negligent entrustment doctrine in Maryland

1997In Rounds v. Phillips (Rounds I), 166 Md. 151 , 170 A. 532 (1934), the first case in this State recognizing the doctrine of negligent entrustment, this Court quoted with approval § 260 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, the precursor of § 390 in the Second Restatement.

1997In Rounds v. Phillips (Rounds I), 166 Md. 151 , 170 A. 532 (1934), the first case in this State recognizing the doctrine of negligent entrustment, this Court quoted with approval § 260 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, the precursor of § 390 in the Second Restatement.

1973He admitted that he did not own an automobile of his own." In its opinion reversing the judgments entered against General Valet, the Court of Special Appeals properly held that the doctrine of negligent entrustment, as recognized and applied in this State in Rounds v. Phillips, 166 Md. 151 , 170 A. 532 (1933), Rounds v. Phillips, 168 Md. 120 , 177 A. 174 (1935), Snowhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291 , 221 A.2d 342 (1966), and State, Use of Weaver v. O'Brien, 140 F. Supp. 306 (D.Md. 1956), is based on the adoption of what is now 2 Restatement, Second, Torts, § 390, which reads as follo

1973He admitted that he did not own an automobile of his own." In its opinion reversing the judgments entered against General Valet, the Court of Special Appeals properly held that the doctrine of negligent entrustment, as recognized and applied in this State in Rounds v. Phillips, 166 Md. 151 , 170 A. 532 (1933), Rounds v. Phillips, 168 Md. 120 , 177 A. 174 (1935), Snowhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291 , 221 A.2d 342 (1966), and State, Use of Weaver v. O'Brien, 140 F. Supp. 306 (D.Md. 1956), is based on the adoption of what is now 2 Restatement, Second, Torts, § 390, which reads as follo

1997Respondents rely on Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, 290 Md. 477 , 431 A.2d 76 (1981), for the proposition that control at the time of the accident is not a prerequisite for liability under the doctrine of negligent entrustment.

1997Respondents rely on Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, 290 Md. 477 , 431 A.2d 76 (1981), for the proposition that control at the time of the accident is not a prerequisite for liability under the doctrine of negligent entrustment.

1977Maryland has adopted the doctrine of negligent entrustment as stated in 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 at 314 (1965): “One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.” (emphasis supplied) In short, the doctrine requires scie

1977Maryland has adopted the doctrine of negligent entrustment as stated in 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 at 314 (1965): “One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.” (emphasis supplied) In short, the doctrine requires scie

2013Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965); see Broadwater v. Dorsey, 344 Md. 548, 554 , 688 A.2d 436, 439 (1997) (and cases cited therein). .

2013Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965); see Broadwater v. Dorsey, 344 Md. 548, 554 , 688 A.2d 436, 439 (1997) (and cases cited therein). .

1997Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965); see, e.g., Neale v. Wright, 322 Md. 8, 13-14 , 585 A.2d 196, 198-99 (1991); Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, 290 Md. 477, 488-89 , 431 A.2d 76, 83 (1981); Morrell v. Williams, 279 Md. 497, 503 , 366 A.2d 1040, 1043 (1976); Curley v. General Valet Service, 270 Md. 248, 255 , 311 A.2d 231, 235 (1973); Snowhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 311 , 221 A.2d 342, 353-54 (1966); Rounds v. Phillips (Rounds I), 166 Md. 151, 160-61 , 170 A. 532, 535 (1934).

1997Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965); see, e.g., Neale v. Wright, 322 Md. 8, 13-14 , 585 A.2d 196, 198-99 (1991); Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, 290 Md. 477, 488-89 , 431 A.2d 76, 83 (1981); Morrell v. Williams, 279 Md. 497, 503 , 366 A.2d 1040, 1043 (1976); Curley v. General Valet Service, 270 Md. 248, 255 , 311 A.2d 231, 235 (1973); Snowhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 311 , 221 A.2d 342, 353-54 (1966); Rounds v. Phillips (Rounds I), 166 Md. 151, 160-61 , 170 A. 532, 535 (1934).

1997Recognizing that the “position of the majority is one that is logically supportable under an expansive (virtually all inclusive) interpretation of the applicability of the tort,” the dissent suggested that the better position for this Court to adopt would be a more limited application of the doctrine which would, “in a sales context, require the transferor to retain the legal right to control the instrumentality or have a legal responsibility to control the buyer.” Id. at 75 , 666 A.2d at 1291 (Cathell, J., dissenting).

1997Recognizing that the “position of the majority is one that is logically supportable under an expansive (virtually all inclusive) interpretation of the applicability of the tort,” the dissent suggested that the better position for this Court to adopt would be a more limited application of the doctrine which would, “in a sales context, require the transferor to retain the legal right to control the instrumentality or have a legal responsibility to control the buyer.” Id. at 75 , 666 A.2d at 1291 (Cathell, J., dissenting).

1997Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965); see, e.g., Neale v. Wright, 322 Md. 8, 13-14 , 585 A.2d 196, 198-99 (1991); Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, 290 Md. 477, 488-89 , 431 A.2d 76, 83 (1981); Morrell v. Williams, 279 Md. 497, 503 , 366 A.2d 1040, 1043 (1976); Curley v. General Valet Service, 270 Md. 248, 255 , 311 A.2d 231, 235 (1973); Snowhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 311 , 221 A.2d 342, 353-54 (1966); Rounds v. Phillips (Rounds I), 166 Md. 151, 160-61 , 170 A. 532, 535 (1934).

1997Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965); see, e.g., Neale v. Wright, 322 Md. 8, 13-14 , 585 A.2d 196, 198-99 (1991); Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, 290 Md. 477, 488-89 , 431 A.2d 76, 83 (1981); Morrell v. Williams, 279 Md. 497, 503 , 366 A.2d 1040, 1043 (1976); Curley v. General Valet Service, 270 Md. 248, 255 , 311 A.2d 231, 235 (1973); Snowhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 311 , 221 A.2d 342, 353-54 (1966); Rounds v. Phillips (Rounds I), 166 Md. 151, 160-61 , 170 A. 532, 535 (1934).