50 California opinions name it 2 courts 1864–2025 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Maryland Casualty Co.green2 sentences2023Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1293 (Fireman’s Fund).) “In the insurance context, the right to contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action 6 The district court also addressed and rejected United’s argument that a certificate of insurance that “remains on record after a policy lapses functions as a surety, through which the insurer ‘promises to pay up to $750,000 towards a judgment against the trucker [for harm to a third party] whe 2021Hawley now contends in its appellate briefing that the argument has merit and we should affirm the trial court’s ruling on that basis. 16 supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1294, fn. 4 .) More specifically, “[i]n the insurance context, the right to contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action without any participation by the others. | 4 | 7 |
Cornette v. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2023(Alvarez v. State of California (1999) 79 Cal.App.4th 720, 737 (Alvarez), abrogated on another point in Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 67, 74 & fn. 3, italics added.) The party opposing the application of the defense has the burden of establishing the loss of the immunity. 2023(See Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 66 [court determines as a matter of law whether substantial evidence supports reasonableness of plan or design].) The court properly left for the jury, as the factfinder: (1) the remaining two elements for an application of the design immunity defense (see ibid.); as well as (2) the elements at issue for Plaintiff’s claims of sufficiently changed physical conditions to establish the loss of this defense (see Alvarez, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 737 ; Cornette, at p. 72). | 3 | 3 |
North American Capacity Insurance v. Claremont Liability Insurancegreen2 sentences2016Co. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 272, 295 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 225 ].) “[T]he right to contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action .... 2016Co. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 272, 295 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 225 ].) “[T]he right to contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action .... | 2 | 4 |
People v. Pricegreen2 sentences2025(Price, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 545 .) 68 When there has been a “delay in prosecution [that] resulted in the loss to the defense of identifiable evidence, the prejudice to the defendant may be substantially mitigated, even virtually eliminated, by presenting the evidence to the jury through alternate means.” (Conrad, at p. 1185.) “[P]rejudice from fading witness memories due to passage of time is diminished where contemporaneous police reports exist that may be introduced into evidence or used to refresh the witness’s recollection.” (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 409 ; see id. a 2016(People v. Price (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 536, 545 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 642 ]; see also People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 99 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 615 P.2d 1361 ] . . . .) When, as here, the delay in prosecution resulted in the loss to the defense of identifiable evidence, the prejudice to the defendant may be substantially mitigated, even virtually eliminated, by presenting the evidence to the jury through alternate means.” (Conrad, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1185 .) The alternate method adopted in Conrad was to have the trial court instruct the jury as to the substance of the brother’s stateme | 2 | 3 |
Alvarez v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences2023(Alvarez v. State of California (1999) 79 Cal.App.4th 720, 737 (Alvarez), abrogated on another point in Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 67, 74 & fn. 3, italics added.) The party opposing the application of the defense has the burden of establishing the loss of the immunity. 2023(See Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 66 [court determines as a matter of law whether substantial evidence supports reasonableness of plan or design].) The court properly left for the jury, as the factfinder: (1) the remaining two elements for an application of the design immunity defense (see ibid.); as well as (2) the elements at issue for Plaintiff’s claims of sufficiently changed physical conditions to establish the loss of this defense (see Alvarez, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 737 ; Cornette, at p. 72). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Zamoragreen2 sentences2016(People v. Price (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 536, 545 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 642 ]; see also People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 99 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 615 P.2d 1361 ] . . . .) When, as here, the delay in prosecution resulted in the loss to the defense of identifiable evidence, the prejudice to the defendant may be substantially mitigated, even virtually eliminated, by presenting the evidence to the jury through alternate means.” (Conrad, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1185 .) The alternate method adopted in Conrad was to have the trial court instruct the jury as to the substance of the brother’s stateme 2016(People v. Price (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 536, 545 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 642 ]; see also People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 99 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 615 P.2d 1361 ] . . . .) When, as here, the delay in prosecution resulted in the loss to the defense of identifiable evidence, the prejudice to the defendant may be substantially mitigated, even virtually eliminated, by presenting the evidence to the jury through alternate means.” (Conrad, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1185 .) The alternate method adopted in Conrad was to have the trial court instruct the jury as to the substance of the brother’s stateme | 2 | 2 |
