loss claim in Texas

2016As has been seen, however, the Supreme Court has provided a framework for analyzing whether the specific .requirements for a complaint contained in the TCHRA are jurisdictional, or “a non-jurisdictional requirement mandated by statute [that] may result in the loss of a claim .’’Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d at 359 .

2015Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 359 (Tex.2004) (noting that failure to comply with a non-jurisdictional statutory requirement may result in the loss of a claim, but that failure must be timely asserted and compliance can be waived).

2012Seizing upon this precedent, Justice Wil-lett stated in his concurring opinion in Roccaforte , “Under [Texas supreme court] precedent, dismissal delayed is sometimes dismissal denied,” even when the statute, “mandates strict compliance.” Roccaforte, 341 S.W.3d at 928-30 (J.

2012The statutory provision at issue in Rocca-forte v. Jefferson County, section 89.0041 of the local government code, also provides that "[i]f a person does not give notice as required by this section, the court in which the suit is pending shall dismiss the suit on a motion for dismissal made by the county or the county official.” 341 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex.2011); see Tex. Loc.

2025Sys., 201 S.W.3d 260, 265 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“Appellant has failed to establish a waiver of immunity based on premises liability because the alleged defect did not 12 proximately cause her injuries.

2006Scott v. Prairie View A & M University , 7 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Tex. App.-Houston [1 st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); accord Renteria v. Housing Authority of El Paso , 96 S.W.3d 454, 458-59 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. denied) (concluding that the Housing Authority's immunity was not pierced though the assault occurred on the Authority's premises since the realty itself did not cause the injuries); see also Dimas v. Texas State University System, 201 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding that because the actions of the attacker caused the victim's injuries as oppos

2015Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71 , subsequent review by a district court, id. § 143.057(c), except 75–77 (Tex.2000); see also Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d at 359 “on the grounds that the [hearing examiner] 2 was without (“The failure of a non-jurisdictional requirement mandated jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction or that the order was by statute may result in the loss of a claim, but that failure procured by fraud, collusion, or other unlawful means.” Id. § must be timely asserted and compliance can be waived.”).

2015Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71 , subsequent review by a district court, id. § 143.057(c), except 75–77 (Tex.2000); see also Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d at 359 “on the grounds that the [hearing examiner] 2 was without (“The failure of a non-jurisdictional requirement mandated jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction or that the order was by statute may result in the loss of a claim, but that failure procured by fraud, collusion, or other unlawful means.” Id. § must be timely asserted and compliance can be waived.”).

2006Scott v. Prairie View A & M University , 7 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Tex. App.–Houston [1 st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); accord Renteria v. Housing Authority of El Paso , 96 S.W.3d 454, 458-59 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2002, pet. denied) (concluding that the Housing Authority’s immunity was not pierced though the assault occurred on the Authority‘s premises since the realty itself did not cause the injuries); see also Dimas v. Texas State University System, 201 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. App.–Houston [14 th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding that because the actions of the attacker caused the victim’s injuries as oppos

2006Scott v. Prairie View A & M University , 7 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Tex. App.-Houston [1 st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); accord Renteria v. Housing Authority of El Paso , 96 S.W.3d 454, 458-59 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. denied) (concluding that the Housing Authority's immunity was not pierced though the assault occurred on the Authority's premises since the realty itself did not cause the injuries); see also Dimas v. Texas State University System, 201 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding that because the actions of the attacker caused the victim's injuries as oppos

2006Scott v. Prairie View A & M University , 7 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Tex. App.–Houston [1 st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); accord Renteria v. Housing Authority of El Paso , 96 S.W.3d 454, 458-59 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2002, pet. denied) (concluding that the Housing Authority’s immunity was not pierced though the assault occurred on the Authority‘s premises since the realty itself did not cause the injuries); see also Dimas v. Texas State University System, 201 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. App.–Houston [14 th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding that because the actions of the attacker caused the victim’s injuries as oppos

