collective knowledge doctrine in Massachusetts

2024See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 308 F.2d 326, 327 (D.C.

2023The collective knowledge doctrine, sometimes referred to as the fellow officer rule, originated in Williams v. United States, 308 F.2d 326, 327 (D.C.

2023Rivet, supra.7 More recently, in Commonwealth v. Roland R., 448 Mass. 278, 285 (2007), the court applied the collective knowledge doctrine to a set of facts highlighting its importance.

2021If Dwan's knowledge may be imputed to Doherty under the collective knowledge doctrine, see Commonwealth v. Roland R., 448 Mass. 278, 285 (2007), then Doherty would have an additional basis for reasonable suspicion that the defendant was the robber. 1.

2023See Commonwealth v. Gullick, 386 Mass. 278, 283 (1982), S.C., 462 Mass. 1011 (2012) ("Troopers Johnson, Ellis, and Mackin were engaged in a cooperative effort in the investigation of this incident.

1994See also Commonwealth v. Gullick, 386 Mass. 278, 283-284 (1982).

2011Id. at 836 , citing Bank of New England, supra. 15 Because the offense in Bank of New England was a statutorily-created crime, and because “the mens rea at issue in [Bank of New England) was essentially only the requirement of knowledge,” the collective knowledge instruction given there was appropriate as a matter of Massachusetts law. 16 Life Care, supra. We interpret Life Care and Bank of New England, taken together, to mean that the Commonwealth may establish a corporation’s knowledge, for purposes of imposing criminal liability, through collective knowledge of the corporate defendant’s age

2010The court distinguished its decision from the holding by the First Circuit in United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 855-856 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987), a decision cited by both parties in their briefs.

2010The defendant fails to acknowledge the collective knowledge rule of Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 356 Mass. at 340 , and hence ignores the potent evidence as to the license plate numbers.

1994Under the collective knowledge doctrine as it relates to probable cause to arrest (an issue not before us), “it is unnecessary for the detaining officer to know all the information pertaining to the incident . . . . ‘[T]he knowledge of one [police officer] . . . [is] the knowledge of all.’ ” Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 356 Mass. 337, 340 (1969), quoting from Commonwealth v. Mc Dermott, 347 Mass. 246, 249 (1964).

2024Third, the only authority that Westgate cites for its broad statement is Commonwealth v. Perez, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 271, 274 (2011).

2023See United States v. Whitfield, 634 F.3d 741, 746 (3d Cir. 2010) ("It would make little sense to decline to apply the collective knowledge doctrine in a fast-paced, dynamic situation such as we have before us, in which the officers worked together as a unified and tight-knit team; indeed, it would be impractical to expect an officer in such a situation to communicate to the other officers every fact that could be pertinent in a subsequent reasonable suspicion analysis"); United States v. Nunez, 455 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006) (reasonable suspicion determined from "collective knowledge of

2023See Commonwealth v. Gullick, 386 Mass. 278, 283 (1982), S.C., 462 Mass. 1011 (2012) ("Troopers Johnson, Ellis, and Mackin were engaged in a cooperative effort in the investigation of this incident.

2023See also United States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307 , 316 n.8 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Absent record evidence that [the first officer] communicated his suspicion or any relevant information to [the acting officer] before the latter began to conduct the protective search, we will not impute his knowledge or reasonable suspicion to [the acting officer] under the doctrine of collective knowledge. . . . [W]e decline to extend the collective knowledge doctrine to cases where, as here, there is no evidence that an officer has 12 communicated his suspicions with the officer conducting the search, even when the o

2023See also United States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307 , 316 n.8 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Absent record evidence that [the first officer] communicated his suspicion or any relevant information to [the acting officer] before the latter began to conduct the protective search, we will not impute his knowledge or reasonable suspicion to [the acting officer] under the doctrine of collective knowledge. . . . [W]e decline to extend the collective knowledge doctrine to cases where, as here, there is no evidence that an officer has 12 communicated his suspicions with the officer conducting the search, even when the o

2023See also United States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307 , 316 n.8 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Absent record evidence that [the first officer] communicated his suspicion or any relevant information to [the acting officer] before the latter began to conduct the protective search, we will not impute his knowledge or reasonable suspicion to [the acting officer] under the doctrine of collective knowledge. . . . [W]e decline to extend the collective knowledge doctrine to cases where, as here, there is no evidence that an officer has 12 communicated his suspicions with the officer conducting the search, even when the o

2023See also United States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307 , 316 n.8 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Absent record evidence that [the first officer] communicated his suspicion or any relevant information to [the acting officer] before the latter began to conduct the protective search, we will not impute his knowledge or reasonable suspicion to [the acting officer] under the doctrine of collective knowledge. . . . [W]e decline to extend the collective knowledge doctrine to cases where, as here, there is no evidence that an officer has 12 communicated his suspicions with the officer conducting the search, even when the o

2023Commonwealth v. Gant, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 314, 318 (2001) (aggregating observations of two separate officers to get to probable cause because "[b]oth officers were engaged in a cooperative effort in the investigation of this incident so that we may consider the complete picture"); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 386 , 393 n.8 (1993) (noting collective knowledge doctrine and probable cause standard).