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2023Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1089 ; see also Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 8:65.1, p. 8-26 [discussing differences between equitable contribution, equitable indemnity, and equitable subrogation, and noting “it is important for an insurer seeking reimbursement from other insurers to select the appropriate remedy”].) “In the insurance context, the right to contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action wit 2023Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1089 ; see also Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 8:65.1, p. 8-26 [discussing differences between equitable contribution, equitable indemnity, and equitable subrogation, and noting “it is important for an insurer seeking reimbursement from other insurers to select the appropriate remedy”].) “In the insurance context, the right to contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action wit | 1 | 4 |
Low v. Golden Eagle Insurancegreen2 sentences2005Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1361 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 155 ].) “Where multiple insurance carriers insure the same insured and cover the same risk, each insurer has independent standing to assert a cause of action against its coinsurers for equitable contribution when it has undertaken the defense or indemnification of the common insured.” (Fireman’s Fund Ins. 2005Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1361 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 155 ].) “Where multiple insurance carriers insure the same insured and cover the same risk, each insurer has independent standing to assert a cause of action against its coinsurers for equitable contribution when it has undertaken the defense or indemnification of the common insured.” (Fireman’s Fund Ins. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Cowangreen2 sentences2025(Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 433 ; see id. at pp. 431–433.) 4. 2025(Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 433 ; see id. at pp. 431–433.) 4. | 1 | 1 |
San Mateo Union High School District v. County of San Mateogreen1 sentence2025(San Mateo Union High School Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 418, 435, fn. 8 ; Telles Transport, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mataelegreen2 sentences2025(Price, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 545 .) 68 When there has been a “delay in prosecution [that] resulted in the loss to the defense of identifiable evidence, the prejudice to the defendant may be substantially mitigated, even virtually eliminated, by presenting the evidence to the jury through alternate means.” (Conrad, at p. 1185.) “[P]rejudice from fading witness memories due to passage of time is diminished where contemporaneous police reports exist that may be introduced into evidence or used to refresh the witness’s recollection.” (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 409 ; see id. a 2025(Price, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 545 .) 68 When there has been a “delay in prosecution [that] resulted in the loss to the defense of identifiable evidence, the prejudice to the defendant may be substantially mitigated, even virtually eliminated, by presenting the evidence to the jury through alternate means.” (Conrad, at p. 1185.) “[P]rejudice from fading witness memories due to passage of time is diminished where contemporaneous police reports exist that may be introduced into evidence or used to refresh the witness’s recollection.” (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 409 ; see id. a | 1 | 1 |
Wyckoff v. Stategreen1 sentence2023(Wyckoff v. State of California, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 61, fn. 3 .) As the trial court correctly noted, Lin presented no “surveys or studies showing a statistically aberrant increase in wet weather accidents or cross centerline collisions at the subject location” leading up to the time of the accident. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Conradgreen2 sentences2016(People v. Price (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 536, 545 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 642 ]; see also People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 99 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 615 P.2d 1361 ] . . . .) When, as here, the delay in prosecution resulted in the loss to the defense of identifiable evidence, the prejudice to the defendant may be substantially mitigated, even virtually eliminated, by presenting the evidence to the jury through alternate means.” (Conrad, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1185 .) The alternate method adopted in Conrad was to have the trial court instruct the jury as to the substance of the brother’s stateme 2016(Conrad, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186 .) Even though the brother’s statement was rank hearsay (id. at p. 1185), the court determined its admission was necessary to safeguard the defendant’s constitutional rights. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Lacygreen2 sentences2010(Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 650, fn. 7 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 355 , 660 P.2d 813 ]; Jackson v. Lacy (1940) 37 Cal.App.2d 551, 560 [ 100 P.2d 313 ].) Scottsdale would have us disregard this authority on the basis of general language stating that “[i]n the insurance context, the right to contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action without any participation by the others.” (Fireman’s Fund Ins. 2010(Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 650, fn. 7 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 355 , 660 P.2d 813 ]; Jackson v. Lacy (1940) 37 Cal.App.2d 551, 560 [ 100 P.2d 313 ].) Scottsdale would have us disregard this authority on the basis of general language stating that “[i]n the insurance context, the right to contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action without any participation by the others.” (Fireman’s Fund Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Jessup Farms v. Baldwingreen2 sentences2010(Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 650, fn. 7 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 355 , 660 P.2d 813 ]; Jackson v. Lacy (1940) 37 Cal.App.2d 551, 560 [ 100 P.2d 313 ].) Scottsdale would have us disregard this authority on the basis of general language stating that “[i]n the insurance context, the right to contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action without any participation by the others.” (Fireman’s Fund Ins. 2010(Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 650, fn. 7 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 355 , 660 P.2d 813 ]; Jackson v. Lacy (1940) 37 Cal.App.2d 551, 560 [ 100 P.2d 313 ].) Scottsdale would have us disregard this authority on the basis of general language stating that “[i]n the insurance context, the right to contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action without any participation by the others.” (Fireman’s Fund Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Nationwide Insurancegreen2 sentences2009Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 21, 26 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 113 ].) “[T]he right to contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action .... 2009Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 21, 26 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 113 ].) “[T]he right to contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action .... | 1 | 1 |
Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. American Equity Insurancegreen2 sentences2005Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 ].) Although courts honor coverage terms, including “other insurance” clauses, whenever possible, “where the policies of two or more insurers of a common insured, providing [the same level of] coverage for the same risk, contain conflicting ‘other insurance’ clauses ... if one insurer pays more than its share of the loss or defense costs without participation from the other insurer or insurers, a right to contribution arises.” (Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Century Surety Co., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160 , citing Fireman’s F 2005Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 ].) Although courts honor coverage terms, including “other insurance” clauses, whenever possible, “where the policies of two or more insurers of a common insured, providing [the same level of] coverage for the same risk, contain conflicting ‘other insurance’ clauses ... if one insurer pays more than its share of the loss or defense costs without participation from the other insurer or insurers, a right to contribution arises.” (Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Century Surety Co., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160 , citing Fireman’s F | 1 | 1 |
AM. CONTINENTAL INS. v. Am. Cas. Co.green2 sentences2000Co. v. American Casualty Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 508, 513 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 560 ].) Respondents recognize the distinction between these contribution and subrogation theories, and concede that their policies were primary and covered the same insured (Nielsen) and the same risks as did Nationwide’s policy. 2000Co. v. American Casualty Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 508, 513 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 560 ].) Respondents recognize the distinction between these contribution and subrogation theories, and concede that their policies were primary and covered the same insured (Nielsen) and the same risks as did Nationwide’s policy. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Collinsred2 sentences1998Dict. (3d ed. 1961) p. 463.) In a similar vein, Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word to mean “[t]o urge forcefully; under extreme pressure.” (Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 282.) 6 It is true that in People v. Lankford (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 203 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 408 ] (disapproved on other grounds in People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 695, fn. 4 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 782 , 552 P.2d 742 ]), the magistrate (prior to the wife’s testifying at a preliminary hearing) carefully questioned the wife concerning the consequent loss of her privileges insofar as any future trial in the same overall cri 1998Dict. (3d ed. 1961) p. 463.) In a similar vein, Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word to mean “[t]o urge forcefully; under extreme pressure.” (Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 282.) 6 It is true that in People v. Lankford (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 203 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 408 ] (disapproved on other grounds in People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 695, fn. 4 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 782 , 552 P.2d 742 ]), the magistrate (prior to the wife’s testifying at a preliminary hearing) carefully questioned the wife concerning the consequent loss of her privileges insofar as any future trial in the same overall cri | 1 | 1 |
| McCann v. Weldengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Horne v. Peckhamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| ITT Small Business Finance Corp. v. Nilesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fuentes v. Tuckergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hunton v. California Portland Cement Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McDowellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Abers v. Rounsavell
green
2 sentences2022This is because contract language is not “reasonably . . . susceptible” to a party’s interpretation thereof “merely because the parties (or judges) disagree about its meaning.” (See Abers v. Rounsavell (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 348, 356 .) Indeed, holding that the trial court’s prior rulings regarding paragraph 8 trigger the genuine dispute rule “would have the practical effect of denying the policy did not require the Hollanders to procure an appraisal of their paintings before exercising their rights under paragraph 8,” and (b) paragraph 25’s appraisal process did not directly apply to the Holl 2022This is because contract language is not “reasonably . . . susceptible” to a party’s interpretation thereof “merely because the parties (or judges) disagree about its meaning.” (See Abers v. Rounsavell (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 348, 356 .) Indeed, holding that the trial court’s prior rulings regarding paragraph 8 trigger the genuine dispute rule “would have the practical effect of denying the policy did not require the Hollanders to procure an appraisal of their paintings before exercising their rights under paragraph 8,” and (b) paragraph 25’s appraisal process did not directly apply to the Holl | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Renteria v. County of Orange
green
