negligent entrustment claim in Georgia

2016“In a negligent entrustment claim, liability arises from the negligent act of the owner in lending his automobile to another to drive, with actual knowledge that the driver is incompetent or habitually reckless.” Bashlor v. Walker, 303 Ga. App. 478, 480 (1) (a) ( 693 SE2d 858 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted); see also Gunn v. Booker, 259 Ga. 343, 347 (3) ( 381 SE2d 286 ) (1989). “[A] plaintiff in a negligent entrustment action is not limited to showing actual knowledge of the entruster inasmuch as that plaintiff may *868 show actual knowledge of a pattern of reckless driving or fact

2016“In a negligent entrustment claim, liability arises from the negligent act of the owner in lending his automobile to another to drive, with actual knowledge that the driver is incompetent or habitually reckless.” Bashlor v. Walker, 303 Ga. App. 478, 480 (1) (a) ( 693 SE2d 858 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted); see also Gunn v. Booker, 259 Ga. 343, 347 (3) ( 381 SE2d 286 ) (1989). “[A] plaintiff in a negligent entrustment action is not limited to showing actual knowledge of the entruster inasmuch as that plaintiff may *868 show actual knowledge of a pattern of reckless driving or fact

2014See Butler v. Warren, 261 Ga. App. 375 ( 582 SE2d 530 ) (2003) (affirming grant of summary judgment where there was no evidence that defendants entrusted the vehicle to their employee for that particular use); see also Watkins v. Jackson, 215 Ga. App. 380, 380 ( 451 SE2d 111 ) (1994) (evidence of prior vehicle use not sufficient to withstand summary judgment on a negligent entrustment claim).

2014See Butler v. Warren, 261 Ga. App. 375 ( 582 SE2d 530 ) (2003) (affirming grant of summary judgment where there was no evidence that defendants entrusted the vehicle to their employee for that particular use); see also Watkins v. Jackson, 215 Ga. App. 380, 380 ( 451 SE2d 111 ) (1994) (evidence of prior vehicle use not sufficient to withstand summary judgment on a negligent entrustment claim).

2016“In a negligent entrustment claim, liability arises from the negligent act of the owner in lending his automobile to another to drive, with actual knowledge that the driver is incompetent or habitually reckless.” Bashlor v. Walker, 303 Ga. App. 478, 480 (1) (a) ( 693 SE2d 858 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted); see also Gunn v. Booker, 259 Ga. 343, 347 (3) ( 381 SE2d 286 ) (1989). “[A] plaintiff in a negligent entrustment action is not limited to showing actual knowledge of the entruster inasmuch as that plaintiff may *868 show actual knowledge of a pattern of reckless driving or fact

2016“In a negligent entrustment claim, liability arises from the negligent act of the owner in lending his automobile to another to drive, with actual knowledge that the driver is incompetent or habitually reckless.” Bashlor v. Walker, 303 Ga. App. 478, 480 (1) (a) ( 693 SE2d 858 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted); see also Gunn v. Booker, 259 Ga. 343, 347 (3) ( 381 SE2d 286 ) (1989). “[A] plaintiff in a negligent entrustment action is not limited to showing actual knowledge of the entruster inasmuch as that plaintiff may *868 show actual knowledge of a pattern of reckless driving or fact

2022“In a negligent entrustment claim, liability arises from the negligent act of the owner in lending his automobile to another to drive, with actual knowledge that the driver is incompetent or habitually reckless.” McManus v. Taylor, 326 Ga. App. 477, 480 (1) ( 756 SE2d 709 ) (2014) (citation omitted).

2022“In a negligent entrustment claim, liability arises from the negligent act of the owner in lending his automobile to another to drive, with actual knowledge that the driver is incompetent or habitually reckless.” McManus v. Taylor, 326 Ga. App. 477, 480 (1) ( 756 SE2d 709 ) (2014) (citation omitted).

2014See Butler v. Warren, 261 Ga. App. 375 ( 582 SE2d 530 ) (2003) (affirming grant of summary judgment where there was no evidence that defendants entrusted the vehicle to their employee for that particular use); see also Watkins v. Jackson, 215 Ga. App. 380, 380 ( 451 SE2d 111 ) (1994) (evidence of prior vehicle use not sufficient to withstand summary judgment on a negligent entrustment claim).

