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10 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Salaman v. City of Waterburygreen2 sentences2019Rather, our Supreme Court, guided by § 330 of the Restatement (First) of Torts, has defined a licensee as ‘‘a person who is privi- leged to enter or remain upon land by virtue of the possessor’s consent, whether given by invitation or permission.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 473 , 78 A.2d 693 (1951); see also Salaman v. Waterbury, 246 Conn. 298, 305 , 717 A.2d 161 (1998) (same). 2019Rather, our Supreme Court, guided by § 330 of the Restatement (First) of Torts, has defined a licensee as ‘‘a person who is privi- leged to enter or remain upon land by virtue of the possessor’s consent, whether given by invitation or permission.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 473 , 78 A.2d 693 (1951); see also Salaman v. Waterbury, 246 Conn. 298, 305 , 717 A.2d 161 (1998) (same). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ramosgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Ramos, supra, 261 Conn. at 170 -71 , 801 A.2d 788 ("[i]t does not follow, however, that a request to charge addressed to the subject matter generally, but which omits an instruction on a specific component, preserves a claim that the trial court's instruction regarding that component was defective" [emphasis in original] ); State v. Lee, 138 Conn.App. 420 , 453 n. 19, 52 A.3d 736 (2012) ("[i]n order to preserve an objection to a proposed jury instruction, the defendant must plainly put the trial court on notice as to the specific basis for his objection" [internal quotation marks 2016See State v. Ramos, supra, 261 Conn. at 170 -71 , 801 A.2d 788 ("[i]t does not follow, however, that a request to charge addressed to the subject matter generally, but which omits an instruction on a specific component, preserves a claim that the trial court's instruction regarding that component was defective" [emphasis in original] ); State v. Lee, 138 Conn.App. 420 , 453 n. 19, 52 A.3d 736 (2012) ("[i]n order to preserve an objection to a proposed jury instruction, the defendant must plainly put the trial court on notice as to the specific basis for his objection" [internal quotation marks | 1 | 1 |
State v. Respassgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., State v. Respass, 256 Conn. 164, 192-93 , 770 A.2d 471 (waiver occurred when court “explicitly gave both parties opportunities to conduct further inquiry, and both parties declined. . . . [I]f the defendant perceived the trial court’s inquiry as inadequate, then he would have complained during the inquiry process instead of waiting until after the jury had reached a verdict.” [Citation omitted.]), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1002 , 122 S. Ct. 478 , 151 L. 2008See, e.g., State v. Respass, 256 Conn. 164, 192-93 , 770 A.2d 471 (waiver occurred when court “explicitly gave both parties opportunities to conduct further inquiry, and both parties declined. . . . [I]f the defendant perceived the trial court’s inquiry as inadequate, then he would have complained during the inquiry process instead of waiting until after the jury had reached a verdict.” [Citation omitted.]), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1002 , 122 S. Ct. 478 , 151 L. | 1 | 1 |
Gray v. Knowlesgreen1 sentence2008See, e.g., State v. Respass, 256 Conn. 164, 192-93 , 770 A.2d 471 (waiver occurred when court “explicitly gave both parties opportunities to conduct further inquiry, and both parties declined. . . . [I]f the defendant perceived the trial court’s inquiry as inadequate, then he would have complained during the inquiry process instead of waiting until after the jury had reached a verdict.” [Citation omitted.]), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1002 , 122 S. Ct. 478 , 151 L. | 1 | 1 |
Respass v. Connecticutgreen1 sentence2008See, e.g., State v. Respass, 256 Conn. 164, 192-93 , 770 A.2d 471 (waiver occurred when court “explicitly gave both parties opportunities to conduct further inquiry, and both parties declined. . . . [I]f the defendant perceived the trial court’s inquiry as inadequate, then he would have complained during the inquiry process instead of waiting until after the jury had reached a verdict.” [Citation omitted.]), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1002 , 122 S. Ct. 478 , 151 L. | 1 | 1 |
Galle v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programsgreen1 sentence2008See, e.g., State v. Respass, 256 Conn. 164, 192-93 , 770 A.2d 471 (waiver occurred when court “explicitly gave both parties opportunities to conduct further inquiry, and both parties declined. . . . [I]f the defendant perceived the trial court’s inquiry as inadequate, then he would have complained during the inquiry process instead of waiting until after the jury had reached a verdict.” [Citation omitted.]), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1002 , 122 S. Ct. 478 , 151 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Laube v. Stevenson
green
2 sentences2019Rather, our Supreme Court, guided by § 330 of the Restatement (First) of Torts, has defined a licensee as ‘‘a person who is privi- leged to enter or remain upon land by virtue of the possessor’s consent, whether given by invitation or permission.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 473 , 78 A.2d 693 (1951); see also Salaman v. Waterbury, 246 Conn. 298, 305 , 717 A.2d 161 (1998) (same). 2019Rather, our Supreme Court, guided by § 330 of the Restatement (First) of Torts, has defined a licensee as ‘‘a person who is privi- leged to enter or remain upon land by virtue of the possessor’s consent, whether given by invitation or permission.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 473 , 78 A.2d 693 (1951); see also Salaman v. Waterbury, 246 Conn. 298, 305 , 717 A.2d 161 (1998) (same). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Olano
