77 New York opinions name it 13 courts 1915–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Caseygreen2 sentences2015Thus, to satisfy the prima facie case requirement an information must allege completely every element of the offense charged and those allegations must be nonhearsay (see People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 362 [2000]; Kalin, 12 NY3d at 229 ; see also People v Fernandez, 20 NY3d 44, 47 [2012]; People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]). 2013The prima facie case standard for an information comprises two requirements (see People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 362 [2000]). | 23 | 28 |
People v. Kalingreen2 sentences2026This prima facie case requirement " is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial, nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial." Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d at 230; see also Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d at 680; People v. Guaman, 22 N.Y.3d 678, 681 (2014). 2026This prima facie case requirement " is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial, nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial." Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d at 230 ; see also Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d at 680 ; People v. Guaman, 22 N.Y.3d 678, 681 (2014). | 20 | 31 |
People v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2026This prima facie case requirement " is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial, nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial." Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d at 230; see also Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d at 680; People v. Guaman, 22 N.Y.3d 678, 681 (2014). 2026This prima facie case requirement " is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial, nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial." Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d at 230 ; see also Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d at 680 ; People v. Guaman, 22 N.Y.3d 678, 681 (2014). | 18 | 23 |
People v. Alejandrogreen2 sentences2020The prima facie case standard, which is necessary because of "the unique function that an information serves under the [CPL]," demands that the information contain factual allegations establishing a legally sufficient case against the defendant ( People v Alejandro , 70 NY2d 133, 137, 137-139 [1987]; see People v Jones , 9 NY3d 259, 262 [2007]). 2016(People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518 [2014]; People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 138-139 [1987].) Accordingly, a misdemeanor information must set forth “nonhearsay allegations which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof.” (People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228-229 [2009], citing People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 679 [1999], and CPL 100.40 [1] [c].) This is known as the “prima facie case requirement.” (Kalin, 12 NY3d at 229 [emphasis added].) The prima facie case requirement does not necessitate that the information allege facts that would prove defendan | 12 | 25 |
People v. Jenningsgreen2 sentences2016(People v Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 115 [1986].) Rather, the information need only contain allegations of fact that “give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense.” (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000].) A court reviewing for facial insufficiency must subject the allegations in the information to a “fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading” (id.), assume that those allegations are true, and consider all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them. 2015The prima facie case requirement does not insist that the information allege facts that would prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (People v Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 115 [1986]). | 8 | 9 |
People v. Koniecznygreen2 sentences2025The [*3]Court of Appeals has repeatedly emphasized, "[s]o long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading." Casey , 95 NY2d at 360 ; see also People v Berrezueta , 31 NY3d 1091, 1092 (2018); Smalls , 26 NY.3d at 1066; People v Dreyden , 15 NY3d 100 (2010); Kalin , 12 NY3d at 230 ; People v Konieczny , 2 NY3d 569, 576 (2004). 2015“So long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, [it] should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading” (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]; People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569 [2004]). | 4 | 5 |
The People v. Dennis P. Smallsgreen2 sentences2025The prima facie case requirement in an accusatory instrument "is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial, nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial." People v Smalls , 26 NY3d 1064, 1066 (2015) (citations omitted). 2025The prima facie case requirement for the facial sufficiency of an information "is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial, nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial" (People v Smalls, 26 N.Y.3d 1064 [2015]). | 3 | 7 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2020The prima facie case standard, which is necessary because of "the unique function that an information serves under the [CPL]," demands that the information contain factual allegations establishing a legally sufficient case against the defendant ( People v Alejandro , 70 NY2d 133, 137, 137-139 [1987]; see People v Jones , 9 NY3d 259, 262 [2007]). 2015The Court of Appeals has stated that CPL 100.40 (1) places “the burden on the People to make out their prima facie case for the offense charged in the text of the information” (People v Jones, 9 NY3d 259, 261 [2007])- It should be noted that the prima facie case requirement is not the same as the burden required at trial of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, “nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial” (People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 230 [2009]). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Dumaygreen2 sentences2025Although that obligation—known as [*3]"the prima facie case requirement"—applies to an information, "[a] misdemeanor complaint, in comparison, need only set forth facts that establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the charged offense" ( Dumay , 23 NY3d at 525). 2025Although that obligation—known as [*3]"the prima facie case requirement"—applies to an information, "[a] misdemeanor complaint, in comparison, need only set forth facts that establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the charged offense" ( Dumay , 23 NY3d at 525 ). | 2 | 12 |