2014See Butler v. Warren, 261 Ga. App. 375 ( 582 SE2d 530 ) (2003) (affirming grant of summary judgment where there was no evidence that defendants entrusted the vehicle to their employee for that particular use); see also Watkins v. Jackson, 215 Ga. App. 380, 380 ( 451 SE2d 111 ) (1994) (evidence of prior vehicle use not sufficient to withstand summary judgment on a negligent entrustment claim).

1992In Chupp v. Henderson, 134 Ga. App. 808 ( 216 SE2d 366 ) (1975), a case in which the liability of an alleged reckless driver was asserted together with a claim against the driver’s employer for negligent entrustment, we noted that evidence “essential” to support punitive damages for the negligent entrustment claim would be “irrelevant and prejudicial in the resolution of the issues [regarding the driver’s liability].” Thus, we held that “[t]he obvious solution to the problem is a separate trial of issues presented in [the count against the driver] from those presented in [the negligent entrust

1992In Chupp v. Henderson, 134 Ga. App. 808 ( 216 SE2d 366 ) (1975), a case in which the liability of an alleged reckless driver was asserted together with a claim against the driver’s employer for negligent entrustment, we noted that evidence “essential” to support punitive damages for the negligent entrustment claim would be “irrelevant and prejudicial in the resolution of the issues [regarding the driver’s liability].” Thus, we held that “[t]he obvious solution to the problem is a separate trial of issues presented in [the count against the driver] from those presented in [the negligent entrust

1995Id. at 443 ; see Willis v. Hill, 116 Ga. App. 848 ( 159 SE2d 145 ) (1967), rev’d on other grounds, 224 Ga. 263 ( 161 SE2d 281 ) (1968).

1995Thomason v. Harper, 162 Ga. App. at 442-443 .

2025Because the negligent entrustment claim against Chisholm “is necessarily premised on negligence by the driver to whom she [allegedly] entrusted her car, we also reverse the denial of summary judgment as to [Chisholm].” Hunsucker v. Belford, 304 Ga. App. 200, 203 (2) ( 695 SE2d 405 ) (2010).

2025Because the negligent entrustment claim against Chisholm “is necessarily premised on negligence by the driver to whom she [allegedly] entrusted her car, we also reverse the denial of summary judgment as to [Chisholm].” Hunsucker v. Belford, 304 Ga. App. 200, 203 (2) ( 695 SE2d 405 ) (2010).

2025See Thompson v. Ledbetter, 254 Ga. App. 179, 180 (1) ( 561 SE2d 476 ) (2002) (the plaintiff in a negligent entrustment claim must prove that the vehicle’s owner gave another person permission to use it). 5 But this appeal does not concern Dollar’s underlying wrongful death lawsuit or her claim in that action that Holder negligently entrusted the truck to Walker.

2025See Thompson v. Ledbetter, 254 Ga. App. 179, 180 (1) ( 561 SE2d 476 ) (2002) (the plaintiff in a negligent entrustment claim must prove that the vehicle’s owner gave another person permission to use it). 5 But this appeal does not concern Dollar’s underlying wrongful death lawsuit or her claim in that action that Holder negligently entrusted the truck to Walker.

2023To recover under this theory of negligence, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that the vehicle owner gave the allegedly incompetent driver permission to drive the vehicle.6 4 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ellison v. Burger King Corp., 294 Ga. App. 814, 815 ( 670 SE2d 469 ) (2008); see OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). 5 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ellison, 294 Ga. App. at 819 (3) (a); see OCGA § 9-11-56 (e). 6 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McManus v. Taylor, 326 Ga. App. 477, 480 (1) ( 756 SE2d 709 ) (2014). 5 Here, both Addison and Morel testified that Addison was not allowed to drive

2023To recover under this theory of negligence, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that the vehicle owner gave the allegedly incompetent driver permission to drive the vehicle.6 4 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ellison v. Burger King Corp., 294 Ga. App. 814, 815 ( 670 SE2d 469 ) (2008); see OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). 5 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ellison, 294 Ga. App. at 819 (3) (a); see OCGA § 9-11-56 (e). 6 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McManus v. Taylor, 326 Ga. App. 477, 480 (1) ( 756 SE2d 709 ) (2014). 5 Here, both Addison and Morel testified that Addison was not allowed to drive

2023See Marshall v. Whaley, 238 Ga. App. 776, 779-780 (3) ( 520 SE2d 271 ) (1999) (summary judgment appropriate on negligent entrustment claim where no evidence defendant had actual knowledge of driver’s incompetence). 3.

