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10 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matthews v. City of AtLantic Citygreen2 sentences2012The Supreme Court later rejected the application of either of those standards to the durational residency requirement before it in Matthews, supra, 84 N.J. at 164-71 , 417 A.2d 1011 . 2012The Supreme Court later rejected the application of either of those standards to the durational residency requirement before it in Matthews, supra, 84 N.J. at 164-71 , 417 A.2d 1011 . | 1 | 2 |
Joseph v. City of Birminghamgreen2 sentences2012Thus, in Joseph, supra, where interstate travel played no role in the assessment of the burden imposed by a durational residency requirement, the Eastern District of Michigan held that it would not apply strict scrutiny to a city charter provision requiring that a candidate for city commissioner have lived in the city for one year preceding the election because there was no indication that the “requirement has had an inordinate impact on any discrete political group ... [or] that the field of choice has been drastically reduced.” 510 F.Supp. at 1330 . 2012Thus, in Joseph, supra, where interstate travel played no role in the assessment of the burden imposed by a durational residency requirement, the Eastern District of Michigan held that it would not apply strict scrutiny to a city charter provision requiring that a candidate for city commissioner have lived in the city for one year preceding the election because there was no indication that the “requirement has had an inordinate impact on any discrete political group ... [or] that the field of choice has been drastically reduced.” 510 F.Supp. at 1330 . | 1 | 1 |
The City of Akron v. Eugene Leonard Bellgreen2 sentences2012Compare Draper v. Phelps, 351 F.Supp. 677, 681 (W.D.Okla.1972) (applying “compelling interest” test pre-Bullock), and Robertson, supra, 150 F.Supp.2d at 695 (applying same standard), with Joseph, supra, 510 F.Supp. at 1335 (applying intermediate scrutiny), and Beil, supra, 660 F.2d at 169 (applying “lesser standard” than strict scrutiny). 4 Post-Bullock, courts that have applied strict scrutiny to durational residency requirements have done so only when those requirements imposed a burden on the right to interstate travel and have based the strict scrutiny analysis on that interference, not on 2012Like wise, in Beil, supra, the Sixth Circuit found that a city requirement that candidates for city council reside in the city for one year before running did not warrant strict scrutiny for much the same reasons. 660 F.2d at 169 . | 1 | 1 |
Draper v. Phelpsgreen2 sentences2012See Draper, supra, 351 F.Supp. at 683 (“Absent a durational residency requirement ‘carpet bagger’ candidates who have no desire, as agents or representatives of the district, genuinely to acquaint themselves with the problems of a representative district and conscientiously strive for the solution thereof in the legislative halls, can be candidates.”). 2012See Draper, supra, 351 F.Supp. at 683 (“Absent a durational residency requirement ‘carpet bagger’ candidates who have no desire, as agents or representatives of the district, genuinely to acquaint themselves with the problems of a representative district and conscientiously strive for the solution thereof in the legislative halls, can be candidates.”). | 1 | 1 |
Storer v. Browngreen2 sentences2012First, “‘a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political process from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.’” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733 , 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1280 , 39 L.Ed.2d 714, 725 (1974) (quoting Bullock, supra, 405 U.S. at 145, 92 S.Ct. at 857 , 31 L.Ed.2d at 101 ). 2012First, “‘a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political process from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.’” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733 , 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1280 , 39 L.Ed.2d 714, 725 (1974) (quoting Bullock, supra, 405 U.S. at 145, 92 S.Ct. at 857 , 31 L.Ed.2d at 101 ). | 1 | 1 |
Bullock v. Cartergreen2 sentences2012First, “‘a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political process from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.’” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733 , 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1280 , 39 L.Ed.2d 714, 725 (1974) (quoting Bullock, supra, 405 U.S. at 145, 92 S.Ct. at 857 , 31 L.Ed.2d at 101 ). 2012First, “‘a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political process from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.’” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733 , 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1280 , 39 L.Ed.2d 714, 725 (1974) (quoting Bullock, supra, 405 U.S. at 145, 92 S.Ct. at 857 , 31 L.Ed.2d at 101 ). | 1 | 1 |
Robertson v. Bartelsgreen2 sentences2012Robertson, supra, 150 F.Supp.2d at 698 . 2012Robertson, supra, 150 F.Supp.2d at 698 . | 1 | 1 |
Callaway v. Samsongreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Callaway v. Samson, 193 F.Supp.2d 783, 784 (D.N.J.2002). 2012Mosquera’s connections to the Fourth Legislative District in no way parallel those which the court in Callaway, supra, found sufficient to establish that a durational residency requirement was unconstitutional as applied to the candidate in that case. | 1 | 1 |
