negligent entrustment claim in Texas

2022Negligent Entrustment and Negligent Hiring, Training, or Supervising Because of the similarity in the elements of the two claims, we consider the negligent entrustment and negligent hiring, training, or supervising claims in tandem. 5 In a negligent entrustment claim, the evidence must show “(1) entrustment of a vehicle by the owner; (2) to an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver; (3) that the owner knew or should have known to be unlicensed [or incompetent or reckless], (4) that the driver was negligent on the occasion in question and (5) that the driver's negligence proximately caused

2019Negligent Entrustment The elements of a negligent entrustment claim are “(1) entrustment of a vehicle by the owner; (2) to an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver; (3) that the owner knew or should have known to be unlicensed, [incompetent, or reckless;] (4) that the driver was negligent on the occasion in question; and (5) that the driver’s negligence proximately caused the accident.” Schneider v. Esperanza Transmission Co., 744 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex. 1987).

2021In Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 758 (Tex. 2007), the Texas Supreme Court rendered a take-nothing summary judgment on an injured motorist’s negligent entrustment claim.

2011Negligent Entrustment Though we have not specifically recognized a cause of action for negligent entrustment of a firearm, even if we were to apply the negligent entrustment factors articulated in Prather and Mayes, we cannot say that appellants’ summary judgment evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact so as to preclude summary judgment. 5 See Prather, 981 S.W.2d at 806 ; see also Mayes, 236 S.W.3d at 758 .

2023And we have explained that a negligent-entrustment claim requires separate negligent acts by two parties: the owner’s negligence in entrusting property to another, and the entrustee’s negligence in using that property. 4Front Engineered Sols., Inc. v. Rosales, 505 S.W.3d 905, 909 (Tex. 2016).

2019And we have explained that a negligent-entrustment claim requires separate negligent acts by two parties: the owner’s negligence in entrusting property to another, and the entrustee’s negligence in using that property. 4Front Engineered Sols., Inc. v. Rosales, 505 S.W.3d 905, 909 (Tex. 2016).

2008The majority equates its conclusion that Robson failed to make a reasonable inquiry prior to filing the negligent entrustment claim with an implied finding of bad faith, citing to Monroe v. Grider , 884 S.W.2d 811, 819 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, writ denied).

2008The majority equates its conclusion that Robson failed to make a reasonable inquiry prior to filing the negligent entrustment claim with an implied finding of bad faith, citing to Monroe v. Grider, 884 S.W.2d 811, 819 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).

2005See Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex.1985); Rosell, 89 S.W.3d at 655 .

2005See Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex.1985); Rosell, 89 S.W.3d at 655 .

2008Although there are circumstances when a trial court may sanction by taking judicial notice of items in the trial court's file at the hearing, see Gibson v. Ellis, 126 S.W.3d 324, 336 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.) (at trial on counterclaim for sanctions, trial court took judicial notice of evidence presented at jury trial; sanctions award affirmed); Texas-Ohio Gas Inc. v. Mecom, 28 S.W.3d 129, 139 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (trial court had no evidence to determine bad faith or to harass when there was no evidentiary hearing and the trial court did not take judicial notice of any item

2008The circumstances surrounding Robson's filing as revealed in the record would allow the trial court, in its discretion, to conclude that the filing was made in bad faith. [1] Because of the complete lack of evidence that Robson filed the negligent entrustment claim in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment that should have been fatal to the motion for sanctions, I have not addressed the circumstances of the automobile accident that was the basis for the plaintiffs' suit, the chronology of events in discovery between the parties, or evidence of a medical impairment that was disclosed during

2008Although there are circumstances when a trial court may sanction by taking judicial notice of items in the trial court's file at the hearing, see Gibson v. Ellis, 126 S.W.3d 324, 336 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.) (at trial on counterclaim for sanctions, trial court took judicial notice of evidence presented at jury trial; sanctions award affirmed); Texas-Ohio Gas Inc. v. Mecom, 28 S.W.3d 129, 139 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (trial court had no evidence to determine bad faith or to harass when there was no evidentiary hearing and the trial court did not take judicial notice of any item

2008The circumstances surrounding Robson's filing as revealed in the record would allow the trial court, in its discretion, to conclude that the filing was made in bad faith. [1] Because of the complete lack of evidence that Robson filed the negligent entrustment claim in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment that should have been fatal to the motion for sanctions, I have not addressed the circumstances of the automobile accident that was the basis for the plaintiffs' suit, the chronology of events in discovery between the parties, or evidence of a medical impairment that was disclosed during

2022Co. v. Hughes, 224 S.W.3d 870, 917 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007) rev’d on other grounds, 306 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2010).

2012Co. v. Hughes , 306 S.W.3d 230, 241 (Tex. 2010) (noting that a claim for negligent entrustment cannot lie if a “defendant’s negligence did no more than furnish a condition which made the injury possible”) (quoting Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc. , 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995)).

2024Id. at 298.

2016See id.

