negligent entrustment claim in Arizona

2016Appellees also argue Appellants’ complaint failed to state a claim because, as a matter of public policy, Arizona should exempt valet parking services from claims of negligent entrustment. 4 A. Appellants Adequately Pled Facts That Appellees Knew Or Should Have Known Morken Was Incompetent To Drive. ¶ 9 To satisfy the “incompetent to drive” element of a negligent entrustment claim, Appellants were required to adequately plead facts that Appellees “knew or should have known that the driver, by virtue of his physical or mental condition, was incompetent to drive safely.” Acuna, 212 Ariz. at 109

2016See, e.g., Powell v. Langford, 58 Ariz. 281 , 119 P.2d 230 (1941); Lutfy v. Lockhart, 37 Ariz. 488 , 295 P. 975 (1931); Acuna v. Kroack, 212 Ariz. 104 , 128 P.3d 221 (App. 2006).

2006We review that ruling de novo. 8 See Crackel, 208 Ariz. 252, ¶20 , 92 P.3d at 890 ; Monaco v. HealthPartners of S. Ariz., 196 Ariz. 299, ¶ 6 , 995 P.2d 735, 738 (App. 1999). ¶24 A trial court should grant a motion for JMOL “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little *111 probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990).

2006We review that ruling de novo. 8 See Crackel, 208 Ariz. 252, ¶20 , 92 P.3d at 890 ; Monaco v. HealthPartners of S. Ariz., 196 Ariz. 299, ¶ 6 , 995 P.2d 735, 738 (App. 1999). ¶24 A trial court should grant a motion for JMOL “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little *111 probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990).

2006See Mitchell v. Gamble, 207 Ariz. 364, ¶ 16 , 86 P.3d 944, 949-50 (App.2004) (party generally may not raise new issues or theories on appeal in attempt to secure reversal); Webber v. Grindle Audio Prods., Inc., 204 Ariz. 84, ¶ 26 , 60 P.3d 224, 230 (App.2002) (“an appeal is not the appropriate place to consider issues or theories not presented below” in summary judgment proceedings); cf. Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 190 Ariz. 6, 27-28 , 945 P.2d 317, 338-39 (App.1996) (although party neglected to include issue in motion for directed verdict, issue was not waived because it did n

2006See Mitchell v. Gamble, 207 Ariz. 364, ¶ 16 , 86 P.3d 944, 949-50 (App.2004) (party generally may not raise new issues or theories on appeal in attempt to secure reversal); Webber v. Grindle Audio Prods., Inc., 204 Ariz. 84, ¶ 26 , 60 P.3d 224, 230 (App.2002) (“an appeal is not the appropriate place to consider issues or theories not presented below” in summary judgment proceedings); cf. Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 190 Ariz. 6, 27-28 , 945 P.2d 317, 338-39 (App.1996) (although party neglected to include issue in motion for directed verdict, issue was not waived because it did n

2006See Mitchell v. Gamble, 207 Ariz. 364, ¶ 16 , 86 P.3d 944, 949-50 (App.2004) (party generally may not raise new issues or theories on appeal in attempt to secure reversal); Webber v. Grindle Audio Prods., Inc., 204 Ariz. 84, ¶ 26 , 60 P.3d 224, 230 (App.2002) (“an appeal is not the appropriate place to consider issues or theories not presented below” in summary judgment proceedings); cf. Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 190 Ariz. 6, 27-28 , 945 P.2d 317, 338-39 (App.1996) (although party neglected to include issue in motion for directed verdict, issue was not waived because it did n

2006See Mitchell v. Gamble, 207 Ariz. 364, ¶ 16 , 86 P.3d 944, 949-50 (App.2004) (party generally may not raise new issues or theories on appeal in attempt to secure reversal); Webber v. Grindle Audio Prods., Inc., 204 Ariz. 84, ¶ 26 , 60 P.3d 224, 230 (App.2002) (“an appeal is not the appropriate place to consider issues or theories not presented below” in summary judgment proceedings); cf. Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 190 Ariz. 6, 27-28 , 945 P.2d 317, 338-39 (App.1996) (although party neglected to include issue in motion for directed verdict, issue was not waived because it did n

2006See Mitchell v. Gamble, 207 Ariz. 364, ¶ 16 , 86 P.3d 944, 949-50 (App.2004) (party generally may not raise new issues or theories on appeal in attempt to secure reversal); Webber v. Grindle Audio Prods., Inc., 204 Ariz. 84, ¶ 26 , 60 P.3d 224, 230 (App.2002) (“an appeal is not the appropriate place to consider issues or theories not presented below” in summary judgment proceedings); cf. Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 190 Ariz. 6, 27-28 , 945 P.2d 317, 338-39 (App.1996) (although party neglected to include issue in motion for directed verdict, issue was not waived because it did n

