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205 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1980–2026 37 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Madden v. Stategreen2 sentences2025A defendant’s right to the submission of an Article 38.23(a) jury instruction “is limited to disputed issues of fact that are material to [her] claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidence inadmissible.” Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504 , 509–10 (Tex. Crim. 2024App. 1984) (en banc). 13 A defendant’s right to the submission of an Article 38.32 jury instruction “is limited to disputed issues of fact that are material to [her] claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidence inadmissible.” Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504 , 509–10 (Tex. Crim. | 77 | 146 |
Robinson, Timothy Leegreen2 sentences2024In order to be entitled to such an instruction, “the defendant must show that (1) an issue of historical fact was raised in front of the jury; (2) the fact was contested by affirmative evidence at trial; and (3) the fact is material to the constitutional or statutory violation that the defendant has identified as rendering the particular evidence inadmissible.” Robinson v. State, 377 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. Crim. 2023In order to be entitled to 3 During the hearing on Turner’s motion to suppress, Turner’s counsel informed the court that he would like to “outline[] what happened there at the residence of Jennifer Garrett and Travis Turner the morning of August 12th.” Turner immediately stated, “That wasn’t my legal residence.” 4 Moreover, there was testimony at trial that officers did not enter the residence until after a search warrant was signed by a judge. 13 such an instruction, “the defendant must show that (1) an issue of historical fact was raised in front of the jury; (2) the fact was contested by af | 27 | 34 |
Lowe v. Texas Tech Universitygreen2 sentences2025Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 611 (Tex. 2000); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ. 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976). 1980As instrumentalities of the state, the systems themselves are not liable for the torts of their officers or employees in the absence of a constitutional or statutory requirement to the contrary. e Lowe v. Texas Tech University, 540 S.W. 2d 297 (Tex. 1976); 52 Tex. Jur. 2d State of Texas S50, at 761. | 3 | 4 |
City of Houston v. Danielsgreen2 sentences2024City of Houston v. Daniels, 66 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (citing Mount Pleasant Indep. 2017City of Houston v. Daniels, 66 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (citing Mount Pleasant Indep. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Olanogreen2 sentences2024Our suggestion in 59 Id.; see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737 (1993) (presence of alternates in jury deliberations, with instructions not to participate, did not affect substantial rights of defendants). 60 See, e.g., Tex. Const. Art. 5 §4(a) (“The Court of Criminal Appeals shall consist of eight Judges and one Presiding Judge.”) Becerra - 27 Trinidad that there might be a constitutional or statutory violation of the twelve-person jury requirement if an alternate juror participates in the jury’s “ultimate verdict” was unsupported dicta. 2024Our suggestion in 59 Id.; see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737 (1993) (presence of alternates in jury deliberations, with instructions not to participate, did not affect substantial rights of defendants). 60 See, e.g., Tex. Const. Art. 5 §4(a) (“The Court of Criminal Appeals shall consist of eight Judges and one Presiding Judge.”) Becerra - 27 Trinidad that there might be a constitutional or statutory violation of the twelve-person jury requirement if an alternate juror participates in the jury’s “ultimate verdict” was unsupported dicta. | 2 | 2 |
Holmes v. Stategreen2 sentences2019App. 2007); see also Holmes v. State, 248 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex. Crim. 2010Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); see also Holmes v. State, 248 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (“There is, of course, nothing to instruct the jury about if the suppression question is one of law only, and there is nothing to instruct the jury about unless there is affirmative evidence that raises a contested fact issue.”). | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2015A defendant’s right to the submission of an instruction under article 38.23(a) “is limited to disputed issues of fact that are material to his claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidence inadmissible.” Jones v. State, 338 S.W.3d 725, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed) (quoting Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504 , 509–10 (Tex. Crim. 2011A defendant’s right to the submission of an instruction under article 38.23(a) “is limited to disputed issues of fact that are material to his claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidence inadmissible.” Jones v. State , 338 S.W.3d 725, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed) (quoting Madden v. State , 242 S.W.3d 504 , 509–10 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Brooks v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Madden, 242 S.W.3d at 513 ; see Brooks, 707 S.W.2d at 706 . 2010See Madden , 242 S.W.3d at 513 ; see Brooks , 707 S.W.2d at 706 . | 2 | 2 |
Oursbourn v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159 , 173–74, 177 (Tex. Crim. 2020App. 2007); see Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 177 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2 |
Grant v. Woodgreen2 sentences2011Meca Homes, 969 S.W.2d at 451 ; Grant, 916 S.W.2d at 46 . 1998Grant v. Wood, 916 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). | 1 | 2 |
Texas Department of Transportation v. Ablegreen1 sentence2025Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 611 (Tex. 2000); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ. 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976). | 1 | 1 |
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Mirandagreen1 sentence2024See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 , 226–28 (Tex. 2004) (stating that the standard of review for a jurisdictional plea based on evidence generally mirrors the traditional-summary-judgment standard). 3 Governmental units are not liable for the torts of their agents unless there is a constitutional or statutory waiver of immunity. | 1 | 1 |
Hamal, Angela Doddgreen1 sentence2024Under Madden, there are three 12 requirements for the mandatory inclusion of a 38.23 instruction: “(1) [t]he evidence heard by the jury must raise an issue of fact; (2) [t]he evidence on that fact must be affirmatively contested; and (3) [t]hat contested factual issue must be material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct in obtaining the evidence.” Id. at 510 ; see Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Democracy Coalition v. City of Austingreen1 sentence2022Harris County v. Coats, 607 S.W.3d 359 , 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.); see Democracy Coal. v. City of Austin, 141 S.W.3d 282, 289 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (policy can be official custom or take form of duly promulgated policy statements, regulations, or similar act (citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001))). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 22972green1 sentence2022Harris County v. Coats, 607 S.W.3d 359 , 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.); see Democracy Coal. v. City of Austin, 141 S.W.3d 282, 289 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (policy can be official custom or take form of duly promulgated policy statements, regulations, or similar act (citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001))). | 1 | 1 |