2016For example, an owner’s proximate causation might be shown through foreseeability evidence of warning signs that should alert a reasonably prudent owner of the need to investigate the driver’s competency, see Nobbie v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 763 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied), or evidence that the owner failed to fulfill a special duty to investigate an entrustee’s background even without any warning signs. - See generally Morris v. JTM Materials, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 28 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (considering a negligent entrustment claim in light of the spe

2001See Nobbie v. Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc., 763 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied).

2012Co. v. Hughes , 306 S.W.3d 230, 241 (Tex. 2010) (noting that a claim for negligent entrustment cannot lie if a “defendant’s negligence did no more than furnish a condition which made the injury possible”) (quoting Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc. , 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995)).

2012Co. v. Hughes, 7 306 S.W.3d 230, 241 (Tex. 2010) (noting that a claim for negligent entrustment cannot lie if a ―defendant’s negligence did no more than furnish a condition which made the injury possible‖) (quoting Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995)).

2012See Newkumet v. Allen, 230 S.W.3d 518, 522 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (upholding summary judgment on a negligent entrustment claim when plaintiff produced no evidence indicating that defendants knew or should have known of the incompetence or recklessness of the driver entrusted with their vehicle); Roach v. Dental Arts Lab., Inc., 79 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 2002, pet. denied) (rendering judgment in favor of the defendant because the defendant’s knowledge that the driver of the entrusted vehicle was addicted to cocaine ―[did] not translate into the more specialized knowled

2012See Newkumet v. Allen , 230 S.W.3d 518, 522 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (upholding summary judgment on a negligent entrustment claim when plaintiff produced no evidence indicating that defendants knew or should have known of the incompetence or recklessness of the driver entrusted with their vehicle); Roach v. Dental Arts Lab., Inc ., 79 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied) (rendering judgment in favor of the defendant because the defendant’s knowledge that the driver of the entrusted vehicle was addicted to cocaine “[did] not translate into the more specialized knowle

2012See Newkumet v. Allen, 230 S.W.3d 518, 522 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (upholding summary judgment on a negligent entrustment claim when plaintiff produced no evidence indicating that defendants knew or should have known of the incompetence or recklessness of the driver entrusted with their vehicle); Roach v. Dental Arts Lab., Inc., 79 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 2002, pet. denied) (rendering judgment in favor of the defendant because the defendant’s knowledge that the driver of the entrusted vehicle was addicted to cocaine ―[did] not translate into the more specialized knowled

2012See Newkumet v. Allen , 230 S.W.3d 518, 522 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (upholding summary judgment on a negligent entrustment claim when plaintiff produced no evidence indicating that defendants knew or should have known of the incompetence or recklessness of the driver entrusted with their vehicle); Roach v. Dental Arts Lab., Inc ., 79 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied) (rendering judgment in favor of the defendant because the defendant’s knowledge that the driver of the entrusted vehicle was addicted to cocaine “[did] not translate into the more specialized knowle

2006See Stewart v. Sanmina Tex., L.P., 156 S.W.3d 198, 214 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) ("If any legitimate basis exists to support a trial court's evidentiary ruling, then we must uphold the court's decision."); see also Ortega v. LPP Mortg., Ltd., 160 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied) (same).

2006See Stewart v. Sanmina Tex., L.P. , 156 S.W.3d 198, 214 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2005, no pet.) ( A If any legitimate basis exists to support a trial court = s evidentiary ruling, then we must uphold the court = s decision. @ ); see also Ortega v. LPP Mortg., Ltd. , 160 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex. App. C Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied) (same).

2006See Stewart v. Sanmina Tex., L.P., 156 S.W.3d 198, 214 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) ("If any legitimate basis exists to support a trial court's evidentiary ruling, then we must uphold the court's decision."); see also Ortega v. LPP Mortg., Ltd., 160 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied) (same).

2006See Stewart v. Sanmina Tex., L.P. , 156 S.W.3d 198, 214 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2005, no pet.) ( A If any legitimate basis exists to support a trial court = s evidentiary ruling, then we must uphold the court = s decision. @ ); see also Ortega v. LPP Mortg., Ltd. , 160 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex. App. C Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied) (same).

1958Appellants do not contend here that the failure of appellee Carswell to have a chauffeur’s license was a proximate cause of the collision or that the doctrine of negligent entrustment, exemplified in Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co., 146 Tex. 314 , 206 S.W.2d 587 , is applicable here.

1958Appellants do not contend here that the failure of appellee Carswell to have a chauffeur’s license was a proximate cause of the collision or that the doctrine of negligent entrustment, exemplified in Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co., 146 Tex. 314 , 206 S.W.2d 587 , is applicable here.

2011Negligent Entrustment Though we have not specifically recognized a cause of action for negligent entrustment of a firearm, even if we were to apply the negligent entrustment factors articulated in Prather and Mayes , we cannot say that appellants’ summary judgment evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact so as to preclude summary judgment. [5] See Prather , 981 S.W.2d at 806 ; see also Mayes , 236 S.W.3d at 758 .