Zobel v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1994In my view, it is difficult to escape from the recognition that underlying any scheme of classification on the basis of duration of residence, we shall almost invariably find the unstated premise that “some citizens are more equal than others.” We rejected that premise and, I believe, implicitly rejected most forms of discrimination based upon length of residence, when we adopted the Equal Protection Clause. [Id. at 71, 102 S.Ct. at 2318-19 , 72 L.Ed.2d at 685 (Brennan, J., concurring).] To the same effect is Martinez v. Bynum, supra. On several occasions the Court has invalidated requirements 1994In my view, it is difficult to escape from the recognition that underlying any scheme of classification on the basis of duration of residence, we shall almost invariably find the unstated premise that “some citizens are more equal than others.” We rejected that premise and, I believe, implicitly rejected most forms of discrimination based upon length of residence, when we adopted the Equal Protection Clause. [Id. at 71, 102 S.Ct. at 2318-19 , 72 L.Ed.2d at 685 (Brennan, J., concurring).] To the same effect is Martinez v. Bynum, supra. On several occasions the Court has invalidated requirements | 1 | 1 |
cluster 296597green2 sentences1991As in Shapiro there is no contention here that a state or local government may not require that applicants for public services be bona fide residents. [442 F. 2d at 649]. *179 N.J.A.C. 5:92-15.1 is not a durational residency requirement subject to the constitutional constraints set forth in Shapiro, Cole and the other cases relied upon in the dissent. 1991As in Shapiro there is no contention here that a state or local government may not require that applicants for public services be bona fide residents. [442 F. 2d at 649]. *179 N.J.A.C. 5:92-15.1 is not a durational residency requirement subject to the constitutional constraints set forth in Shapiro, Cole and the other cases relied upon in the dissent. | 1 | 1 |
| Chimento v. Starkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Sununu v. Starkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dunn v. Blumstein
green
2 sentences2012In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), the Supreme Court held that a durational residency requirement imposed on voters is subject to strict scrutiny because it directly impacts the fundamental right to vote and burdens the right to interstate travel. 2012In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), the Supreme Court held that a durational residency requirement imposed on voters is subject to strict scrutiny because it directly impacts the fundamental right to vote and burdens the right to interstate travel. | 3 | 1974–2012 |
Wurtzel v. Falcey
green
2 sentences1980Like age, residence, or citizenship restrictions on public office holding, see Wurtzel, 69 N.J. at 403 , a durational residency requirement is directed at maintaining the integrity of the ballot by preventing fraudulent and frivolous candidacies. 1980Like age, residence, or citizenship restrictions on public office holding, see Wurtzel, 69 N.J. at 403 , a durational residency requirement is directed at maintaining the integrity of the ballot by preventing fraudulent and frivolous candidacies. | 2 | 1980–2001 |
Shapiro v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1998The durational residency requirement essentially “create[d] two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction.” Id. at 627 , 89 S.Ct. at 1327 , 22 L. 1998The durational residency requirement essentially “create[d] two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction.” Id. at 627 , 89 S.Ct. at 1327 , 22 L. | 2 | 1981–1998 |
Garramone v. Caputo
neutral
1 sentence2012Ammond v. Keating, 150 N.J.Super. 5 , 374 A.2d 498 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 285 , 377 A.2d 689 (1977). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Ammond v. Keating
neutral
1 sentence2012Ammond v. Keating, 150 N.J.Super. 5 , 374 A.2d 498 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 285 , 377 A.2d 689 (1977). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Ammond v. Keating
green
2 sentences2012Ammond v. Keating, 150 N.J.Super. 5 , 374 A.2d 498 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 285 , 377 A.2d 689 (1977). 2012Ammond v. Keating, 150 N.J.Super. 5 , 374 A.2d 498 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 285 , 377 A.2d 689 (1977). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Whitcomb v. Affeldt
green
1 sentence2012The State’s interest that voters “have an opportunity to observe, learn about and appraise those who seek to be candidates” was the rationale advanced for the durational residency requirement upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Hadnott, supra, 320 F.Supp. at 119-21 , aff'd, 401 U.S. 968 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 318 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Electronic Industries Ass'n v. United States
green
1 sentence2012The State’s interest that voters “have an opportunity to observe, learn about and appraise those who seek to be candidates” was the rationale advanced for the durational residency requirement upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Hadnott, supra, 320 F.Supp. at 119-21 , aff'd, 401 U.S. 968 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 318 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Hadnott v. Amos
green
1 sentence2012The State’s interest that voters “have an opportunity to observe, learn about and appraise those who seek to be candidates” was the rationale advanced for the durational residency requirement upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Hadnott, supra, 320 F.Supp. at 119-21 , aff'd, 401 U.S. 968 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 318 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Hadnott v. Amos
green
1 sentence2012The State’s interest that voters “have an opportunity to observe, learn about and appraise those who seek to be candidates” was the rationale advanced for the durational residency requirement upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Hadnott, supra, 320 F.Supp. at 119-21 , aff'd, 401 U.S. 968 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 318 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
PLAYCRAFTERS, ETC. v. Teaneck Tp. Bd. of Ed.
green
1 sentence1998Bd. of Ed., 177 NJ.Super. 66, 73, 424 A.2d 1192 (App.Div.), aff'd, 88 N.J. 74 , 438 A2d 543 (1981). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Playcrafters Student Members v. Teaneck Tp. Bd. of Ed.