2006See Mitchell v. Gamble, 207 Ariz. 364, ¶ 16 , 86 P.3d 944, 949-50 (App.2004) (party generally may not raise new issues or theories on appeal in attempt to secure reversal); Webber v. Grindle Audio Prods., Inc., 204 Ariz. 84, ¶ 26 , 60 P.3d 224, 230 (App.2002) (“an appeal is not the appropriate place to consider issues or theories not presented below” in summary judgment proceedings); cf. Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 190 Ariz. 6, 27-28 , 945 P.2d 317, 338-39 (App.1996) (although party neglected to include issue in motion for directed verdict, issue was not waived because it did n

2006We review that ruling de novo. 8 See Crackel, 208 Ariz. 252, ¶20 , 92 P.3d at 890 ; Monaco v. HealthPartners of S. Ariz., 196 Ariz. 299, ¶ 6 , 995 P.2d 735, 738 (App. 1999). ¶24 A trial court should grant a motion for JMOL “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little *111 probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990).

2006We review that ruling de novo. 8 See Crackel, 208 Ariz. 252, ¶20 , 92 P.3d at 890 ; Monaco v. HealthPartners of S. Ariz., 196 Ariz. 299, ¶ 6 , 995 P.2d 735, 738 (App. 1999). ¶24 A trial court should grant a motion for JMOL “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little *111 probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990).

2005See, e.g., Mills v. Crone, 63 Ark.App. 45 , 973 S.W.2d 828, 831 (1998) (“According to the Restatement, one is not liable for negligent entrustment of a thing if he has no right to control its use.”); Zedella v. Gibson, 165 Ill.2d 181 , 209 Ill.Dec. 27 , 650 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (1995) (defining entrustment under the restatement “with reference to the right of control of the subject property”); Green v. Harris, 70 P.3d 866, 871 (Okla.2003) (acknowledging that, although negligent entrustment usually involves ownership, possession and control is actual requirement). ¶ 11 We conclude that a genuine i

2005See, e.g., Mills v. Crone, 63 Ark.App. 45 , 973 S.W.2d 828, 831 (1998) (“According to the Restatement, one is not liable for negligent entrustment of a thing if he has no right to control its use.”); Zedella v. Gibson, 165 Ill.2d 181 , 209 Ill.Dec. 27 , 650 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (1995) (defining entrustment under the restatement “with reference to the right of control of the subject property”); Green v. Harris, 70 P.3d 866, 871 (Okla.2003) (acknowledging that, although negligent entrustment usually involves ownership, possession and control is actual requirement). ¶ 11 We conclude that a genuine i

2024Id. at 198; 1 see also Pruitt, 141 Ariz. at 202 (App. 1984) (holding that a realty company, aware of an employee’s past forgery, was liable for negligent hiring where it hired and actively helped that employee obtain a real estate license, which she then used to defraud a seller outside the scope of her employment). ¶21 In line with this reasoning, this Court has recognized that an employer can be liable for its own conduct justifying punitive damages when its employee’s conduct warranted punitive damages in the underlying claim.

2006We 7 See also Tellez v. Saban, 188 Ariz. 165, 171 , 933 P.2d 1233, 1239 (App. 1996) (tort of negligent entrustment not restricted “to cases in which the owner entrusts a vehicle to one known to be incompetent or inexperienced,” but also applies when “‘the peculiar circumstances of the case are such as to give the actor good reason to believe that the third person may misuse [the instrumentality]’”), quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308, cmt. b (1965); cf. Martin v. Schroeder, 209 Ariz. 531, n.1 , 105 P.3d 577 , 579 n.1 (App. 2005) (recognizing that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1

2006We 7 See also Tellez v. Saban, 188 Ariz. 165, 171 , 933 P.2d 1233, 1239 (App. 1996) (tort of negligent entrustment not restricted “to cases in which the owner entrusts a vehicle to one known to be incompetent or inexperienced,” but also applies when “‘the peculiar circumstances of the case are such as to give the actor good reason to believe that the third person may misuse [the instrumentality]’”), quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308, cmt. b (1965); cf. Martin v. Schroeder, 209 Ariz. 531, n.1 , 105 P.3d 577 , 579 n.1 (App. 2005) (recognizing that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1

2006We 7 See also Tellez v. Saban, 188 Ariz. 165, 171 , 933 P.2d 1233, 1239 (App. 1996) (tort of negligent entrustment not restricted “to cases in which the owner entrusts a vehicle to one known to be incompetent or inexperienced,” but also applies when “‘the peculiar circumstances of the case are such as to give the actor good reason to believe that the third person may misuse [the instrumentality]’”), quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308, cmt. b (1965); cf. Martin v. Schroeder, 209 Ariz. 531, n.1 , 105 P.3d 577 , 579 n.1 (App. 2005) (recognizing that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1