2011Negligent Entrustment Though we have not specifically recognized a cause of action for negligent entrustment of a firearm, even if we were to apply the negligent entrustment factors articulated in Prather and Mayes, we cannot say that appellants’ summary judgment evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact so as to preclude summary judgment. 5 See Prather, 981 S.W.2d at 806 ; see also Mayes, 236 S.W.3d at 758 .

2005See Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex.1985); Rosell, 89 S.W.3d at 655 .

2005See Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex.1985); Rosell, 89 S.W.3d at 655 .

2026Id. at 580 .

2018See Shupe, 192 S.W.3d at 580 .

2022Co. v. Hughes, 224 S.W.3d 870, 917 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007) rev’d on other grounds, 306 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2010).

2021See Prescott, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33 (noting that “[b]ecause the PLCAA does not ‘create a public or private cause of action or remedy,’ courts look to state law” in determining whether the negligent-entrustment exception applies (internal citation omitted)); Phillips v. Lucky Gunner, LLC, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1225 (D.

2021GOV’T CODE § 311.011(b); see Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 326 (Tex. 2017) (relying on statutory definition for terms with express definitions and relying on “ordinary meaning” for undefined terms where phrase at issue included defined and undefined terms); Transp.

2021July 18, 2016) (denying PLCAA dismissal motion and permitting plaintiff to amend complaint to include allegations matching PLCAA’s definition, noting that defendants “focus only on the language of the negligent entrustment exception to the PLCAA and do not address plaintiff’s argument that she has otherwise stated a claim for negligent entrustment under Kansas and Missouri law”); Delana v. CED Sales, 486 S.W.3d 316, 324, 326 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (holding that the PLCAA does not bar a state-law claim, “even if it is not denominated as a ‘negligent entrustment’ claim under state law, if it falls

2021July 18, 2016) (denying PLCAA dismissal motion and permitting plaintiff to amend complaint to include allegations matching PLCAA’s definition, noting that defendants “focus only on the language of the negligent entrustment exception to the PLCAA and do not address plaintiff’s argument that she has otherwise stated a claim for negligent entrustment under Kansas and Missouri law”); Delana v. CED Sales, 486 S.W.3d 316, 324, 326 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (holding that the PLCAA does not bar a state-law claim, “even if it is not denominated as a ‘negligent entrustment’ claim under state law, if it falls

2021July 18, 2016) (denying PLCAA dismissal motion and permitting plaintiff to amend complaint to include allegations matching PLCAA’s definition, noting that defendants “focus only on the language of the negligent entrustment exception to the PLCAA and do not address plaintiff’s argument that she has otherwise stated a claim for negligent entrustment under Kansas and Missouri law”); Delana v. CED Sales, 486 S.W.3d 316, 324, 326 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (holding that the PLCAA does not bar a state-law claim, “even if it is not denominated as a ‘negligent entrustment’ claim under state law, if it falls

2021July 18, 2016) (denying PLCAA dismissal motion and permitting plaintiff to amend complaint to include allegations matching PLCAA’s definition, noting that defendants “focus only on the language of the negligent entrustment exception to the PLCAA and do not address plaintiff’s argument that she has otherwise stated a claim for negligent entrustment under Kansas and Missouri law”); Delana v. CED Sales, 486 S.W.3d 316, 324, 326 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (holding that the PLCAA does not bar a state-law claim, “even if it is not denominated as a ‘negligent entrustment’ claim under state law, if it falls

2021Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 758 (Tex. 2007); Ramirez v. Colonial Freight Warehouse Co., Inc., 434 S.W.3d 244, 253-54 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

2021See Prescott, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1133 (applying Nevada law on negligent entrustment to determine whether the PLCAA’s negligent-entrustment exception applied); Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, 202 A.3d 262, 278, 283 (Conn. 2019) (holding that the plaintiffs had failed to plead a legally sufficient cause of action for negligent entrustment under Connecticut law and that the plaintiffs’ action thus could not proceed under the PLCAA’s negligent-entrustment exception). 14 Absent an applicable exception, the plaintiffs’ suits are qualified civil liability actions that “may not be brought.” 15 U.S.

2021See Prescott, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1133 (applying Nevada law on negligent entrustment to determine whether the PLCAA’s negligent-entrustment exception applied); Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, 202 A.3d 262, 278, 283 (Conn. 2019) (holding that the plaintiffs had failed to plead a legally sufficient cause of action for negligent entrustment under Connecticut law and that the plaintiffs’ action thus could not proceed under the PLCAA’s negligent-entrustment exception). 14 Absent an applicable exception, the plaintiffs’ suits are qualified civil liability actions that “may not be brought.” 15 U.S.

2019Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Tex. 2004). 6 Villegas maintains that he did not pursue the negligent entrustment claim.

2016For example, an owner’s proximate causation might be shown through foreseeability evidence of warning signs that should alert a reasonably prudent owner of the need to investigate the driver’s competency, see Nobbie v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 763 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied), or evidence that the owner failed to fulfill a special duty to investigate an entrustee’s background even without any warning signs. - See generally Morris v. JTM Materials, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 28 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (considering a negligent entrustment claim in light of the spe