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9 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1910–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Leegreen2 sentences2023In the absence of countervailing evidence, once the [S]tate has established a prima facie case of waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness of an in-custody statement, the statement should be admitted into evidence. …. “[T]he general rule is that a prima facie case will be established ‘when the [S]tate has established that [the] 14 No. 2021AP1581-CR defendant has been told or has read all the rights and admonitions required in Miranda, and the defendant indicates he [or she] understands them and is willing to make a statement.’” Lee, 175 Wis. 2d at 359-60 (citation omitted). ¶24 We agree with 2021“In the absence of countervailing evidence, once the state has established a prima facie case of waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness of an in-custody statement, the statement should be admitted into evidence.” Lee, 175 Wis. 2d at 359 . | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hernandez
green
2 sentences1999In Mitchell , we stated, "Once the state has established a prima facie case of waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness of a statement of an in-custody police interrogation in the absence of countervailing evidence, the statement should be admitted into evidence." Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d at 696 (citing State v. Hernandez, 61 Wis. 2d 253, 259 , 212 N.W.2d 118 (1973))(emphasis added). 1999In Mitchell , we stated, "Once the state has established a prima facie case of waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness of a statement of an in-custody police interrogation in the absence of countervailing evidence, the statement should be admitted into evidence." Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d at 696 (citing State v. Hernandez, 61 Wis. 2d 253, 259 , 212 N.W.2d 118 (1973))(emphasis added). | 3 | 1992–1999 |
State v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences2008State v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 696 , 482 N.W.2d 364 (1992). ¶ 37. 1999In Mitchell , we stated, "Once the state has established a prima facie case of waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness of a statement of an in-custody police interrogation in the absence of countervailing evidence, the statement should be admitted into evidence." Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d at 696 (citing State v. Hernandez, 61 Wis. 2d 253, 259 , 212 N.W.2d 118 (1973))(emphasis added). | 2 | 1999–2008 |
Denny v. Mertz
green
2 sentences2005Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 499 , 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975) ("When the defendant has established a prima facie case of privilege, it ordinarily devolves upon the plaintiff to rebut this showing by proof of actual malice, want of good faith, or due care, etc." (Citations omitted; second emphasis added.)); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 674 , 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (noting that although defamation is in general a strict liability tort, "the application of the doctrines of 'conditional privilege' and 'abuse of privilege' means that the law of defamation in operation is not a 2005Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 499 , 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975) ("When the defendant has established a prima facie case of privilege, it ordinarily devolves upon the plaintiff to rebut this showing by proof of actual malice, want of good faith, or due care, etc." (Citations omitted; second emphasis added.)); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 674 , 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (noting that although defamation is in general a strict liability tort, "the application of the doctrines of 'conditional privilege' and 'abuse of privilege' means that the law of defamation in operation is not a | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Calero v. Del Chemical Corp.
green
2 sentences2005Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 499 , 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975) ("When the defendant has established a prima facie case of privilege, it ordinarily devolves upon the plaintiff to rebut this showing by proof of actual malice, want of good faith, or due care, etc." (Citations omitted; second emphasis added.)); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 674 , 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (noting that although defamation is in general a strict liability tort, "the application of the doctrines of 'conditional privilege' and 'abuse of privilege' means that the law of defamation in operation is not a 2005Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 499 , 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975) ("When the defendant has established a prima facie case of privilege, it ordinarily devolves upon the plaintiff to rebut this showing by proof of actual malice, want of good faith, or due care, etc." (Citations omitted; second emphasis added.)); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 674 , 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (noting that although defamation is in general a strict liability tort, "the application of the doctrines of 'conditional privilege' and 'abuse of privilege' means that the law of defamation in operation is not a | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Parker
green
1 sentence1978In Hernandez , at 259, we stated: “[A]s a generalization to the Miranda question . . . when the state has established that defendant has been told or has read all the rights and admonitions required in Miranda , and the defendant indicates he understands them and is willing to make a statement, a prima facie case (case is used in the limited sense of the issue at hand) has been established.” *81 While the state has the burden “to show beyond a reasonable doubt that statements or confessions are admissible, on review by this court the test is whether the findings by the trial court were contrar | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Scarbrough
green
1 sentence1978In Hernandez , at 259, we stated: “[A]s a generalization to the Miranda question . . . when the state has established that defendant has been told or has read all the rights and admonitions required in Miranda , and the defendant indicates he understands them and is willing to make a statement, a prima facie case (case is used in the limited sense of the issue at hand) has been established.” *81 While the state has the burden “to show beyond a reasonable doubt that statements or confessions are admissible, on review by this court the test is whether the findings by the trial court were contrar | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Dale v. Harris
green
1 sentence1910Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193 ; Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517, 524 , 34 N. E. 342 ; Dale v. Harris, 109 Mass. 193 ; 8 Ency. of Ev. 220. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Hemmens v. . Nelson
green
2 sentences1910Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193 ; Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517, 524 , 34 N. E. 342 ; Dale v. Harris, 109 Mass. 193 ; 8 Ency. of Ev. 220. 1910Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193 ; Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517, 524 , 34 N. E. 342 ; Dale v. Harris, 109 Mass. 193 ; 8 Ency. of Ev. 220. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Calkins v. Sumner
green
1 sentence1910Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193 ; Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517, 524 , 34 N. E. 342 ; Dale v. Harris, 109 Mass. 193 ; 8 Ency. of Ev. 220. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.