2006Scott v. Prairie View A & M University , 7 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Tex. App.-Houston [1 st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); accord Renteria v. Housing Authority of El Paso , 96 S.W.3d 454, 458-59 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. denied) (concluding that the Housing Authority's immunity was not pierced though the assault occurred on the Authority's premises since the realty itself did not cause the injuries); see also Dimas v. Texas State University System, 201 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding that because the actions of the attacker caused the victim's injuries as oppos

2025This Court, in turn, at least under its current name, was created in amendments to the Texas Constitution adopted in 1891, which granted it “exclusive appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases.” Id. at 430 (Cochran, J., dissenting). 5 Marin defines a forfeiture to be “the loss of a claim or right for failure to insist upon it by objection, request, motion, or some other behavior calculated to exercise the right in a manner comprehensible to the system’s impartial representative, usually the trial judge.” 851 S.W.2d at 279 .

2024The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has “since referred to these separate classifications as category-one, -two, and -three Marin rights, respectively,” and has explained that: [P]rocedural default—that is, “the loss of a claim or right for failure to insist upon it by objection”—“only applies to the last category,” since these rights are typically considered to be “optional with the litigants.” [Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279 .] On the other hand, category-two rights, because they are “so fundamental to the proper functioning of our adjudicatory process as to enjoy special protection,” are only aba

2012Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex.2004) ("The failure of a non-jurisdictional requirement mandated by statute may result in the loss of a claim ....”); but see Albertson’s, Inc. v. Sinclair, 984 S.W.2d 958, 961-62 (Tex.1999) (noting that failure to comply with mandatory notice provision under worker’s compensation law did not require dismissal of action for judicial review); Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Tex.1992) (noting that purpose of mandatory, presuit notice requirement under deceptive trade practices act does not require dismissal of plaintiffs action when notice is

2012Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser , 140 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. 2003) ("The failure of a non-jurisdictional requirement mandated by statute may result in the loss of a claim . . . ."); but see Albertson's, Inc. v. Sinclair , 984 S.W.2d 958, 961-62 (Tex. 1999) (noting that failure to comply with mandatory notice provision under worker's compensation law did not require dismissal of action for judicial review); Hines v. Hash , 843 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Tex. 1992) (noting that purpose of mandatory, presuit notice requirement under deceptive trade practices act does not require dismissal of plaintiff's action when

2012Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex.2004) ("The failure of a non-jurisdictional requirement mandated by statute may result in the loss of a claim ....”); but see Albertson’s, Inc. v. Sinclair, 984 S.W.2d 958, 961-62 (Tex.1999) (noting that failure to comply with mandatory notice provision under worker’s compensation law did not require dismissal of action for judicial review); Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Tex.1992) (noting that purpose of mandatory, presuit notice requirement under deceptive trade practices act does not require dismissal of plaintiffs action when notice is

2012Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser , 140 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. 2003) ("The failure of a non-jurisdictional requirement mandated by statute may result in the loss of a claim . . . ."); but see Albertson's, Inc. v. Sinclair , 984 S.W.2d 958, 961-62 (Tex. 1999) (noting that failure to comply with mandatory notice provision under worker's compensation law did not require dismissal of action for judicial review); Hines v. Hash , 843 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Tex. 1992) (noting that purpose of mandatory, presuit notice requirement under deceptive trade practices act does not require dismissal of plaintiff's action when

2007Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).

2007Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).

2024See Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Tr., 354 S.W.3d 384, 392 (Tex. 2011) (“Creative pleading cannot be used to effect the loss or waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity.”). 6 When, as here, the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, “then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.” Bacon v. Texas Historical Comm’n, 411 S.W.3d 161, 170 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.). 11 Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Smith Reversed and Rendered Filed: March 22, 2024 12

2019In that 9 regard, the Texas Supreme Court has said, “[c]reative pleading cannot be used to effect the loss or waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity.” Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d at 392 .

