collective knowledge doctrine in California

2020(United States v. Ramirez (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3d 1026 , 1032.) “[A] detaining officer who is not personally aware of all the facts on which a reasonable suspicion might be based may nevertheless properly detain an individual on the basis of a direction or information transmitted by police officers who were personally aware of such facts.” (People v. Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1521 ; see United States v. Shareef (10th Cir. 1996) 100 F.3d 1491, 1503 [“The cases in which we have applied the ‘collective knowledge’ rule all have involved actual communication to the arresting officer of eith

2015Instead, “[u]nder the collective knowledge doctrine, we must determine whether an investigatory stop, search, or arrest complied with the Fourth Amendment by ‘look[ing] to the collective knowledge of all the officers involved in the criminal investigation although all of the information known to the law enforcement officers involved in the investigation is not communicated to the officer who actually [undertakes the challenged action].’ ” (United States v. Ramirez (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3d 1026 , 1032.) “[W]hen police officers work together to build ‘collective knowledge’ of probable cause, the

2021Moreover, even if a Fourth Amendment violation could have been established, it would not require suppression of Hanley’s confession absent a causal link establishing that the confession was obtained by exploitation of the illegal detention. ( Jenkins, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1178–1180.) This issue turns on “whether ‘intervening events break the causal connection between the illegal [detention] and the [incriminating statement] so that the [statement] is “ ‘sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 268 .) Here, although a re

2021Moreover, even if a Fourth Amendment violation could have been established, it would not require suppression of Hanley’s confession absent a causal link establishing that the confession was obtained by exploitation of the illegal detention. ( Jenkins, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1178–1180.) This issue turns on “whether ‘intervening events break the causal connection between the illegal [detention] and the [incriminating statement] so that the [statement] is “ ‘sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 268 .) Here, although a re

2021Because the record shows that Hanley was taken into custody through the collective action of several officers, all of the officers who participated in the investigation “constructively shared the same pool of information under the collective knowledge doctrine.” (Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 780 ; see also People v. Ramirez (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1555 .) Thus, at the outset of Hanley’s interview, the officers had the following pertinent information: Hanley and Outin’s relationship was fraught; Hanley was living in a half-way house but had parties

2020(United States v. Ramirez (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3d 1026 , 1032.) “[A] detaining officer who is not personally aware of all the facts on which a reasonable suspicion might be based may nevertheless properly detain an individual on the basis of a direction or information transmitted by police officers who were personally aware of such facts.” (People v. Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1521 ; see United States v. Shareef (10th Cir. 1996) 100 F.3d 1491, 1503 [“The cases in which we have applied the ‘collective knowledge’ rule all have involved actual communication to the arresting officer of eith

2020(United States v. Ramirez (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3d 1026 , 1032.) “[A] detaining officer who is not personally aware of all the facts on which a reasonable suspicion might be based may nevertheless properly detain an individual on the basis of a direction or information transmitted by police officers who were personally aware of such facts.” (People v. Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1521 ; see United States v. Shareef (10th Cir. 1996) 100 F.3d 1491, 1503 [“The cases in which we have applied the ‘collective knowledge’ rule all have involved actual communication to the arresting officer of eith

2020First, in United States v. Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221 , where one law enforcement agency relied on the work of another law enforcement agency, the Court endorsed the collective knowledge doctrine.

2020First, in United States v. Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221 , where one law enforcement agency relied on the work of another law enforcement agency, the Court endorsed the collective knowledge doctrine.

2017That analysis drives the probable cause analysis, for if there was no objectively reasonable basis to believe *781 Cornell had violated Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a) or any other law, probable cause to arrest was lacking as well. ( Casares , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 838 , 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 167 , 364 P.3d 1093 ["The detention being unlawful, the subsequent searches of defendant's person and the car he had been sitting in were also unlawful."].) We agree with the trial court that there was no reasonable suspicion to detain and hence no probable cause to arrest.

2017That analysis drives the probable cause analysis, for if there was no objectively reasonable basis to believe *781 Cornell had violated Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a) or any other law, probable cause to arrest was lacking as well. ( Casares , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 838 , 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 167 , 364 P.3d 1093 ["The detention being unlawful, the subsequent searches of defendant's person and the car he had been sitting in were also unlawful."].) We agree with the trial court that there was no reasonable suspicion to detain and hence no probable cause to arrest.

2016“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised . . . , we consider the issues waived.” (Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 .) 5 reflecting which sailors “had duty.” (Id. at p. 839.) Then Hunt began to testify about the content of the logs and the prosecutor objected.

2016When defense counsel asked, “How do you know you had duty on that day?” Hunt referred to “logs” kept on the ship orders as the superior court’s appellate division. [Citations.] Therefore, our review is as if the parties directly appealed from the trial court ruling on [Melchoir’s] suppression motion. [Citation.]” (People v. Linn (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 56 .) We do not consider whether Officer Aloise’s statement to Officer Landi is admissible under the collective knowledge rule because the People do not raise that argument on appeal.

2002(Id. at p. 845.) The court also explained that where that principle applies, “there is police conduct to deter.” (Ibid.) Finally, the court reasoned that failure to apply the exclusionary rule “would . . . encourage careless, perhaps deliberately neglectful, record keeping.” (Id. at p. 846.) In State v. Mayorga (Tex.App. 1996) 938 S.W.2d 81, 83 , a Texas Court of Appeals considered how the collective knowledge principle would apply where a police officer arrested the defendant based on incorrect radio information from a police dispatcher that there were outstanding arrest warrants for the defe

2002Suppression of evidence seized pursuant to police computer errors will encourage law enforcement agencies to diligently maintain accurate and current computer records." ( Id. at p. 667, fn. omitted.) In State v. Gough (1986) 35 Ohio App.3d 81 , 519 N.E.2d 842, 846 , an Ohio appellate court found the good faith exception inapplicable where police executed an arrest warrant issued on the basis of information that was incorrect due to "negligence, inaccuracies, or inadequacies in record-keeping procedure" by "law enforcement personnel at [a] jail." The court explained that in Leon, the high court

2002Suppression of evidence seized pursuant to police computer errors will encourage law enforcement agencies to diligently maintain accurate and current computer records." ( Id. at p. 667, fn. omitted.) In State v. Gough (1986) 35 Ohio App.3d 81 , 519 N.E.2d 842, 846 , an Ohio appellate court found the good faith exception inapplicable where police executed an arrest warrant issued on the basis of information that was incorrect due to "negligence, inaccuracies, or inadequacies in record-keeping procedure" by "law enforcement personnel at [a] jail." The court explained that in Leon, the high court

2002Suppression of evidence seized pursuant to police computer errors will encourage law enforcement agencies to diligently maintain accurate and current computer records." ( Id. at p. 667, fn. omitted.) In State v. Gough (1986) 35 Ohio App.3d 81 , 519 N.E.2d 842, 846 , an Ohio appellate court found the good faith exception inapplicable where police executed an arrest warrant issued on the basis of information that was incorrect due to "negligence, inaccuracies, or inadequacies in record-keeping procedure" by "law enforcement personnel at [a] jail." The court explained that in Leon, the high court