74 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1948–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
French v. Chasegreen2 sentences2014Cf. French v. Chase, 48 Wn.2d 825, 830 , 297 P.2d 235 (1956) (requiring a reasonable appearance of imminent peril in a different variety of the rescue doctrine applicable where an injured rescuer seeks compensation from a person who caused the danger requiring rescue); McCoy v. Am. 2014Cf. French v. Chase, 48 Wn.2d 825, 830 , 297 P.2d 235 (1956) (requiring a reasonable appearance of imminent peril in a different variety of the rescue doctrine applicable where an injured rescuer seeks compensation from a person who caused the danger requiring rescue); McCoy v. Am. | 3 | 10 |
United States v. Jumelia M. Devane, as Administratrix of the Estate of James Frank Devane, Deceasedgreen2 sentences2006Specifically, Chambers-Castanes claimed that “foreseeable reliance on governmental representations creates a special relationship duty.” Chambers-Castanes , Reply Br. of Appellants at 9; see also United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that the representations and foreseeable reliance on those representations created a relationship-based duty); United States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1960) (same); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 , 76 S. Ct. 122 , 100 L. 1983See also United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir.1962). [4] Certainly, an actionable duty to provide police services may also arise under the rescue doctrine. | 3 | 3 |
Cummins v. Lewis Countygreen2 sentences2026“A special relationship imposing an actionable duty to perform arises between the plaintiff and a government entity when ‘(1) there is a direct contact or privity between the public official and the injured plaintiff which sets the latter apart from the general public, and (2) there are express assurances given by a public official, which (3) gives rise to justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff.’ ” Cummins v. Lewis County, 156 Wn.2d 844, 854 , 133 P.3d 458 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Beal v. City of Seattle, 134 Wn.2d 769, 785 , 954 P.2d 237 (1998)). 2016Thus, at the outset of a negligence action against a governmental entity, courts look to the public duty doctrine to determine whether the government owed the plaintiffs a duty of care. 5 There are four exceptions to the public duty doctrine, "( 1) legislative intent, (2) failure to enforce, (3) the rescue doctrine, and (4) a special relationship." Cummins v. Lewis County, 156 Wn.2d 844 , 853 n.7, 133 P.3d 458 (2006). 6 No. 33204-7-III Garcia v. Franklin Co. The appellants originally relied upon the rescue doctrine exception to assert that the county owed Ms. Garcia a duty of care. | 2 | 12 |
Maltman v. Sauergreen2 sentences2019The rescue doctrine is a tort concept that "allows an injured rescuer to sue the party which caused the danger requiring the rescue in the first place." McCoy, 136 Wash.2d at 355 , 961 P.2d 952 (citing Maltman, 84 Wash.2d at 976 -77 , 530 P.2d 254 ). 2019The rescue doctrine is a tort concept that "allows an injured rescuer to sue the party which caused the danger requiring the rescue in the first place." McCoy, 136 Wash.2d at 355 , 961 P.2d 952 (citing Maltman, 84 Wash.2d at 976 -77 , 530 P.2d 254 ). | 2 | 10 |
Bratton v. Welpgreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Bratton v. Welp, 145 Wn.2d 572, 576-77 , 39 P.3d 959 (2002); Babcock v. Mason County Fire Dist. 2006Babcock, 144 Wash.2d at 786 , 30 P.3d 1261 . [8] See, e.g., Bratton, 145 Wash.2d at 577 , 39 P.3d 959 (analyzing duty owed by 911 to send police); Babcock, 144 Wash.2d at 785 , 30 P.3d 1261 (analyzing duty owed by fire department when fire fighter communicated with plaintiffs in person); Mull v. City of Bellevue, 64 Wash.App. 245 , 823 P.2d 1152 (1992) (analyzing government duty owed to building owner). [1] For example, consider these two uses of the term. | 2 | 3 |