2 sentences1983Respondents complain that workers' compensation may be awarded for emotional suffering which causes physical injury, but, as noted in Renteria v. County of Orange, supra, 82 Cal. App.3d 833, 839-840 , no decisional or statutory authority states that "mental suffering, as such, is a compensable injury." Here, it appears that neither the loss of hearing nor any alleged emotional damages are compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. 1983Respondents complain that workers’ compensation may be awarded for emotional suffering which causes physical injury, but, as noted in Renteria v. County of Orange, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d 833, 839-840 , no decisional or statutory authority states that “mental suffering, as such, is a compensable injury.” Here, it appears that neither the loss of hearing nor any alleged emotional damages are compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Singer Co. v. County of Kings
green
2 sentences1980“Our conclusion is supported by Singer Co. v. Kings County (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 852 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 398 ]. 1980“Our conclusion is supported by Singer Co. v. Kings County (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 852 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 398 ]. | 2 | 1975–1980 |
ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2024Therefore, [she] could not have been harmed before the trial court granted summary judgment to the ambulance driver.” The problem with this argument is that the case-within-a-case methodology applies only in certain legal malpractice claims, that is, when alleged malpractice occurs “in the prosecution or defense of a legal claim” (Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1057 ), a different context than failing at all to file an action within the applicable limitations period. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Carmel Development Co. v. RLI Insurance
green
1 sentence2016(Id. at p. 508.) ‘“Although courts honor coverage terms, including ‘other insurance’ clauses, whenever possible, ‘where the policies of two or more insurers of a common insured, providing [the same level of] coverage for the same risk, contain conflicting “other insurance” clauses ... if one insurer pays more than its share of the loss or defense costs without participation from the other insurer or insurers, a right to contribution arises.’ ” (Ibid.) Even when an insurance policy has an other insurance clause that purports to be excess only and another insurance policy provides for pro rata c | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Chavez v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2014(See Chavez, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 769-771 (plur. opn. of Thomas, J.).) 11 the Attorney General does not explain how defendant could protect his Fifth Amendment rights in a future criminal proceeding after expressly waiving these rights as a condition of probation. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozab
green
1 sentence2013In Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozab (1990) 51 Cal.3d 991 (Wozab), the court determined that even if a creditor takes steps that result in the loss or waiver of the security interest under section 726's "one form of action" rule, that does not necessarily 6 We also observe that the Hibernia line of case law appears directed more at the application of the "one form of action" rule embodied in section 726, and the circumstances under which a creditor may proceed immediately and directly against the debtor instead of foreclosing on the security first. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Superior Ct.
green
1 sentence2012General principles of equitable contribution “Equitable contribution apportions costs among insurers sharing the same level of liability on the same risk as to the same insured, and is available when several insurers are ‘ “obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action without any participation by the others.” ’ ” (Safeco, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 879 ; see Axis Surplus Ins. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Davis v. Phoenix Insurance
green
1 sentence2007Co., supra, 111 Cal. at page 415 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Travelers Cas. and Sur. v. Century Sur.
green
1 sentence2005Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 ].) Although courts honor coverage terms, including “other insurance” clauses, whenever possible, “where the policies of two or more insurers of a common insured, providing [the same level of] coverage for the same risk, contain conflicting ‘other insurance’ clauses ... if one insurer pays more than its share of the loss or defense costs without participation from the other insurer or insurers, a right to contribution arises.” (Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Century Surety Co., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160 , citing Fireman’s F | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Foxborough v. Van Atta
green
2 sentences2002Sehuelt's position is that the claim itself would not exist but for his former lawyers' alleged malpractice. [1] Majority Opinion at page 235, quoting from a Court of Appeal opinion, Foxborough v. Van Atta (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 217, 227 , 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 525 . 2002Sehuelt's position is that the claim itself would not exist but for his former lawyers' alleged malpractice. [1] Majority Opinion at page 235, quoting from a Court of Appeal opinion, Foxborough v. Van Atta (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 217, 227 , 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 525 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Fortes v. Municipal Court green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Lankford green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Karl v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Heyer v. Flaig green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Laird v. Blacker green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People Ex Rel. Van De Kamp v. American Art Enterprises, Inc. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Brewer v. Second Baptist Church green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Hanover Insurance Co. v. Carroll green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Rice v. Schmid green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Waring v. Crow neutral | 1 | 1864–1864 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.