2023See Massenburg, 654 F.3d at 493 ("the collective-knowledge doctrine simply directs us to substitute the knowledge of the instructing officer or officers for the knowledge of the acting officer").

2023See United States v. Whitfield, 634 F.3d 741, 746 (3d Cir. 2010) ("It would make little sense to decline to apply the collective knowledge doctrine in a fast-paced, dynamic situation such as we have before us, in which the officers worked together as a unified and tight-knit team; indeed, it would be impractical to expect an officer in such a situation to communicate to the other officers every fact that could be pertinent in a subsequent reasonable suspicion analysis"); United States v. Nunez, 455 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006) (reasonable suspicion determined from "collective knowledge of

2023In this context, it is not necessary for the acting officers to have personal knowledge of the facts establishing reasonable suspicion or probable cause, because the acting officers "are acting as the agents or proxies of, or are relying on information provided by, the officers who possess probable cause or reasonable suspicion." United States v. Gorham, 317 F. Supp. 3d 459, 473 (D.D.C. 2018).

2023State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971).

2023The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit permits the knowledge of a group of officers to "be considered in determining probable cause, not 20 just the knowledge of the individual who physically effected the arrest," so long as the "agents [were] in close communication with one another." United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 752 (6th Cir. 2008), quoting United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 260 (6th Cir. 1976).

2023See United States v. Whitfield, 634 F.3d 741, 746 (3d Cir. 2010) ("It would make little sense to decline to apply the collective knowledge doctrine in a fast-paced, dynamic situation such as we have before us, in which the officers worked together as a unified and tight-knit team; indeed, it would be impractical to expect an officer in such a situation to communicate to the other officers every fact that could be pertinent in a subsequent reasonable suspicion analysis"); United States v. Nunez, 455 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006) (reasonable suspicion determined from "collective knowledge of

2023See United States v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007) (requiring only "some degree of communication" between arresting officer and officer who has knowledge of all necessary facts); United States v. Gillette, 245 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 982 (2001) (requiring "some degree of communication" to ensure officers functioning as "search team"); State v. Breeding, 200 So. 3d 1193, 1200 (Ala. Crim.

2023See United States v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007) ("Under the collective knowledge doctrine, it is not necessary for the arresting officer to know all of the facts amounting to probable cause, as long as there is some degree of communication between the arresting officer and an officer who has knowledge of all the necessary facts").

2023See United States v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007) (requiring only "some degree of communication" between arresting officer and officer who has knowledge of all necessary facts); United States v. Gillette, 245 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 982 (2001) (requiring "some degree of communication" to ensure officers functioning as "search team"); State v. Breeding, 200 So. 3d 1193, 1200 (Ala. Crim.

2023The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit permits the knowledge of a group of officers to "be considered in determining probable cause, not 20 just the knowledge of the individual who physically effected the arrest," so long as the "agents [were] in close communication with one another." United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 752 (6th Cir. 2008), quoting United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 260 (6th Cir. 1976).

2023The court held that the collective knowledge doctrine could not be applied to aggregate the knowledge of the officers because "the police were not aware of the theft reported to station 9 nor were they engaged in a cooperative effort with officers in connection with the stolen bonds who did have this knowledge." Id. at 387 .

2023"The primary purpose 10In Hawkins, 361 Mass. at 386 , the court declined to apply the collective knowledge doctrine because the arresting officers were not engaged in a cooperative effort with those who had knowledge that the recovered bonds were stolen.

2023See United States v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007) (requiring only "some degree of communication" between arresting officer and officer who has knowledge of all necessary facts); United States v. Gillette, 245 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 982 (2001) (requiring "some degree of communication" to ensure officers functioning as "search team"); State v. Breeding, 200 So. 3d 1193, 1200 (Ala. Crim.

2023See also United States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307 , 316 n.8 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Absent record evidence that [the first officer] communicated his suspicion or any relevant information to [the acting officer] before the latter began to conduct the protective search, we will not impute his knowledge or reasonable suspicion to [the acting officer] under the doctrine of collective knowledge. . . . [W]e decline to extend the collective knowledge doctrine to cases where, as here, there is no evidence that an officer has 12 communicated his suspicions with the officer conducting the search, even when the o

2023See also United States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307 , 316 n.8 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Absent record evidence that [the first officer] communicated his suspicion or any relevant information to [the acting officer] before the latter began to conduct the protective search, we will not impute his knowledge or reasonable suspicion to [the acting officer] under the doctrine of collective knowledge. . . . [W]e decline to extend the collective knowledge doctrine to cases where, as here, there is no evidence that an officer has 12 communicated his suspicions with the officer conducting the search, even when the o