Bratton v. Welpgreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Bratton v. Welp, 145 Wn.2d 572, 576-77 , 39 P.3d 959 (2002); Babcock v. Mason County Fire Dist. 2006Babcock, 144 Wash.2d at 786 , 30 P.3d 1261 . [8] See, e.g., Bratton, 145 Wash.2d at 577 , 39 P.3d 959 (analyzing duty owed by 911 to send police); Babcock, 144 Wash.2d at 785 , 30 P.3d 1261 (analyzing duty owed by fire department when fire fighter communicated with plaintiffs in person); Mull v. City of Bellevue, 64 Wash.App. 245 , 823 P.2d 1152 (1992) (analyzing government duty owed to building owner). [1] For example, consider these two uses of the term. | 2 | 3 |
Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc.green2 sentences2023We disagree. 4 “The rescue doctrine recognizes that a duty to exercise reasonable care arises when a person undertakes ‘to render aid to or warn a person in danger.’” Beltran- Serrano, 193 Wn.2d at 550 n.10 (quoting Brown, 86 Wn.2d at 299 ). 2019The rescue doctrine recognizes that a duty to exercise reasonable care arises when a person undertakes "to render aid to or warn a person in danger." Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 293 , 299, 545 P.2d 13 (1975). | 1 | 13 |
Chambers-Castanes v. King Countygreen2 sentences2004The rescue doctrine is one of these exceptions: (1) [W]hen the terms of a legislative enactment evidence an intent to identify and protect a particular and circumscribed class of persons (legislative intent), Halvorson v. Dahl, [ 89 Wash.2d 673, 676-77 , 574 P.2d 1190 (1978)]; (2) where governmental agents responsible for enforcing statutory requirements possess actual knowledge of a statutory violation, fail to take corrective action despite a statutory duty to do so, and the plaintiff is within the *1265 class the statute intended to protect (failure to enforce), Campbell v. Bellevue, [ 85 W 2004The rescue doctrine is one of these exceptions: (1) [W]hen the terms of a legislative enactment evidence an intent to identify and protect a particular and circumscribed class of persons (legislative intent), Halvorson v. Dahl, [ 89 Wash.2d 673, 676-77 , 574 P.2d 1190 (1978)]; (2) where governmental agents responsible for enforcing statutory requirements possess actual knowledge of a statutory violation, fail to take corrective action despite a statutory duty to do so, and the plaintiff is within the *1265 class the statute intended to protect (failure to enforce), Campbell v. Bellevue, [ 85 W | 1 | 7 |
Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.green2 sentences1998The Court of Appeals agreed stating the rescue doctrine "varies the ordinary rules of negligence." McCoy, 86 Wash.App. at 110 , 936 P.2d 31 (citing Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 6 Cal.3d 361 , 491 P.2d 821 , 99 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1971)). 1998The Court of Appeals agreed stating the rescue doctrine "varies the ordinary rules of negligence." McCoy, 86 Wash.App. at 110 , 936 P.2d 31 (citing Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 6 Cal.3d 361 , 491 P.2d 821 , 99 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1971)). | 1 | 3 |
| Solomon v. Shuellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Solomon v. Shuellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walters v. Sloangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Babcock v. Mason County Fire District No. 6
green
2 sentences2020These -12- Ehrhart et al. v. King County et al., 96464-5 exceptions are “(1) legislative intent, (2) failure to enforce, (3) the rescue doctrine, and (4) a special relationship.” Id. at n.7 (citing Munich, 175 Wn.2d at 879 ). “‘If any one of the exceptions applies, the government is held as a matter of law to owe a duty to the plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Munich, 175 Wn.2d at 879 ). 2015No. 6, 144 Wn.2d 774, 785 , 30 P.3d 1261 (2001); Beal v. City of Seattle, 134 Wn.2d 769, 784 , 954 P.2d 237 (1998)). ¶55 There are four exceptions to the public duty doctrine: (1) legislative intent, (2) failure to enforce, (3) the rescue doctrine, and (4) a special relationship. | 10 | 2006–2020 |
