prima facie case requirement in California

2019In the category of cases involving jury selection before the high court clarified the prima facie case standard in Johnson v. California, this court has adopted a mode of analysis under which, rather than accord the usual deference to the trial court’s no-prima-facie case determination, we “review the record independently to determine whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on a prohibited discriminatory basis.” (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 779 ; accord, People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 999 (Reed); Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 582–583; Bel

2019In the category of cases involving jury selection before the high court clarified the prima facie case standard in Johnson v. California, this court has adopted a mode of analysis under which, rather than accord the usual deference to the trial court’s no-prima-facie case determination, we “review the record independently to determine whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on a prohibited discriminatory basis.” (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 779 ; accord, People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 999 (Reed); Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 582–583; Bel

2019In the category of cases involving jury selection before the high court clarified the prima facie case standard in Johnson v. California, this court has adopted a mode of analysis under which, rather than accord the usual deference to the trial court’s no-prima-facie case determination, we “review the record independently to determine whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on a prohibited discriminatory basis.” (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 779 ; accord, People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 999 (Reed); Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 582–583; Bel

2004Citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at pages 252-253, 101 S.Ct. 1089 , the Connecticut Supreme Court has said that under the first stage of the Batson inquiry, the "defendant must establish by a preponderance *12 of the evidence a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination." ( State v. Gonzalez (1988) 206 Conn. 391 , 538 A.2d 210, 213 .) The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized that Batson cited title VII cases "for an explanation of the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules." ( Stanley v. State (1988) 313 Md. 50 , 542 A.2d 1267, 1271 .) The Maryland

2004Citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at pages 252-253, 101 S.Ct. 1089 , the Connecticut Supreme Court has said that under the first stage of the Batson inquiry, the "defendant must establish by a preponderance *12 of the evidence a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination." ( State v. Gonzalez (1988) 206 Conn. 391 , 538 A.2d 210, 213 .) The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized that Batson cited title VII cases "for an explanation of the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules." ( Stanley v. State (1988) 313 Md. 50 , 542 A.2d 1267, 1271 .) The Maryland

2004In 1989 the Connecticut Supreme Court, under its authority to supervise the administration of justice, abolished the prima facie case requirement, and established a one-stage procedure. ( State v. Holloway (1989) 209 Conn. 636 , 553 A.2d 166, 171-172 .) Quoting a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court said: "`Rather than deciding on a case by case basis whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing based upon a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination under the vague guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the better course to foll

2004In 1989 the Connecticut Supreme Court, under its authority to supervise the administration of justice, abolished the prima facie case requirement, and established a one-stage procedure. ( State v. Holloway (1989) 209 Conn. 636 , 553 A.2d 166, 171-172 .) Quoting a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court said: "`Rather than deciding on a case by case basis whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing based upon a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination under the vague guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the better course to foll

2004In 1989 the Connecticut Supreme Court, under its authority to supervise the administration of justice, abolished the prima facie case requirement, and established a one-stage procedure. ( State v. Holloway (1989) 209 Conn. 636 , 553 A.2d 166, 171-172 .) Quoting a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court said: "`Rather than deciding on a case by case basis whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing based upon a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination under the vague guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the better course to foll

2004In 1989 the Connecticut Supreme Court, under its authority to supervise the administration of justice, abolished the prima facie case requirement, and established a one-stage procedure. ( State v. Holloway (1989) 209 Conn. 636 , 553 A.2d 166, 171-172 .) Quoting a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court said: "`Rather than deciding on a case by case basis whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing based upon a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination under the vague guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the better course to foll

2004Citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at pages 252-253, 101 S.Ct. 1089 , the Connecticut Supreme Court has said that under the first stage of the Batson inquiry, the "defendant must establish by a preponderance *12 of the evidence a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination." ( State v. Gonzalez (1988) 206 Conn. 391 , 538 A.2d 210, 213 .) The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized that Batson cited title VII cases "for an explanation of the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules." ( Stanley v. State (1988) 313 Md. 50 , 542 A.2d 1267, 1271 .) The Maryland

2004Citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at pages 252-253, 101 S.Ct. 1089 , the Connecticut Supreme Court has said that under the first stage of the Batson inquiry, the "defendant must establish by a preponderance *12 of the evidence a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination." ( State v. Gonzalez (1988) 206 Conn. 391 , 538 A.2d 210, 213 .) The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized that Batson cited title VII cases "for an explanation of the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules." ( Stanley v. State (1988) 313 Md. 50 , 542 A.2d 1267, 1271 .) The Maryland

2004The cases answer this question; it is those actions that, if unexplained, permit a reasonable inference of an improper purpose or motive. ( Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at p. 254 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 ; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 576 , 98 S.Ct. 2943 .) I focus on the italicized phrase, because it is here that the trial court went wrong in the case before us.