2023See Marshall v. Whaley, 238 Ga. App. 776, 779-780 (3) ( 520 SE2d 271 ) (1999) (summary judgment appropriate on negligent entrustment claim where no evidence defendant had actual knowledge of driver’s incompetence). 3.

2022See Georgia-Pacific, LLC v. Fields, 293 Ga. 499, 504 (2) ( 748 SE2d 407 ) (2013) (we may affirm the grant of summary judgment if it is “right for any reason”).

2022See Georgia-Pacific, LLC v. Fields, 293 Ga. 499, 504 (2) ( 748 SE2d 407 ) (2013) (we may affirm the grant of summary judgment if it is “right for any reason”).

2020If it is not disputed that the employee’s negligence is to be imputed to the employer, there is 14 See Wilkes & McHugh, 306 Ga. at 258 (2) (citing Zaldivar, 297 Ga. at 598-600 (1)). 27 no need to prove that the employer is liable.

2020See Diaz v. Carcamo, 253 P3d 535, 544 (V) (Cal. 2011) (where employer admits vicarious liability for its employee’s negligent driving, plaintiff cannot pursue a negligent entrustment claim under the state’s system of allocating comparative fault); Bogdanski v. Budzik, 408 P3d 1156, 1163 (A) (Wyo. 2018) (“Under either theory, the liability of the principal is dependent on the negligence of the agent.

2020See Hicks v. Heard, 297 Ga. App. 689, 691-692 (2) ( 678 SE2d 145 ) (2009) (holding that the plaintiff failed to show incompetence or a pattern of reckless driving as required for a negligent entrustment claim, where the evidence showed that two years before the accident at issue, the employee had received a speeding ticket and had also been involved in a minor traffic accident for which she received a citation for failure to yield).

2020See Hicks v. Heard, 297 Ga. App. 689, 691-692 (2) ( 678 SE2d 145 ) (2009) (holding that the plaintiff failed to show incompetence or a pattern of reckless driving as required for a negligent entrustment claim, where the evidence showed that two years before the accident at issue, the employee had received a speeding ticket and had also been involved in a minor traffic accident for which she received a citation for failure to yield).

2020See Diaz v. Carcamo, 253 P3d 535, 544 (V) (Cal. 2011) (where employer admits vicarious liability for its employee’s negligent driving, plaintiff cannot pursue a negligent entrustment claim under the state’s system of allocating comparative fault); Bogdanski v. Budzik, 408 P3d 1156, 1163 (A) (Wyo. 2018) (“Under either theory, the liability of the principal is dependent on the negligence of the agent.

2020If it is not disputed that the employee’s negligence is to be imputed to the employer, there is 14 See Wilkes & McHugh, 306 Ga. at 258 (2) (citing Zaldivar, 297 Ga. at 598-600 (1)). 27 no need to prove that the employer is liable.

2017See Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 623 (1) (a) ( 697 SE2d 779 ) (2010) (a defendant is entitled to summary judgment where the plaintiff is unable to point to specific evidence in the record giving rise to a genuine issue of fact on plaintiff’s claims). (b) As for the Johnsons’ respondeat superior claim, an employer is liable under this theory when the employee is acting within the course and scope of his employment.

2017See Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 623 (1) (a) ( 697 SE2d 779 ) (2010) (a defendant is entitled to summary judgment where the plaintiff is unable to point to specific evidence in the record giving rise to a genuine issue of fact on plaintiff’s claims). (b) As for the Johnsons’ respondeat superior claim, an employer is liable under this theory when the employee is acting within the course and scope of his employment.