Cummins v. Lewis County
green
2 sentences2026“A special relationship imposing an actionable duty to perform arises between the plaintiff and a government entity when ‘(1) there is a direct contact or privity between the public official and the injured plaintiff which sets the latter apart from the general public, and (2) there are express assurances given by a public official, which (3) gives rise to justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff.’ ” Cummins v. Lewis County, 156 Wn.2d 844, 854 , 133 P.3d 458 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Beal v. City of Seattle, 134 Wn.2d 769, 785 , 954 P.2d 237 (1998)). 2016Thus, at the outset of a negligence action against a governmental entity, courts look to the public duty doctrine to determine whether the government owed the plaintiffs a duty of care. 5 There are four exceptions to the public duty doctrine, "( 1) legislative intent, (2) failure to enforce, (3) the rescue doctrine, and (4) a special relationship." Cummins v. Lewis County, 156 Wn.2d 844 , 853 n.7, 133 P.3d 458 (2006). 6 No. 33204-7-III Garcia v. Franklin Co. The appellants originally relied upon the rescue doctrine exception to assert that the county owed Ms. Garcia a duty of care. | 9 | 2011–2026 |
Munich v. Skagit Emergency Communications Center
green
2 sentences2020These -12- Ehrhart et al. v. King County et al., 96464-5 exceptions are “(1) legislative intent, (2) failure to enforce, (3) the rescue doctrine, and (4) a special relationship.” Id. at n.7 (citing Munich, 175 Wn.2d at 879 ). “‘If any one of the exceptions applies, the government is held as a matter of law to owe a duty to the plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Munich, 175 Wn.2d at 879 ). 2020These -12- Ehrhart et al. v. King County et al., 96464-5 exceptions are “(1) legislative intent, (2) failure to enforce, (3) the rescue doctrine, and (4) a special relationship.” Id. at n.7 (citing Munich, 175 Wn.2d at 879 ). “‘If any one of the exceptions applies, the government is held as a matter of law to owe a duty to the plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Munich, 175 Wn.2d at 879 ). | 9 | 2015–2026 |
McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp.
green
2 sentences2019The rescue doctrine is a tort concept that "allows an injured rescuer to sue the party which caused the danger requiring the rescue in the first place." McCoy, 136 Wash.2d at 355 , 961 P.2d 952 (citing Maltman, 84 Wash.2d at 976 -77 , 530 P.2d 254 ). 2019The rescue doctrine reflects "a societal value judgment that rescuers should not be barred from bringing suit for knowingly placing themselves in danger to undertake a rescue." Id. at 356 , 961 P.2d 952 . | 6 | 2006–2019 |
McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp.
green
2 sentences2019Bailey, 'The rescue doctrine is a tort concept that "allows an injured rescuer to sue the party which caused the danger requiring the rescue in the first place." McCoy, 136 Wn.2d at 355 (citing Maltman, 84 Wn.2d at 976-77 ). 2019The rescue doctrine is a tort concept that "allows an injured rescuer to sue the party which caused the danger requiring the rescue in the first place." McCoy, 136 Wash.2d at 355 , 961 P.2d 952 (citing Maltman, 84 Wash.2d at 976 -77 , 530 P.2d 254 ). | 6 | 2006–2019 |
Bailey v. Town of Forks
green
2 sentences2006On the contrary, reliance is the linchpin of the rescue doctrine. f 12 Under the rescue doctrine, a public entity has a “special” duty “to exercise reasonable care after assuming a duty to warn or come to the aid of a particular plaintiff.” Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108 Wn.2d 262, 268 , 737 P.2d 1257 , 753 P.2d 523 (1987). 2006On the contrary, reliance is the linchpin of the rescue doctrine. f 12 Under the rescue doctrine, a public entity has a “special” duty “to exercise reasonable care after assuming a duty to warn or come to the aid of a particular plaintiff.” Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108 Wn.2d 262, 268 , 737 P.2d 1257 , 753 P.2d 523 (1987). | 6 | 1989–2006 |