2006We 7 See also Tellez v. Saban, 188 Ariz. 165, 171 , 933 P.2d 1233, 1239 (App. 1996) (tort of negligent entrustment not restricted “to cases in which the owner entrusts a vehicle to one known to be incompetent or inexperienced,” but also applies when “‘the peculiar circumstances of the case are such as to give the actor good reason to believe that the third person may misuse [the instrumentality]’”), quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308, cmt. b (1965); cf. Martin v. Schroeder, 209 Ariz. 531, n.1 , 105 P.3d 577 , 579 n.1 (App. 2005) (recognizing that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1

2005See, e.g., Mills v. Crone, 63 Ark.App. 45 , 973 S.W.2d 828, 831 (1998) (“According to the Restatement, one is not liable for negligent entrustment of a thing if he has no right to control its use.”); Zedella v. Gibson, 165 Ill.2d 181 , 209 Ill.Dec. 27 , 650 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (1995) (defining entrustment under the restatement “with reference to the right of control of the subject property”); Green v. Harris, 70 P.3d 866, 871 (Okla.2003) (acknowledging that, although negligent entrustment usually involves ownership, possession and control is actual requirement). ¶ 11 We conclude that a genuine i

2005See, e.g., Mills v. Crone, 63 Ark.App. 45 , 973 S.W.2d 828, 831 (1998) (“According to the Restatement, one is not liable for negligent entrustment of a thing if he has no right to control its use.”); Zedella v. Gibson, 165 Ill.2d 181 , 209 Ill.Dec. 27 , 650 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (1995) (defining entrustment under the restatement “with reference to the right of control of the subject property”); Green v. Harris, 70 P.3d 866, 871 (Okla.2003) (acknowledging that, although negligent entrustment usually involves ownership, possession and control is actual requirement). ¶ 11 We conclude that a genuine i

2005See, e.g., Mills v. Crone, 63 Ark.App. 45 , 973 S.W.2d 828, 831 (1998) (“According to the Restatement, one is not liable for negligent entrustment of a thing if he has no right to control its use.”); Zedella v. Gibson, 165 Ill.2d 181 , 209 Ill.Dec. 27 , 650 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (1995) (defining entrustment under the restatement “with reference to the right of control of the subject property”); Green v. Harris, 70 P.3d 866, 871 (Okla.2003) (acknowledging that, although negligent entrustment usually involves ownership, possession and control is actual requirement). ¶ 11 We conclude that a genuine i

1996“For a court to grant declaratory judgment, the party seeking relief must assert ‘a legal relationship, status or right’ in which the party has a definite interest and ‘the denial of it by the other party.’ ” Original Apartment Movers, Inc. v. Waddell, 179 Ariz. 419, 420 , 880 P.2d 639, 640 (App.1993) (quoting Morris v. Fleming, 128 Ariz. 271, 273 , 625 P.2d 334, 336 (App.1980)).

1996“For a court to grant declaratory judgment, the party seeking relief must assert ‘a legal relationship, status or right’ in which the party has a definite interest and ‘the denial of it by the other party.’ ” Original Apartment Movers, Inc. v. Waddell, 179 Ariz. 419, 420 , 880 P.2d 639, 640 (App.1993) (quoting Morris v. Fleming, 128 Ariz. 271, 273 , 625 P.2d 334, 336 (App.1980)).

1996In Day , the Alabama Supreme Court summarized its holding in New as that "the lack of a driver's license, when combined with other evidence of a driver's lack of skill, is probative evidence of incompetence in a negligent entrustment claim." Day, 670 So.2d at 916 (emphasis added).

1996In Day , the Alabama Supreme Court summarized its holding in New as that “the lack of a driver’s license, when combined with other evidence of a driver’s lack of skill, is probative evidence of incompetence in a negligent entrustment claim.” Day, 670 So.2d at 916 (emphasis added).

1996“For a court to grant declaratory judgment, the party seeking relief must assert ‘a legal relationship, status or right’ in which the party has a definite interest and ‘the denial of it by the other party.’ ” Original Apartment Movers, Inc. v. Waddell, 179 Ariz. 419, 420 , 880 P.2d 639, 640 (App.1993) (quoting Morris v. Fleming, 128 Ariz. 271, 273 , 625 P.2d 334, 336 (App.1980)).

1996“For a court to grant declaratory judgment, the party seeking relief must assert ‘a legal relationship, status or right’ in which the party has a definite interest and ‘the denial of it by the other party.’ ” Original Apartment Movers, Inc. v. Waddell, 179 Ariz. 419, 420 , 880 P.2d 639, 640 (App.1993) (quoting Morris v. Fleming, 128 Ariz. 271, 273 , 625 P.2d 334, 336 (App.1980)).