neutral
2 sentences1998Bd. of Ed., 177 NJ.Super. 66, 73, 424 A.2d 1192 (App.Div.), aff'd, 88 N.J. 74 , 438 A2d 543 (1981). 1998Bd. of Ed., 177 NJ.Super. 66, 73, 424 A.2d 1192 (App.Div.), aff'd, 88 N.J. 74 , 438 A2d 543 (1981). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez
green
2 sentences1998Ed.2d 93 (1994) (noting that in Memorial Hospital, providing free emergency medical care during the waiting period for free non-emergent care did not save the Arizona statute’s durational residency requirement.) Furthermore, “even temporary deprivations of very important benefits and rights can operate to penalize migration.” Soto-Lopez, supra, 476 U.S. at 907 , 106 S.Ct. at 2323 , 90 L. 1998Ed.2d 93 (1994) (noting that in Memorial Hospital, providing free emergency medical care during the waiting period for free non-emergent care did not save the Arizona statute’s durational residency requirement.) Furthermore, “even temporary deprivations of very important benefits and rights can operate to penalize migration.” Soto-Lopez, supra, 476 U.S. at 907 , 106 S.Ct. at 2323 , 90 L. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Martinez Ex Rel. Morales v. Bynum
green
1 sentence1994In my view, it is difficult to escape from the recognition that underlying any scheme of classification on the basis of duration of residence, we shall almost invariably find the unstated premise that “some citizens are more equal than others.” We rejected that premise and, I believe, implicitly rejected most forms of discrimination based upon length of residence, when we adopted the Equal Protection Clause. [Id. at 71, 102 S.Ct. at 2318-19 , 72 L.Ed.2d at 685 (Brennan, J., concurring).] To the same effect is Martinez v. Bynum, supra. On several occasions the Court has invalidated requirements | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Catherine Cole v. Housing Authority of the City of Newport
green
1 sentence1991The court in Cole was presented with many of the arguments advanced by the majority here to justify the residency preference, such as providing a means for continued residency within the community of those with historical roots and otherwise *186 helping to "preserve [the municipality's] social fabric." The Cole court held that the durational residency requirement for public housing under review was unconstitutional even under the traditional "rational basis" standard as "the goal of promoting provincial prejudices towards long time residents is [not] cognizable under a constitution which was | 1 | 1991–1991 |
DEPT. OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY OF STATE v. Cruz
green
1 sentence1981The general constitutionality of this statute was left open in Labor & Industry Dept. v. Cruz, 45 N.J. 372 (1965), where a companion statute, N.J.S.A. 34:9-1, was declared unconstitutional. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Mahlon D. Green v. James B. McKeon
green
1 sentence1980In Green v. McKeon, 468 F. 2d 883 (6th Cir.1972), the court declined to decide whether Bullock required strict scrutiny because it found, on the authority of Dunn , that a durational residency requirement impinged on the right to travel. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Jamerson v. Lennox green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Sununu v. Stark
green
2 sentences1980The courts in Sununu v. Stark, 383 F.Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974), aff’d mem., 420 U.S. 958 , 95 S.Ct. 1346 , 43 L.Ed.2d 435 (1975), and Chimento v. Stark, 353 F.Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973), aff’d mem., 414 U.S. 802 , 94 S.Ct. 125 , 38 L.Ed.2d 39 (1973), rejected the claim that First Amendment rights were implicated, but relied on Dunn and Bullock to hold that a durational residency requirement encroached upon the rights to travel and to vote. 1980The courts in Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974), aff'd mem., 420 U.S. 958 , 95 S.Ct. 1346 , 43 L.Ed. 2d 435 (1975), and Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 802 , 94 S.Ct. 125 , 38 L.Ed. 2d 39 (1973), rejected the claim that First Amendment rights were implicated, but relied on Dunn and Bullock to hold that a durational residency requirement encroached upon the rights to travel and to vote. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Crete Carrier Corp. v. United States
green
2 sentences1980The courts in Sununu v. Stark, 383 F.Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974), aff’d mem., 420 U.S. 958 , 95 S.Ct. 1346 , 43 L.Ed.2d 435 (1975), and Chimento v. Stark, 353 F.Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973), aff’d mem., 414 U.S. 802 , 94 S.Ct. 125 , 38 L.Ed.2d 39 (1973), rejected the claim that First Amendment rights were implicated, but relied on Dunn and Bullock to hold that a durational residency requirement encroached upon the rights to travel and to vote. 1980The courts in Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974), aff'd mem., 420 U.S. 958 , 95 S.Ct. 1346 , 43 L.Ed. 2d 435 (1975), and Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 802 , 94 S.Ct. 125 , 38 L.Ed. 2d 39 (1973), rejected the claim that First Amendment rights were implicated, but relied on Dunn and Bullock to hold that a durational residency requirement encroached upon the rights to travel and to vote. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Stothers v. Martini
green
2 sentences1980II In Stothers v. Martini, supra, this Court rejected an equal protection challenge to the durational residency requirement involved here. 1980II In Stothers v. Martini, supra , this Court rejected an equal protection challenge to the durational residency requirement involved here. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Thomas v. Atkinson green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Echevarria v. Carey green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Hanzimanolis v. Codd green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Middleton v. South Carolina green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Lebowitz v. Florida green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.