2004The cases answer this question; it is those actions that, if unexplained, permit a reasonable inference of an improper purpose or motive. ( Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at p. 254 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 ; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 576 , 98 S.Ct. 2943 .) I focus on the italicized phrase, because it is here that the trial court went wrong in the case before us.

2004(State v. Holloway (1989) 209 Conn. 636 [ 553 A.2d 166, 171-172 ].) Quoting a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court said: “ ‘Rather than deciding on a case by case basis whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing based upon a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination under the vague guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the better course to follow would be to hold a Batson hearing on the defendant’s request whenever the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group and the prosecutor exercises peremptory challenges to rem

2004In 1989 the Connecticut Supreme Court, under its authority to supervise the administration of justice, abolished the prima facie case requirement, and established a one-stage procedure. ( State v. Holloway (1989) 209 Conn. 636 , 553 A.2d 166, 171-172 .) Quoting a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court said: "`Rather than deciding on a case by case basis whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing based upon a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination under the vague guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the better course to foll

2004In 1989 the Connecticut Supreme Court, under its authority to supervise the administration of justice, abolished the prima facie case requirement, and established a one-stage procedure. ( State v. Holloway (1989) 209 Conn. 636 , 553 A.2d 166, 171-172 .) Quoting a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court said: "`Rather than deciding on a case by case basis whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing based upon a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination under the vague guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the better course to foll

2004In 1989 the Connecticut Supreme Court, under its authority to supervise the administration of justice, abolished the prima facie case requirement, and established a one-stage procedure. ( State v. Holloway (1989) 209 Conn. 636 , 553 A.2d 166, 171-172 .) Quoting a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court said: "`Rather than deciding on a case by case basis whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing based upon a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination under the vague guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the better course to foll

2004In 1989 the Connecticut Supreme Court, under its authority to supervise the administration of justice, abolished the prima facie case requirement, and established a one-stage procedure. ( State v. Holloway (1989) 209 Conn. 636 , 553 A.2d 166, 171-172 .) Quoting a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court said: "`Rather than deciding on a case by case basis whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing based upon a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination under the vague guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the better course to foll

2004In 1989 the Connecticut Supreme Court, under its authority to supervise the administration of justice, abolished the prima facie case requirement, and established a one-stage procedure. ( State v. Holloway (1989) 209 Conn. 636 , 553 A.2d 166, 171-172 .) Quoting a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court said: "`Rather than deciding on a case by case basis whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing based upon a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination under the vague guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the better course to foll

1994It is clear that in the circumstances of a particular case (cf. Harlan v. Sohio Petroleum Co. (N.D.Cal. 1988) 677 F.Supp. 1021, 1030 ) ‘the depressed condition of [the employer’s] . . . business and its business decision to reduce its staff with the result that [the employee’s] services [are] no longer needed” can be good cause for discharging the employee (Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 299, 321 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 820 ]; cf. Clutterham v. Coachmen Industries, Inc. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1227 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 795 ]), and can also support an inference of go

1976In addition to the racial and ethnic composition of a school’s student body, other factors, such as the racial and ethnic composition of faculty and staff[,] and the community and administration attitudes toward the school, must be taken into consideration.” ( Keyes, supra, 413 at p. 196 [ 37 L.Ed.2d at p. 556 ].) As the United States Supreme Court explained in Swann: “Independent of student assignment, where it is possible to identify a ‘white school’ or a ‘Negro school’ simply by reference to the racial composition of teachers and staff, the quality of school buildings and equipment, or the

1957(Bishop v. Reid, 120 Cal.App.2d 391 [ 261 P.2d 303 ].) Cases relied upon by plaintiff in support of her argument that defendant’s explanation of his conduct did not afford a sufficient excuse to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from a prima facie case of violation of a statute are clearly distinguishable upon the facts.

1957(Bishop v. Reid, 120 Cal.App.2d 391 [ 261 P.2d 303 ].) Cases relied upon by plaintiff in support of her argument that defendant’s explanation of his conduct did not afford a sufficient excuse to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from a prima facie case of violation of a statute are clearly distinguishable upon the facts.

1957People v. Lett, 77 Cal.App.2d 917 [ 177 P.2d 47 ], was a manslaughter case.

1957People v. Lett, 77 Cal.App.2d 917 [ 177 P.2d 47 ], was a manslaughter case.