2016“In a negligent entrustment claim, liability arises from the negligent act of the owner in lending his automobile to another to drive, with actual knowledge that the driver is incompetent or habitually reckless.” Bashlor v. Walker, 303 Ga. App. 478, 480 (1) (a) ( 693 SE2d 858 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted); see also Gunn v. Booker, 259 Ga. 343, 347 (3) ( 381 SE2d 286 ) (1989). “[A] plaintiff in a negligent entrustment action is not limited to showing actual knowledge of the entruster inasmuch as that plaintiff may *868 show actual knowledge of a pattern of reckless driving or fact

2016“In a negligent entrustment claim, liability arises from the negligent act of the owner in lending his automobile to another to drive, with actual knowledge that the driver is incompetent or habitually reckless.” Bashlor v. Walker, 303 Ga. App. 478, 480 (1) (a) ( 693 SE2d 858 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted); see also Gunn v. Booker, 259 Ga. 343, 347 (3) ( 381 SE2d 286 ) (1989). “[A] plaintiff in a negligent entrustment action is not limited to showing actual knowledge of the entruster inasmuch as that plaintiff may *868 show actual knowledge of a pattern of reckless driving or fact

2014To recover under this theory of negligence, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that the vehicle owner gave the allegedly incompetent driver permission to drive the vehicle.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bashlor v. Walker, 303 Ga. App. 478, 480 (1) (a) ( 693 SE2d 858 ) (2010); see also (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Cloud, 119 Ga. App. 697, 699 ( 168 SE2d 598 ) (1969) (“Knowledge of the driver’s incompetency is an essential element of the rule which holds an owner liable for furnishing his automobile to an incompetent driver and such knowledge must be actual rather than co

2014To recover under this theory of negligence, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that the vehicle owner gave the allegedly incompetent driver permission to drive the vehicle.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bashlor v. Walker, 303 Ga. App. 478, 480 (1) (a) ( 693 SE2d 858 ) (2010); see also (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Cloud, 119 Ga. App. 697, 699 ( 168 SE2d 598 ) (1969) (“Knowledge of the driver’s incompetency is an essential element of the rule which holds an owner liable for furnishing his automobile to an incompetent driver and such knowledge must be actual rather than co

2008Compare Deloach v. Hewes, 211 Ga. App. 321 ( 439 SE2d 94 ) (1993) (plaintiff not guilty of laches where plaintiff showed that the lapse in time was caused by the failure of the marshal’s office to carry out its statutory duty or to communicate with the plaintiff, despite the plaintiffs best efforts to ascertain from the office whether service had been attempted). 6 Montague does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Baker Imported on the negligent entrustment claim.

2008Compare Deloach v. Hewes, 211 Ga. App. 321 ( 439 SE2d 94 ) (1993) (plaintiff not guilty of laches where plaintiff showed that the lapse in time was caused by the failure of the marshal’s office to carry out its statutory duty or to communicate with the plaintiff, despite the plaintiffs best efforts to ascertain from the office whether service had been attempted). 6 Montague does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Baker Imported on the negligent entrustment claim.

2007“Under the doctrine of negligent entrustment, a party is liable if he entrusts someone with an instrumentality, with actual knowledge that the person to whom he has entrusted the instrumentality is incompetent by reason of his age or inexperience, or his physical or mental condition, or his known habit of recklessness.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Danforth v. Bulman, 276 Ga. App. 531, 535 (2) ( 623 SE2d 732 ) (2005).

2007“Under the doctrine of negligent entrustment, a party is liable if he entrusts someone with an instrumentality, with actual knowledge that the person to whom he has entrusted the instrumentality is incompetent by reason of his age or inexperience, or his physical or mental condition, or his known habit of recklessness.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Danforth v. Bulman, 276 Ga. App. 531, 535 (2) ( 623 SE2d 732 ) (2005).

2005“Under the doctrine of negligent entrustment, a party is liable if he entrusts someone with an instrumentality, with actual knowledge that the person to whom he has entrusted the instrumentality is incompetent by reason of his age or inexperience, or his physical or mental condition, or his known habit of recklessness.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Murphy v. Blue Bird Body Co., 207 Ga. App. 853, 859 (6) ( 429 SE2d 530 ) (1993).

2005“Under the doctrine of negligent entrustment, a party is liable if he entrusts someone with an instrumentality, with actual knowledge that the person to whom he has entrusted the instrumentality is incompetent by reason of his age or inexperience, or his physical or mental condition, or his known habit of recklessness.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Murphy v. Blue Bird Body Co., 207 Ga. App. 853, 859 (6) ( 429 SE2d 530 ) (1993).

