durational residency requirement, 6 it nonetheless denies a nonresident attorney the right to practice law on a multistate basis and interferes with the practice of law by attorneys employed by multistate corporations. 7 Stalland v. South Dakota Board of Bar Examiners, 530 F.Supp. 155, 157 (D.S.D.1982); see Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266 , 422 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 , 397 N.E.2d 1309, 1312-13 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gilbert v. State
green
2 sentences1980On the other hand, in Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1974), we sustained a durational residency requirement of three years in the state and one year in the election district for candidates for legislative office. 1980On the other hand, in Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1974), we sustained a durational residency requirement of three years in the state and one year in the election district for candidates for legislative office. | 3 | 1979–1980 |
State v. Van Dort
green
2 sentences1980The right to vote has always been considered one of the freedoms most essential to the well being of our form of government, and our striking down of a durational residency requirement for voting in State v. Van Dort, supra, is quite in harmony with the similar action of the United States Supreme Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, supra. Similarly, the right to enter into a common occupation is deeply ingrained in our constitutional history. 1980The right to vote has always been considered one of the freedoms most essential to the well being of our form of government, and our striking down of a durational residency requirement for voting in State v. Van Dort, supra , is quite in harmony with the similar action of the United States Supreme Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, supra . | 2 | 1979–1980 |
Hicklin v. Orbeck
green
2 sentences1980In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977), reversed on other grounds, 437 U.S. 518 , 98 S.Ct. 2482 , 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978), we invalidated a durational residency requirement as a prerequisite to obtaining jobs on the Alaska pipeline project. 1980In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977), reversed on other grounds, 437 U.S. 518 , 98 S.Ct. 2482 , 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978), we invalidated a durational residency requirement as a prerequisite to obtaining jobs on the Alaska pipeline project. | 2 | 1979–1980 |
State v. Wylie
green
2 sentences1980In State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1973), we applied a strict scrutiny standard and struck down a durational residency requirement of one year for preference in state personnel hiring. 1980In State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1973), we applied a strict scrutiny standard and struck down a durational residency requirement of one year for preference in state personnel hiring. | 2 | 1977–1980 |
State v. Adams
green
2 sentences1980In State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974), which was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosna v. Iowa, supra, we invalidated a one-year durational residency requirement for filing a divorce action. 1980In State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974), which was decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Sosna v. Iowa, supra , we invalidated a one-year durational residency requirement for filing a divorce action. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Johnnie Reb's Book & Card Shop v. Slaton
green
1 sentence1980In support of this conclusion, the Supreme Court cited in a footnote (id. at 452 n. 9, 93 S.Ct. at 2236 n. 9, 37 L.Ed.2d at 72 n. 9) its affirmance of Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.Supp. 234 (D.C.Minn.1970), aff’d, 401 U.S. 985 , 91 S.Ct. 1231 , 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Starns v. Malkerson
green
1 sentence1980In support of this conclusion, the Supreme Court cited in a footnote (id. at 452 n. 9, 93 S.Ct. at 2236 n. 9, 37 L.Ed.2d at 72 n. 9) its affirmance of Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.Supp. 234 (D.C.Minn.1970), aff’d, 401 U.S. 985 , 91 S.Ct. 1231 , 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Starns v. Malkerson
green
2 sentences1980In support of this conclusion, the Supreme Court cited in a footnote (id. at 452 n. 9, 93 S.Ct. at 2236 n. 9, 37 L.Ed.2d at 72 n. 9) its affirmance of Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.Supp. 234 (D.C.Minn.1970), aff’d, 401 U.S. 985 , 91 S.Ct. 1231 , 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971). 1980In support of this conclusion, the Supreme Court cited in a footnote ( id. at 452 n. 9, 93 S.Ct. at 2236 n. 9, 37 L.Ed.2d at 72 n. 9) its affirmance of Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.C. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.