In re Jahron S.green2 sentences2012The dissent disregards this linguistic and historical proof, choosing instead to place emphasis on phrases from People v Alejandro ( 70 NY2d 133 [1987]) and Matter of Jahron S. ( 79 NY2d 632 [1992]) to support its mistaken belief that the prima facie case test is always identical to the legally sufficient evidence standard. 2 We have previously explained that those decisions contain language that was not essential to their holdings and therefore do not bind subsequent cases (see People v Casey, 95 NY2d at 362 ; People v Kalin, 12 NY3d at 232 ). 2012The core holdings of the cases—that the prima facie case rule applies to a juvenile delinquency petition (see Matter of Jahron S., 79 NY2d at 639 ) and that the failure to allege every element of an offense is a jurisdictional defect (see People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d at 136 ; People v Casey, 95 NY2d at 362 )—remain controlling law. | 2 | 4 |
People v. Guamangreen2 sentences2026This prima facie case requirement " is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial, nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial." Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d at 230; see also Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d at 680; People v. Guaman, 22 N.Y.3d 678, 681 (2014). 2026This prima facie case requirement " is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial, nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial." Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d at 230 ; see also Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d at 680 ; People v. Guaman, 22 N.Y.3d 678, 681 (2014). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Allengreen2 sentences2016(People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680 [1999].) In reviewing an accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency, “[s]o long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, [it] should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading.” (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000].) Moreover, the Court of Appeals, in People v Allen ( 92 NY2d 378, 385 [1998]), held that at the pleading stage, all that is required are factual allegations that 2004The allegations must establish a prima facie case that there is reasonable cause to believe that a defendant is guilty of the crimes charged (People v Allen, 92 NY2d 378, 385 [1998]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2023Further, he did not explain or describe the Texas "buy tag." These allegations are too conclusory to meet the prima facie case requirement on the issue of whether the buy tag was a forgery ( cf. People v Jackson , 18 NY3d at 746 ; People v Thorne , 50 Misc 3d 775, 776-777 [Crim Ct, Bronx County]). 2022"The requirement that an accusatory instrument contain nonconclusory allegations is part of the prima facie case requirement" ( People v Jackson , 18 NY3d at 746 ). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Swampgreen2 sentences2013Thus, they ask the court to deny the defendant’s motion and to allow them “the opportunity at trial to detail the nature and extent of the injuries suffered by the complainant, and to offer . . . proof that the complainant suffered either substantial pain or impairment of physical condition.” Although the standard for legally sufficient evidence differs in certain respects from the prima facie case standard, they are substantively equivalent (see People v Suber, 19 NY3d 247, 251 [2012]; People v Swamp, 84 NY2d 725, 730 [1995]). 1999(See, People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677 .) The Court in Henderson , citing People v Gordon ( 88 NY2d 92 , supra) and People v Swamp ( 84 NY2d 725 ), emphasized that a prima facie case requirement is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Dreydengreen2 sentences2025The [*3]Court of Appeals has repeatedly emphasized, "[s]o long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading." Casey , 95 NY2d at 360 ; see also People v Berrezueta , 31 NY3d 1091, 1092 (2018); Smalls , 26 NY.3d at 1066; People v Dreyden , 15 NY3d 100 (2010); Kalin , 12 NY3d at 230 ; People v Konieczny , 2 NY3d 569, 576 (2004). 2015Thus, to satisfy the prima facie case requirement an information must allege completely every element of the offense charged and those allegations must be nonhearsay (see People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 362 [2000]; Kalin, 12 NY3d at 229 ; see also People v Fernandez, 20 NY3d 44, 47 [2012]; People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Guzmangreen2 sentences2004(Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522 [1975].) In order to establish a prima facie case for violation of the fair cross-section requirement under the 6th Amendment, the defendant must show: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in rela tion to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process” (Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 364 [1979]; se 1997In People v Guzman ( 60 NY2d 403 , cert denied 466 US 951 ), the Court of Appeals held that a group is distinctive if that group constitutes "a substantial and identifiable segment of the community” (supra, at 410). " 'To show that a group is distinct or cognizable under the [8]ixth [A]mendment, a defendant must show: (1) that the group is defined and limited by some factor * * * (2) that a common thread or basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience runs through the group; and (3) that there is a community of interest among members of the group such that the group’s interests cannot be | 1 | 2 |
