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10 California opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.green2 sentences2007The court explained that "a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy." ( Croson, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 498 , 109 S.Ct. 706 .) Moreover, "an amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota." ( Id. at p. 499, 109 S.Ct. 706 .) The court concluded that the predicate facts relied upon by the district court did not begin to approach "a prima facie case of a constitut 2007The court explained that "a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy." ( Croson, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 498 , 109 S.Ct. 706 .) Moreover, "an amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota." ( Id. at p. 499, 109 S.Ct. 706 .) The court concluded that the predicate facts relied upon by the district court did not begin to approach "a prima facie case of a constitut | 2 | 2 |
Jett v. Dallas Independent School Districtgreen2 sentences1998The court’s task is to “identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.” (Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist. (1989) 491 U.S. 701, 737 [ 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2724 , 105 L.Ed.2d 598 ].) The status of a person as a government employee whose acts can trigger liability under the law is determined by state law. 1998The court’s task is to “identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.” (Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist. (1989) 491 U.S. 701, 737 [ 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2724 , 105 L.Ed.2d 598 ].) The status of a person as a government employee whose acts can trigger liability under the law is determined by state law. | 1 | 2 |
Davies v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2025Proc., § 2017.010; see Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301 [“discovery is not limited to admissible evidence”].) Information that is otherwise discoverable, however, may be protected by a constitutional or statutory privilege, such as the right to privacy. | 1 | 1 |
Catholic Mutual Relief Society v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2021(See Catholic Mutual Relief Society v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 358, 366, fn. 6 .) Even if information is otherwise discoverable, it may be protected by a constitutional or statutory privilege. | 1 | 1 |
Snyder v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2011(People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 433 ; see Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 106-107 [ 78 L.Ed. 674 , 54 S.Ct. 330 ] [accused has no constitutional right to be present “when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow”].) Finally, more than three years after briefing in this case had been completed, defendant filed a supplemental brief raising the new argument that the questioning of jurors at sidebar violated his federal constitutional right to a public trial. 2011(People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 433 ; see Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 106-107 [ 78 L.Ed. 674 , 54 S.Ct. 330 ] [accused has no constitutional right to be present “when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow”].) Finally, more than three years after briefing in this case had been completed, defendant filed a supplemental brief raising the new argument that the questioning of jurors at sidebar violated his federal constitutional right to a public trial. | 1 | 1 |
McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co.green2 sentences2009III]”]; Adashunas v. Negley (7th Cir. 1980) 626 F.2d 600, 604 [stating, in action on behalf of all learning-disabled Indiana public school students who allegedly had not been identified and thus were not receiving their special-education entitlement, that under article Ill’s “case or controversy” requirement, it must “be reasonably clear that the proposed class members have all suffered a constitutional or statutory violation warranting some relief’; denial of class certification affirmed]; In re Copper Antitrust Litigation (W.D.Wis. 2000) 196 F.R.D. 348, 353 [stating that “[i]mplicit in Rule 2009III's "case or controversy" requirement, it must "be reasonably clear that the proposed class members have all suffered a constitutional or statutory violation warranting some relief"; denial of class certification affirmed]; In re Copper Antitrust Litigation (W.D.Wis. 2000) 196 F.R.D. 348, 353 [stating that "[i]mplicit in Rule 23 is the requirement that the plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent have standing"]; Clay v. American Tobacco Co. (S.D.Ill. 1999) 188 F.R.D. 483, 490 [stating, in suit against tobacco companies for wrongful youth-oriented marketing, seeking disgorgement of al | 1 | 1 |
Clay v. American Tobacco Co.green2 sentences2009III]”]; Adashunas v. Negley (7th Cir. 1980) 626 F.2d 600, 604 [stating, in action on behalf of all learning-disabled Indiana public school students who allegedly had not been identified and thus were not receiving their special-education entitlement, that under article Ill’s “case or controversy” requirement, it must “be reasonably clear that the proposed class members have all suffered a constitutional or statutory violation warranting some relief’; denial of class certification affirmed]; In re Copper Antitrust Litigation (W.D.Wis. 2000) 196 F.R.D. 348, 353 [stating that “[i]mplicit in Rule 2009III's "case or controversy" requirement, it must "be reasonably clear that the proposed class members have all suffered a constitutional or statutory violation warranting some relief"; denial of class certification affirmed]; In re Copper Antitrust Litigation (W.D.Wis. 2000) 196 F.R.D. 348, 353 [stating that "[i]mplicit in Rule 23 is the requirement that the plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent have standing"]; Clay v. American Tobacco Co. (S.D.Ill. 1999) 188 F.R.D. 483, 490 [stating, in suit against tobacco companies for wrongful youth-oriented marketing, seeking disgorgement of al | 1 | 1 |