City of Houston v. Collinsgreen1 sentence2022City of Houston v. Collins, 515 S.W.3d 467, 472 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnatigreen2 sentences2020See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480-81 ; Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 ; Adickes v. S.H. 2020Each liability question required appellees to identify a final policymaker for Harris County concerning the violation at issue, which the county says was not done.6 Regarding policymakers in the section 1983 context, our task is to “identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.” McMillian, 520 U.S. at 784 - 85; see Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 482-83 . | 1 | 1 |
Pierce v. Stategreen1 sentence2019App. 2007) (citing Pierce v. State, 32 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Andrew J. Serrano v. Stategreen1 sentence2016ANN. art. 38.23(a); Serrano v. State, 464 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (observing that a defendant’s right to the submission of an article 38.23 jury instruction “is limited to disputed issues of fact that are material to his claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidence inadmissible” (quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Garza v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Madden, 242 S.W.3d at 509-10 . “[A]n Article 38.23 instruction must be included in the jury charge only if there is a factual dispute about how the evidence was obtained.” Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Armando Ramos v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marin v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Lubbock v. Corbingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mount Pleasant Independent School District v. Estate of Lindburg Ex Rel. Lindburggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Munoz Ex Rel. Martinez v. Cameron Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Duhart v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Recio v. Reciogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jett v. Dallas Independent School District
green
2 sentences2006Id. at 123, 108 S.Ct. at 924; Jett, 491 U.S. at 737 , 109 S.Ct. at 2724 . 2006Id. at 123, 108 S.Ct. at 924; Jett, 491 U.S. at 737 , 109 S.Ct. at 2724 . | 4 | 2004–2006 |
Texas Highway Department v. Weber
green
2 sentences1993Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 *686 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976); Texas Highway Dept. v. Weber, 147 Tex. 628 , 219 S.W.2d 70 (1949). 1993Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 *686 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976); Texas Highway Dept. v. Weber, 147 Tex. 628 , 219 S.W.2d 70 (1949). | 3 | 1989–1993 |
Murphy v. State
green
2 sentences2008However, “[a] defendant’s right to the submission of jury instructions under Article 38.23(a) is limited to disputed issues of fact that are material to his claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidence inadmissible.” Id. 2008However, “[a] defendant's right to the submission of jury instructions under Article 38.23(a) is limited to disputed issues of fact that are material to his claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidence inadmissible.” Id. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik
green
2 sentences2004Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 , 108 S.Ct. 915 ; City of Lubbock v. Corbin, 942 S.W.2d 14, 20-21 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied) (building code inspector was not policymaker, even though he wielded some discretion in imposing requirements and extending permits, because his actions were subject to review by higher authority). *294 To satisfy Monell , officials or governmental bodies must "speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue." Jett v. Dallas Indep. 2004Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 , 108 S.Ct. 915 ; City of Lubbock v. Corbin, 942 S.W.2d 14, 20-21 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied) (building code inspector was not policymaker, even though he wielded some discretion in imposing requirements and extending permits, because his actions were subject to review by higher authority). *294 To satisfy Monell , officials or governmental bodies must "speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue." Jett v. Dallas Indep. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Martinez v. State
green
1 sentence2021“A defendant’s right to the submission of jury instructions under Article 38.23(a) is limited to disputed issues of fact that are material to his claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidence inadmissible.” Madden v. State, 242 22 S.W.3d 504 , 509–10 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Almanza v. State
green
1 sentence2021“A defendant’s right to the submission of jury instructions under Article 38.23(a) is limited to disputed issues of fact that are material to his claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidence inadmissible.” Id. at 509–510 (citation omitted). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
McMillian v. Monroe County
green
1 sentence2020Each liability question required appellees to identify a final policymaker for Harris County concerning the violation at issue, which the county says was not done.6 Regarding policymakers in the section 1983 context, our task is to “identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.” McMillian, 520 U.S. at 784 - 85; see Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 482-83 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
green
1 sentence2020See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480-81 ; Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 ; Adickes v. S.H. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Heien v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences2017“We do not examine the subjective understanding of the particular officer involved ... [a]nd the inquiry is not as forgiving as the one employed in the distinct context of deciding whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity for a constitutional or statutory violation.” 9 Id. 2017“Thus, an officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.” Id. at 539-40 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Trimble v. Itz
green
1 sentence2015Trial counsel admitted that there was no dispute about the facts, but he believed there was a dispute about the interpretation of the facts or a “question about what a reasonable person would have thought was the case and the fact situation.” Although a 38.23 instruction may not have been warranted in this instance, we cannot say that the alleged error was “so serious that [trial counsel] was not functioning as counsel.” Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 495 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| TSM AM-FM TV v. Meca Homes, Inc. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| First National Bank of Atlanta v. Bartow County Board of Tax Assessors green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Teacher Retirement System of Texas v. Neill green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.