1995NOTES [1] We express no opinion regarding the loss or waiver of the right to appeal by means other than ineffective assistance of counsel. [2] The Austin court of appeals held an adjudication of delinquency made without counsel was void in Rodriguez v. State, 491 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1973, no writ) (citing the Juvenile Act, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, art. 2338-1, § 7, which was codified into various locations in Title 3, and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (holding that many constitutional procedural rights ordinarily associated with crim

1995The Austin court of appeals held an adjudication of delinquency made without counsel was void in Rodriguez v. State, 491 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1973, no writ) (citing the Juvenile Act, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes, art. 2338-1, § 7, which was codified into various locations in Title 3, and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (holding that many constitutional procedural rights ordinarily associated with criminal trials apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings)).

1999Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Service, 414 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex.1967); Pinson v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, Inc., 801 S.W.2d 14 (Tex.App.— Austin 1990, no writ); 28 TEX.

1999The burden of proving a failure to mitigate is upon the party who caused the loss and the standard is that of ordinary care, i.e., what an ordinary prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Service, 414 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex.1967); Pinson v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, Inc., 801 S.W.2d 14 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, no writ); 28 Tex. JüR 3d Damages § 194 (1996).

2025This Court, in turn, at least under its current name, was created in amendments to the Texas Constitution adopted in 1891, which granted it “exclusive appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases.” Id. at 430 (Cochran, J., dissenting). 5 Marin defines a forfeiture to be “the loss of a claim or right for failure to insist upon it by objection, request, motion, or some other behavior calculated to exercise the right in a manner comprehensible to the system’s impartial representative, usually the trial judge.” 851 S.W.2d at 279 .

2024The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has “since referred to these separate classifications as category-one, -two, and -three Marin rights, respectively,” and has explained that: [P]rocedural default—that is, “the loss of a claim or right for failure to insist upon it by objection”—“only applies to the last category,” since these rights are typically considered to be “optional with the litigants.” [Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279 .] On the other hand, category-two rights, because they are “so fundamental to the proper functioning of our adjudicatory process as to enjoy special protection,” are only aba

2024See Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Tr., 354 S.W.3d 384, 392 (Tex. 2011) (“Creative pleading cannot be used to effect the loss or waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity.”). 6 When, as here, the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, “then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.” Bacon v. Texas Historical Comm’n, 411 S.W.3d 161, 170 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.). 11 Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Smith Reversed and Rendered Filed: March 22, 2024 12

2020Equistar Chems., L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 240 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex. 2007).

2020Co. v. Lynd Co., 399 S.W.3d 206 , 216–17 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) (stating that while not conclusive or binding, statements in a proof of loss are “prima facie evidence” of the facts recited in the proof); In re Republic Lloyds, 104 S.W.3d 354, 359 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (stating that the “purpose of a proof of loss is to advise the insurer of facts surrounding the loss for which a claim is being made, and to afford the insurer an adequate opportunity to investigate, to prevent fraud, and to form an intelligent estimate of its rights and liabi

2015Failing to meet “a non-jurisdictional requirement mandated by statute may result in the loss of a claim, but that failure must be timely asserted and compliance can be waived.”); Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 141 S.W.3d 172, 180 (Tex. 2004) (“unable to agree” is 2 At the hearing, Mother’s counsel subsequently stated that Father “asked to have it registered at the last hearing.” 11 expressly required to be alleged in the condemnation petition, but while mandatory, it is not a jurisdictional requirement); Jones v. City of Mineola, 203 S.W.2d 1020, 1022-23 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1947

2015City Dallas, Ltd. v. Carlisle Corp., and contract damages by a single answer, the Court " 251 S.W.3d 55, 61 (Tex. 2008) (" 'When the injury is only express[ed] no opinion" on the court of appeals' discussion the economic loss to the subject of a contract itself, the and application of the economic loss rule); Murray v. Ford action sounds in contract.'" (quoting Am.