1945(Thomson v. Bayless (1944), 24 Cal.2'd 543, 546 [ 150 P.2d 413 ].) If the truck was not disabled the question as to whether it was practicable to park it off the highway required “a consideration not only of the physical conditions immediately to the right but also of any other possible parking spaces to which the vehicle might reasonably be taken, no matter in what direction.” (Thomson v. Bayless, supra, p. 547 .) In that case it did not appear how far along the highway the curb extended, but it did appear that there was an intersection about 600 feet from the parked truck and a service stati

1945(Thomson v. Bayless (1944), 24 Cal.2'd 543, 546 [ 150 P.2d 413 ].) If the truck was not disabled the question as to whether it was practicable to park it off the highway required “a consideration not only of the physical conditions immediately to the right but also of any other possible parking spaces to which the vehicle might reasonably be taken, no matter in what direction.” (Thomson v. Bayless, supra, p. 547 .) In that case it did not appear how far along the highway the curb extended, but it did appear that there was an intersection about 600 feet from the parked truck and a service stati

1940(Herbert v. Southern Pacific, Co., 121 Cal. 227 [ 53 Pac. 651 ] ; Hoff v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., 158 Cal. 596 [ 112 Pac. 53 ].) ” Appellant states that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the case, and relies upon the rule laid down in Sistrunk v. Texas Holding Co., 88 Cal. App. 698 [ 264 Pac. 259 ]: ‘ ‘ The effect of the doctrine when applied to this case is that proof of the injuries to the plaintiff, provided such injuries are shown to have been caused through the explosion or ignition upon the defendant’s property of crude petroleum located thereon, which property and which petr

1940(Herbert v. Southern Pacific, Co., 121 Cal. 227 [ 53 Pac. 651 ] ; Hoff v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., 158 Cal. 596 [ 112 Pac. 53 ].) ” Appellant states that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the case, and relies upon the rule laid down in Sistrunk v. Texas Holding Co., 88 Cal. App. 698 [ 264 Pac. 259 ]: ‘ ‘ The effect of the doctrine when applied to this case is that proof of the injuries to the plaintiff, provided such injuries are shown to have been caused through the explosion or ignition upon the defendant’s property of crude petroleum located thereon, which property and which petr

1940(Herbert v. Southern Pacific, Co., 121 Cal. 227 [ 53 Pac. 651 ] ; Hoff v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., 158 Cal. 596 [ 112 Pac. 53 ].) ” Appellant states that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the case, and relies upon the rule laid down in Sistrunk v. Texas Holding Co., 88 Cal. App. 698 [ 264 Pac. 259 ]: ‘ ‘ The effect of the doctrine when applied to this case is that proof of the injuries to the plaintiff, provided such injuries are shown to have been caused through the explosion or ignition upon the defendant’s property of crude petroleum located thereon, which property and which petr

1940(Herbert v. Southern Pacific, Co., 121 Cal. 227 [ 53 Pac. 651 ] ; Hoff v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., 158 Cal. 596 [ 112 Pac. 53 ].) ” Appellant states that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the case, and relies upon the rule laid down in Sistrunk v. Texas Holding Co., 88 Cal. App. 698 [ 264 Pac. 259 ]: ‘ ‘ The effect of the doctrine when applied to this case is that proof of the injuries to the plaintiff, provided such injuries are shown to have been caused through the explosion or ignition upon the defendant’s property of crude petroleum located thereon, which property and which petr

1940(Herbert v. Southern Pacific, Co., 121 Cal. 227 [ 53 Pac. 651 ] ; Hoff v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., 158 Cal. 596 [ 112 Pac. 53 ].) ” Appellant states that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the case, and relies upon the rule laid down in Sistrunk v. Texas Holding Co., 88 Cal. App. 698 [ 264 Pac. 259 ]: ‘ ‘ The effect of the doctrine when applied to this case is that proof of the injuries to the plaintiff, provided such injuries are shown to have been caused through the explosion or ignition upon the defendant’s property of crude petroleum located thereon, which property and which petr

1940(Herbert v. Southern Pacific, Co., 121 Cal. 227 [ 53 Pac. 651 ] ; Hoff v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., 158 Cal. 596 [ 112 Pac. 53 ].) ” Appellant states that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the case, and relies upon the rule laid down in Sistrunk v. Texas Holding Co., 88 Cal. App. 698 [ 264 Pac. 259 ]: ‘ ‘ The effect of the doctrine when applied to this case is that proof of the injuries to the plaintiff, provided such injuries are shown to have been caused through the explosion or ignition upon the defendant’s property of crude petroleum located thereon, which property and which petr