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5 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1975–1995 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arredondo Ex Rel. Lopez v. Brockette
green
2 sentences1982Although the statute permitted the board of trustees to act as the sole arbiter in determining whether an applicant for admission was in fact a resident of the district, the court held: the Texas statute only attempts to articulate a residency definition and in no way contains a durational residency requirement. 482 F. Supp. at 218 . 1982Although the statute permitted the board of trustees to act as the sole arbiter in determining whether an applicant for admission was in fact a resident of the district, the court held: the Texas statute only attempts to articulate a residency definition and in no way contains a durational residency requirement. 482 F. Supp. at 218 . | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County
green
2 sentences1982The court held that a durational residency requirement violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution because it creates an individious classification, not justified by a compelling state interest, that impinges on the right to travel by denying newcomers to the state the basic necessities of life. 415 U.S. at 261 -62 . 1982The court held that a durational residency requirement violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution because it creates an invidious classification, not justified by a compelling state interest, that impinges on the right to travel by denying newcomers to the state the basic necessities of life. 415 U.S. at 261-62 . | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Cooper v. McBeath
green
1 sentence1995The Fii Ciicuit specifically considered the constitutionaiity of the durational residency requirement in the “5 1 percent rule.” Id. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Shapiro v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1994The first case to strike down a durational residency requirement on the grounds that it impinged upon the fundamental right to travel was Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). 1994The first case to strike down a durational residency requirement on the grounds that it impinged upon the fundamental right to travel was Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Barnes v. Board of Trustees, Michigan Veterans Trust Fund
green
1 sentence1975Having found that this durational residency requirement penalizes the exercise of the fun- damental right to travel, this court must deter- mine whether the requirement is necessary to promote a compelling state interest. 369 F. Supp. at 1335 . . . . this durational residency requirement is held to be unconstitutional because it is not necessary to promote a compelling state interest. 369 FI Supp. at 1337. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.