People v. Berrezuetagreen1 sentence2025The [*3]Court of Appeals has repeatedly emphasized, "[s]o long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading." Casey , 95 NY2d at 360 ; see also People v Berrezueta , 31 NY3d 1091, 1092 (2018); Smalls , 26 NY.3d at 1066; People v Dreyden , 15 NY3d 100 (2010); Kalin , 12 NY3d at 230 ; People v Konieczny , 2 NY3d 569, 576 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thornegreen1 sentence2023Further, he did not explain or describe the Texas "buy tag." These allegations are too conclusory to meet the prima facie case requirement on the issue of whether the buy tag was a forgery ( cf. People v Jackson , 18 NY3d at 746 ; People v Thorne , 50 Misc 3d 775, 776-777 [Crim Ct, Bronx County]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ottogreen1 sentence2023Further, even assuming that the information sufficiently alleged that the buy tag was a forgery, the information failed to provide sufficient factual allegations to "establish a presumption that [the] defendant had knowledge of the forged nature of the instrument" ( People v Johnson , 65 NY2d at 561; see People v Brousseau , 149 AD3d at 1277 ). | 1 | 1 |
Blakeslee v. Rabinorgreen1 sentence2022Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on its cause of action for fraudulent conveyance under § 273-a ( see Blakeslee [*2]v Rabinor, 182 AD2d 390, 391 [1st Dept 1992], lv denied 82 NY2d 655 [1993]). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pearsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Fernandezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Subergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Clarksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lawsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Weinberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cooksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Duren v. Missourigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brad Bangerter v. Orem City Corporation, a Utah Municipal Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Goregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Furnco Construction Corp. v. Watersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hyde
green
2 sentences2016The prima facie case requirement is a lower threshold than the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial (People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680 [1999]; People v Hyde, 302 AD2d 101 [1st Dept 2003]). 2005The prima facie case requirement of an accusatory instrument is a lower threshold than the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial (People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680 [1999]; People v Hyde, 302 AD2d 101 [1st Dept 2003]). | 3 | 2004–2016 |
People v. Gordon
green
2 sentences2009The term “physical injury” is defined by Penal Law § 10.00 (9) as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” Thus, under the prima facie case requirement set forth in CPL 100.40 (1) (c), the information must set forth sufficient factual allegations to warrant the conclusion that the victim suffered an “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” However, it must be noted that the prima facie case requirement for pleading purposes is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial (see People v Gordon, 88 NY2d 92 [1996]). 1999(See, People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677 .) The Court in Henderson , citing People v Gordon ( 88 NY2d 92 , supra) and People v Swamp ( 84 NY2d 725 ), emphasized that a prima facie case requirement is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. | 3 | 1999–2009 |
Alston v. Golub Corp.
green
2 sentences1990To be contrasted are those cases involving broken ladders or collapsing scaffolding, where the break or collapse is by itself sufficient to establish a prima facie case of violation of Labor Law § 240 (see, e.g., Alston v Golub Corp., 129 AD2d 916 ; Braun v Dormitory Auth., 118 AD2d 614 ; Harmon v Sager, 106 AD2d 704 ). 1989However, unlike cases involving broken ladders or collapsing scaffoldings, where the break or collapse by itself is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of violation of section 240, since it is unlikely that the scaffolding would collapse or the ladder break if properly constructed (see, Alston v Golub Corp., 129 AD2d 916 ; Braun v Dormitory Auth., 118 AD2d 614 ; Harmon v Sager, 106 AD2d 704 ; Weaver v Lazarus, 93 AD2d 859 ), there is nothing in the present record to indicate that the ladder was not "so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection” (Labor Law § 240 [1]). | 3 | 1989–1992 |
People v. Voelker
green
2 sentences2016When ruling on the sufficiency of an information, a court must accept the factual allegations as true (cf. People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354 [2000]; People v Henderson), but the court is limited to reviewing the facts as they are set forth in the four corners of the accusatory document (see People v Voelker, 172 Misc 2d 564 [Crim Ct, NY County 1997, Morgenstern, J.]; cf. CPL 100.40 [1]). 2008When ruling on the sufficiency of an information, a court must accept the factual allegations as true (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354 [2000]; People v Henderson, supra), but it is limited to reviewing the facts as they are set forth in the four corners of the accusatory document (see People v Voelker, 172 Misc 2d 564 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1997, Morgenstern, J.]; cf. CPL 100.40 [1]), and separate documents must be read separately (see People v Grabinski, 189 Misc 2d 307 [App Term, 2d Dept 2001]). | 2 | 2008–2016 |
People v. Minuto
green
2 sentences1995Ctr., 122 Misc 2d 260, 269 , supra [a misdemeanor complaint may rest on hearsay provided it sets forth reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed]; People v Minuto, 71 Misc 2d 800 , supra; People v Gore, 143 Misc 2d 106, 108 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1989], citing People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 139 , and People v Miles, 64 NY2d 731 [the prima facie case requirement of an information is distinct from the allegations of an evidentiary character required by CPL 100.15].) Defendant’s motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument on the additional ground that the date of occurrence 1989(See, People v Boyer, 105 Misc 2d 877, 884 , revd 116 Misc 2d 931 , revd 58 NY2d 122 ; People v Minuto, 71 Misc 2d 800 .) This subdivision indicates that facts may be added in a supporting deposition which can then satisfy the prima facie case requirement of an information. | 2 | 1989–1995 |