Loeb Industrial, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp.green2 sentences2009III]”]; Adashunas v. Negley (7th Cir. 1980) 626 F.2d 600, 604 [stating, in action on behalf of all learning-disabled Indiana public school students who allegedly had not been identified and thus were not receiving their special-education entitlement, that under article Ill’s “case or controversy” requirement, it must “be reasonably clear that the proposed class members have all suffered a constitutional or statutory violation warranting some relief’; denial of class certification affirmed]; In re Copper Antitrust Litigation (W.D.Wis. 2000) 196 F.R.D. 348, 353 [stating that “[i]mplicit in Rule 2009III's "case or controversy" requirement, it must "be reasonably clear that the proposed class members have all suffered a constitutional or statutory violation warranting some relief"; denial of class certification affirmed]; In re Copper Antitrust Litigation (W.D.Wis. 2000) 196 F.R.D. 348, 353 [stating that "[i]mplicit in Rule 23 is the requirement that the plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent have standing"]; Clay v. American Tobacco Co. (S.D.Ill. 1999) 188 F.R.D. 483, 490 [stating, in suit against tobacco companies for wrongful youth-oriented marketing, seeking disgorgement of al | 1 | 1 |
Joseph D. Adashunas, a Minor by His Parents, Alvin and Olga Adashunas, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Harold H. Negleygreen1 sentence2009III]”]; Adashunas v. Negley (7th Cir. 1980) 626 F.2d 600, 604 [stating, in action on behalf of all learning-disabled Indiana public school students who allegedly had not been identified and thus were not receiving their special-education entitlement, that under article Ill’s “case or controversy” requirement, it must “be reasonably clear that the proposed class members have all suffered a constitutional or statutory violation warranting some relief’; denial of class certification affirmed]; In re Copper Antitrust Litigation (W.D.Wis. 2000) 196 F.R.D. 348, 353 [stating that “[i]mplicit in Rule | 1 | 1 |
cluster 764129green1 sentence2006Once those officials who have the power to make official policy on a particular issue have been identified, it is for the jury to determine whether their decisions have caused the deprivation of rights at issue by policies which affirmatively command that it occur, . . .” (Ibid.; see also Christie v. Iopa (9th Cir. 1999) 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 ; Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates (9th Cir. 1990) 907 F.2d 879, 889-890 .) Consistent with this procedural rule, the City requested the court to instruct the jury that the civil service commission “is the official policy-making body of die Cit | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court of Orange Cty.
green
1 sentence2023“Although the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless.” (Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223 .) In general, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (§ 2017.010.) Information that is otherwise discoverable, however, may be protected by a constitutional or | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Heien v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences2015Thus, an officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.” ( Heien, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [135 S.Ct. at pp. 539- 540].) The United States Supreme Court found “little difficulty” in concluding the officer’s mistake in Heien was reasonable. ( Heien, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [ 135 S.Ct. at p. 533 ].) The officer stopped Heien for having only a working left brake light; the right brake light did not illuminate. 2015Thus, an officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.” ( Heien, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [135 S.Ct. at pp. 539- 540].) The United States Supreme Court found “little difficulty” in concluding the officer’s mistake in Heien was reasonable. ( Heien, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [ 135 S.Ct. at p. 533 ].) The officer stopped Heien for having only a working left brake light; the right brake light did not illuminate. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Ochoa
green
1 sentence2011(People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 433 ; see Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 106-107 [ 78 L.Ed. 674 , 54 S.Ct. 330 ] [accused has no constitutional right to be present “when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow”].) Finally, more than three years after briefing in this case had been completed, defendant filed a supplemental brief raising the new argument that the questioning of jurors at sidebar violated his federal constitutional right to a public trial. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose
green
2 sentences2007The court criticized what appeared to be a lack of consideration of alternative, race-neutral ways to increase minority participation in city contracting. ( Croson, supra, 488 U. S. at pp. 507-508, 109 S.Ct. 706 .) Further, the quota rested on the faulty assumption that minorities would choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the city. ( Id, at p. 508, 109 S.Ct. 706 .) *803 The court reiterated, however, that with the appropriate evidentiary support, a public entity could take action to dismantle a discriminatory, closed business system that excluded minorit 2007The court criticized what appeared to be a lack of consideration of alternative, race-neutral ways to increase minority participation in city contracting. ( Croson, supra, 488 U. S. at pp. 507-508, 109 S.Ct. 706 .) Further, the quota rested on the faulty assumption that minorities would choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the city. ( Id, at p. 508, 109 S.Ct. 706 .) *803 The court reiterated, however, that with the appropriate evidentiary support, a public entity could take action to dismantle a discriminatory, closed business system that excluded minorit | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates
green
1 sentence2006Once those officials who have the power to make official policy on a particular issue have been identified, it is for the jury to determine whether their decisions have caused the deprivation of rights at issue by policies which affirmatively command that it occur, . . .” (Ibid.; see also Christie v. Iopa (9th Cir. 1999) 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 ; Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates (9th Cir. 1990) 907 F.2d 879, 889-890 .) Consistent with this procedural rule, the City requested the court to instruct the jury that the civil service commission “is the official policy-making body of die Cit | 1 | 2006–2006 |
McMillian v. Monroe County
green
2 sentences1998(McMillian v. Monroe County (1997) 520 U.S. 781 , _[ 117 S.Ct. 1734, 1737 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1 ]. 1998(McMillian v. Monroe County (1997) 520 U.S. 781 , _[ 117 S.Ct. 1734, 1737 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1 ]. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.