green
2 sentences2017Additionally, the defendant relies on the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725 , 732-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), for the proposition that a defendant only waives his right to claim plain error when he does so purposefully and freely, and as such, an implied Kitchens waiver should not preclude his claim of plain error. 2017Additionally, the defendant relies on the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725 , 732-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), for the proposition that a defendant only waives his right to claim plain error when he does so purposefully and freely, and as such, an implied Kitchens waiver should not preclude his claim of plain error. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Lee
green
2 sentences2016See State v. Ramos, supra, 261 Conn. at 170 -71 , 801 A.2d 788 ("[i]t does not follow, however, that a request to charge addressed to the subject matter generally, but which omits an instruction on a specific component, preserves a claim that the trial court's instruction regarding that component was defective" [emphasis in original] ); State v. Lee, 138 Conn.App. 420 , 453 n. 19, 52 A.3d 736 (2012) ("[i]n order to preserve an objection to a proposed jury instruction, the defendant must plainly put the trial court on notice as to the specific basis for his objection" [internal quotation marks 2016See State v. Ramos, supra, 261 Conn. at 170 -71 , 801 A.2d 788 ("[i]t does not follow, however, that a request to charge addressed to the subject matter generally, but which omits an instruction on a specific component, preserves a claim that the trial court's instruction regarding that component was defective" [emphasis in original] ); State v. Lee, 138 Conn.App. 420 , 453 n. 19, 52 A.3d 736 (2012) ("[i]n order to preserve an objection to a proposed jury instruction, the defendant must plainly put the trial court on notice as to the specific basis for his objection" [internal quotation marks | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Corbin
green
2 sentences2013State v. Smith, supra, 262 Conn. 466 ; State v. Corbin, 260 Conn. 730, 746 , 799 A.2d 1056 (2002). 2013State v. Smith, supra, 262 Conn. 466 ; State v. Corbin, 260 Conn. 730, 746 , 799 A.2d 1056 (2002). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. JOSE G.
green
2 sentences2012In order to preserve an objection to a proposed jury instruction, “the defendant must plainly put the trial court on notice as to the specific basis for his objection; see Practice Book § 60-5; State v. Jose G., 290 Conn. 331, 342-43 , 963 A.2d 42 (2009) . . . .” State v. Coleman, 304 Conn. 161, 174 , 37 A.3d 713 (2012). 2012In order to preserve an objection to a proposed jury instruction, “the defendant must plainly put the trial court on notice as to the specific basis for his objection; see Practice Book § 60-5; State v. Jose G., 290 Conn. 331, 342-43 , 963 A.2d 42 (2009) . . . .” State v. Coleman, 304 Conn. 161, 174 , 37 A.3d 713 (2012). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Coleman
green
2 sentences2012In order to preserve an objection to a proposed jury instruction, “the defendant must plainly put the trial court on notice as to the specific basis for his objection; see Practice Book § 60-5; State v. Jose G., 290 Conn. 331, 342-43 , 963 A.2d 42 (2009) . . . .” State v. Coleman, 304 Conn. 161, 174 , 37 A.3d 713 (2012). 2012In order to preserve an objection to a proposed jury instruction, “the defendant must plainly put the trial court on notice as to the specific basis for his objection; see Practice Book § 60-5; State v. Jose G., 290 Conn. 331, 342-43 , 963 A.2d 42 (2009) . . . .” State v. Coleman, 304 Conn. 161, 174 , 37 A.3d 713 (2012). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Patterson
green
1 sentence2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Slater
green
1 sentence2008Id., 310-11 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Jett v. Dunlap
green
2 sentences1997A In its charge to the jury, the trial court instructed that the intentional actions of an employee could be attributed to the defendant if the employee had apparent authority to act on the defendant’s behalf or was the alter ego of the defendant. 14 Conversely, the defendant’s proposed jury instruction provided that the defendant could be liable for its employees’ actions under only the actual authority and alter ego theories. 15 In Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215 , 425 A.2d 1263 (1979), this court considered whether an employer could be subject to common-law tort liability for a battery that a 1997A In its charge to the jury, the trial court instructed that the intentional actions of an employee could be attributed to the defendant if the employee had apparent authority to act on the defendant’s behalf or was the alter ego of the defendant. 14 Conversely, the defendant’s proposed jury instruction provided that the defendant could be liable for its employees’ actions under only the actual authority and alter ego theories. 15 In Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215 , 425 A.2d 1263 (1979), this court considered whether an employer could be subject to common-law tort liability for a battery that a | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Bethea
green
1 sentence1994Our review in Bethea included “the subissues of whether that matter involved a hearsay exception or corroboration of a prior statement of the victim.” Id., 17 n.2. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.