People v. Miles
green
2 sentences1995Ctr., 122 Misc 2d 260, 269 , supra [a misdemeanor complaint may rest on hearsay provided it sets forth reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed]; People v Minuto, 71 Misc 2d 800 , supra; People v Gore, 143 Misc 2d 106, 108 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1989], citing People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 139 , and People v Miles, 64 NY2d 731 [the prima facie case requirement of an information is distinct from the allegations of an evidentiary character required by CPL 100.15].) Defendant’s motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument on the additional ground that the date of occurrence 1989(See, People v Alejandro, supra, at 139; People v Miles, 64 NY2d 731 .) CPL 140.45 further qualifies that when an instrument based on a warrant-less arrest is not sufficient, "if the court is satisfied that on the basis of the available facts or evidence it would be impossible to draw and file an accusatory instrument which is sufficient”, it must be dismissed. | 2 | 1989–1995 |
Harmon v. Sager
green
2 sentences1990To be contrasted are those cases involving broken ladders or collapsing scaffolding, where the break or collapse is by itself sufficient to establish a prima facie case of violation of Labor Law § 240 (see, e.g., Alston v Golub Corp., 129 AD2d 916 ; Braun v Dormitory Auth., 118 AD2d 614 ; Harmon v Sager, 106 AD2d 704 ). 1989However, unlike cases involving broken ladders or collapsing scaffoldings, where the break or collapse by itself is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of violation of section 240, since it is unlikely that the scaffolding would collapse or the ladder break if properly constructed (see, Alston v Golub Corp., 129 AD2d 916 ; Braun v Dormitory Auth., 118 AD2d 614 ; Harmon v Sager, 106 AD2d 704 ; Weaver v Lazarus, 93 AD2d 859 ), there is nothing in the present record to indicate that the ladder was not "so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection” (Labor Law § 240 [1]). | 2 | 1989–1990 |
Braun v. Dormitory Authority
neutral
2 sentences1990To be contrasted are those cases involving broken ladders or collapsing scaffolding, where the break or collapse is by itself sufficient to establish a prima facie case of violation of Labor Law § 240 (see, e.g., Alston v Golub Corp., 129 AD2d 916 ; Braun v Dormitory Auth., 118 AD2d 614 ; Harmon v Sager, 106 AD2d 704 ). 1989However, unlike cases involving broken ladders or collapsing scaffoldings, where the break or collapse by itself is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of violation of section 240, since it is unlikely that the scaffolding would collapse or the ladder break if properly constructed (see, Alston v Golub Corp., 129 AD2d 916 ; Braun v Dormitory Auth., 118 AD2d 614 ; Harmon v Sager, 106 AD2d 704 ; Weaver v Lazarus, 93 AD2d 859 ), there is nothing in the present record to indicate that the ladder was not "so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection” (Labor Law § 240 [1]). | 2 | 1989–1990 |
The People v. Matthew P.
green
1 sentence2024Failure to meet those demands—what effectively are the "the reasonable cause requirement of section 100.40 (1) (b) [and] the prima facie case requirement of section 100.40 (1) (c)"—is "a jurisdictional defect" ( Matthew P. , 26 NY3d at 335 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Patten
green
1 sentence2022Thus, where an allegation involves a conclusion, there must be some explanation for the basis of that conclusion that is evident from the accusatory instrument ( see id. ; People v Kalin , 12 NY3d 225, 229 [2009]; People v Patten , 32 Misc 3d at 444-446 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Parsons (Jerome) green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Gonzalez green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Thomas neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Hightower green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Reich v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. King green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| In re Daniel McC. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| People v. Bello green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Fuggazzatto green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Grabinski neutral | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| In re Dirhim A. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| In re Jose M. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| In re Jose M. neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| In re Jose M. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| In re Edward B. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Taylor v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Rojas green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Larkin v. State Of Michigan Department Of Social Services green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Huntington Branch, National Association For The Advancement Of Colored People v. The Town Of Huntington green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Carcich green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Prozeralik v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Antunes v. 950 Park Avenue Corp. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Klein v. City of New York green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Baron green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Flushing Hospital & Medical Center green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| In re David T. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Potwora green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Dick v. John M. Gates Construction Corp. neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Wescott v. Shear green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.