1999The latest Supreme Court pronouncement of this doctrine is in Gunn v. Booker, 259 Ga. 343, 347 (3) ( 381 SE2d 286 ) (1989), where the court explained, citing several earlier cases, that “under the doctrine of negligent entrustment, a party is liable if he entrusts someone with an instrumentality, with actual knowledge that the person to whom he has entrusted the instrumentality is incompetent by reason of his age or inexperience, or his physical or mental condition, or his known habit of recklessness.” (Footnote omitted.) [Cits.] Carolina Cable Contractors v. Hattaway, 226 Ga. App. 413, 414 (

1999The latest Supreme Court pronouncement of this doctrine is in Gunn v. Booker, 259 Ga. 343, 347 (3) ( 381 SE2d 286 ) (1989), where the court explained, citing several earlier cases, that “under the doctrine of negligent entrustment, a party is liable if he entrusts someone with an instrumentality, with actual knowledge that the person to whom he has entrusted the instrumentality is incompetent by reason of his age or inexperience, or his physical or mental condition, or his known habit of recklessness.” (Footnote omitted.) [Cits.] Carolina Cable Contractors v. Hattaway, 226 Ga. App. 413, 414 (

1997The negligent entrustment doctrine was recently applied by this Court in Greene v. Jenkins, 224 Ga. App. 640, 641 (1) ( 481 SE2d 617 ) (1997).

1997The negligent entrustment doctrine was recently applied by this Court in Greene v. Jenkins, 224 Ga. App. 640, 641 (1) ( 481 SE2d 617 ) (1997).

1997The latest Supreme Court pronouncement of this doctrine is in Gunn v. Booker, 259 Ga. 343, 347 (3) ( 381 SE2d 286 ) (1989), where the court explained, citing several earlier cases, that “[u]nder the doctrine of negligent entrustment, a party is liable if he entrusts someone with an instrumentality, with actual knowledge that the person to whom he has entrusted the instrumentality is incompetent by reason of his age or inexperience, or his physical or mental condition, or his known habit of recklessness.” (Footnote omitted.) See also Clarke v. Cox, 197 Ga. App. 83, 84 (1) ( 397 SE2d 598 ) (1990

1997The latest Supreme Court pronouncement of this doctrine is in Gunn v. Booker, 259 Ga. 343, 347 (3) ( 381 SE2d 286 ) (1989), where the court explained, citing several earlier cases, that “[u]nder the doctrine of negligent entrustment, a party is liable if he entrusts someone with an instrumentality, with actual knowledge that the person to whom he has entrusted the instrumentality is incompetent by reason of his age or inexperience, or his physical or mental condition, or his known habit of recklessness.” (Footnote omitted.) See also Clarke v. Cox, 197 Ga. App. 83, 84 (1) ( 397 SE2d 598 ) (1990

1997The latest Supreme Court pronouncement of this doctrine is in Gunn v. Booker, 259 Ga. 343, 347 (3) ( 381 SE2d 286 ) (1989), where the court explained, citing several earlier cases, that “[u]nder the doctrine of negligent entrustment, a party is liable if he entrusts someone with an instrumentality, with actual knowledge that the person to whom he has entrusted the instrumentality is incompetent by reason of his age or inexperience, or his physical or mental condition, or his known habit of recklessness.” (Footnote omitted.) See also Clarke v. Cox, 197 Ga. App. 83, 84 (1) ( 397 SE2d 598 ) (1990

1997The latest Supreme Court pronouncement of this doctrine is in Gunn v. Booker, 259 Ga. 343, 347 (3) ( 381 SE2d 286 ) (1989), where the court explained, citing several earlier cases, that “[u]nder the doctrine of negligent entrustment, a party is liable if he entrusts someone with an instrumentality, with actual knowledge that the person to whom he has entrusted the instrumentality is incompetent by reason of his age or inexperience, or his physical or mental condition, or his known habit of recklessness.” (Footnote omitted.) See also Clarke v. Cox, 197 Ga. App. 83, 84 (1) ( 397 SE2d 598 ) (1990