7 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1973–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Com. v. Mendoza, A.green1 sentence2026See Mendoza, 287 A.3d at 462 ; Rapak, 138 A.3d at 672 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Martigreen1 sentence2014Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Marti, 779 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Pa. Super. 2001)). guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at this stage. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cravergreen2 sentences2004In that case, after citing Commonwealth v. Craver, 547 Pa. 17 , 688 A.2d 691, 696 (1997), for Pennsylvania’s articulation of the prima facie case requirement stated in Duren , our Supreme Court stated that “[pjroof is required of an actual discriminatory practice in the jury selection process, not merely under-representation of one particular group.” Johnson, 838 A.2d at 682 (emphasis added). 2004In that case, after citing Commonwealth v. Craver, 547 Pa. 17 , 688 A.2d 691, 696 (1997), for Pennsylvania’s articulation of the prima facie case requirement stated in Duren , our Supreme Court stated that “[pjroof is required of an actual discriminatory practice in the jury selection process, not merely under-representation of one particular group.” Johnson, 838 A.2d at 682 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2004In that case, after citing Commonwealth v. Craver, 547 Pa. 17 , 688 A.2d 691, 696 (1997), for Pennsylvania’s articulation of the prima facie case requirement stated in Duren , our Supreme Court stated that “[pjroof is required of an actual discriminatory practice in the jury selection process, not merely under-representation of one particular group.” Johnson, 838 A.2d at 682 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation
green
2 sentences1990The critical question in deciding a motion for summary judgment “is whether the admissible evidence in the record, in whatever form, from whatever source, considered in a light most favorable to the respondent to the motion, fails to establish a prima facie case or defense.” In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 , 107 S.Ct. 1955 , 95 L.Ed. 2d 527 (1987). 1989The inquiry in deciding a motion for summary judgment “is whether the admissible evidence in the record, in whatever form, from whatever source, considered in the light most favorable to the respondent to the motion, fails to establish a prima facie case or defense.” In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 , 107 S.Ct. 1955 , 95 L.Ed.2d 527 (1987). | 2 | 1989–1990 |
Potenze v. New York Shipping Ass'n
green
2 sentences1990The critical question in deciding a motion for summary judgment “is whether the admissible evidence in the record, in whatever form, from whatever source, considered in a light most favorable to the respondent to the motion, fails to establish a prima facie case or defense.” In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 , 107 S.Ct. 1955 , 95 L.Ed. 2d 527 (1987). 1989The inquiry in deciding a motion for summary judgment “is whether the admissible evidence in the record, in whatever form, from whatever source, considered in the light most favorable to the respondent to the motion, fails to establish a prima facie case or defense.” In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 , 107 S.Ct. 1955 , 95 L.Ed.2d 527 (1987). | 2 | 1989–1990 |
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. JHJ Ltd. I
green
2 sentences1990The critical question in deciding a motion for summary judgment “is whether the admissible evidence in the record, in whatever form, from whatever source, considered in a light most favorable to the respondent to the motion, fails to establish a prima facie case or defense.” In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 , 107 S.Ct. 1955 , 95 L.Ed. 2d 527 (1987). 1989The inquiry in deciding a motion for summary judgment “is whether the admissible evidence in the record, in whatever form, from whatever source, considered in the light most favorable to the respondent to the motion, fails to establish a prima facie case or defense.” In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 , 107 S.Ct. 1955 , 95 L.Ed.2d 527 (1987). | 2 | 1989–1990 |
Octopi, Inc. v. Courtney
green
2 sentences1990The critical question in deciding a motion for summary judgment “is whether the admissible evidence in the record, in whatever form, from whatever source, considered in a light most favorable to the respondent to the motion, fails to establish a prima facie case or defense.” In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 , 107 S.Ct. 1955 , 95 L.Ed. 2d 527 (1987). 1989The inquiry in deciding a motion for summary judgment “is whether the admissible evidence in the record, in whatever form, from whatever source, considered in the light most favorable to the respondent to the motion, fails to establish a prima facie case or defense.” In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 , 107 S.Ct. 1955 , 95 L.Ed.2d 527 (1987). | 2 | 1989–1990 |
Commonwealth v. Rapak
green
1 sentence2026See Mendoza, 287 A.3d at 462 ; Rapak, 138 A.3d at 672 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Patrick
green
1 sentence2014Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Marti, 779 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Pa. Super. 2001)). guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at this stage. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Rose v. Food Fair Stores, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989See also: Rose v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 437 Pa. 117 , 262 A.2d 851 (1970) (summary judgment properly entered where averments of complaint could not be proved because of parol evidence rule). 1989See also: Rose v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 437 Pa. 117 , 262 A.2d 851 (1970) (summary judgment properly entered where averments of complaint could not be proved because of parol evidence rule). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Dental Manufacturing Supply Co. v. Southern Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1987Dental Manufacturing Supply Co. v. Southern Railway, 82 Pa. Super. 558 (1924). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Repass v. Rees
green
1 sentence1973That section provides, in its relevant part, as follows: “Section 5(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly— “(1) to make use of any means or instrument of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such securities through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise.” Plaintiff presented at trial a prima facie case of violation of that statute, by establishing that defendant sold him unregistered securities and that an instrument of communication in interstate commerce, | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Lennerth v. Mendenhall
green
1 sentence1973Even if all the phone calls took place within Pennsylvania, the interstate commerce requirement has been met, for it is the character of the instrument used, rather than the nature of the call which is determinative: Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (1964). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.