Folsom v. Burger King
green
2 sentences2024Accordingly, the court determined that the City owed the Norgs, individually, a common law duty of reasonable care pursuant to the rescue doctrine, which “‘arises when one party voluntarily begins to assist an individual needing help.’” Id. at 763 (quoting Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658 , 674- 75, 958 P.2d 301 (1998)). 2024These facts gave rise to a duty of reasonable care under the rescue doctrine, which “‘arises when one party voluntarily begins to assist an individual needing help.’” Norg, 200 Wn.2d at 763 (quoting Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 674-75 , 958 P.2d 301 (1998)). | 5 | 2014–2024 |
Hawkins v. Palmer
neutral
2 sentences1993In Hawkins , the court held that, in order for the rescuer to invoke the rescue doctrine when a defendant is not responsible for causing the dangerous situation from which someone had to be rescued, "the defendant must he guilty of some negligence toward the rescuer after he, the rescuer, has begun to attempt the rescue." 29 Wn.2d at 575 . 1948The applicability of the rescue doctrine was considered and discussed in the recent case of Hawkins v. Palmer, 29 Wn. (2d) 570, 188 P. (2d) 121 . | 5 | 1948–1998 |
Babcock v. Mason County Fire Dist. No. 6
green
2 sentences2015No. 6, 144 Wn.2d 774, 785 , 30 P.3d 1261 (2001); Beal v. City of Seattle, 134 Wn.2d 769, 784 , 954 P.2d 237 (1998)). ¶55 There are four exceptions to the public duty doctrine: (1) legislative intent, (2) failure to enforce, (3) the rescue doctrine, and (4) a special relationship. 2008Babcock, 144 Wash.2d at 785-86 , 30 P.3d 1261 . | 4 | 2006–2015 |
State v. Bryant
green
2 sentences2006On the contrary, reliance is the linchpin of the rescue doctrine. f 12 Under the rescue doctrine, a public entity has a “special” duty “to exercise reasonable care after assuming a duty to warn or come to the aid of a particular plaintiff.” Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108 Wn.2d 262, 268 , 737 P.2d 1257 , 753 P.2d 523 (1987). 2006On the contrary, reliance is the linchpin of the rescue doctrine. ¶ 12 Under the rescue doctrine, a public entity has a "special" duty "to exercise reasonable care after assuming a duty to warn or come to the aid of a particular plaintiff." Bailey v. Forks, 108 Wash.2d 262, 268 , 737 P.2d 1257 , 753 P.2d 523 (1987). | 4 | 1989–2006 |
Ballou v. Nelson
green
2 sentences1997Ballou v. Nelson, 67 Wash.App. 67, 70 , 834 P.2d 97 (1992). 1997Ballou v. Nelson, 67 Wash.App. 67, 70 , 834 P.2d 97 (1992). | 4 | 1993–1997 |
Folsom v. Burger King
green
2 sentences2024Accordingly, the court determined that the City owed the Norgs, individually, a common law duty of reasonable care pursuant to the rescue doctrine, which “‘arises when one party voluntarily begins to assist an individual needing help.’” Id. at 763 (quoting Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658 , 674- 75, 958 P.2d 301 (1998)). 2024These facts gave rise to a duty of reasonable care under the rescue doctrine, which “‘arises when one party voluntarily begins to assist an individual needing help.’” Norg, 200 Wn.2d at 763 (quoting Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 674-75 , 958 P.2d 301 (1998)). | 3 | 2021–2024 |
Beal v. City of Seattle
green
2 sentences2026“A special relationship imposing an actionable duty to perform arises between the plaintiff and a government entity when ‘(1) there is a direct contact or privity between the public official and the injured plaintiff which sets the latter apart from the general public, and (2) there are express assurances given by a public official, which (3) gives rise to justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff.’ ” Cummins v. Lewis County, 156 Wn.2d 844, 854 , 133 P.3d 458 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Beal v. City of Seattle, 134 Wn.2d 769, 785 , 954 P.2d 237 (1998)). 2015No. 6, 144 Wn.2d 774, 785 , 30 P.3d 1261 (2001); Beal v. City of Seattle, 134 Wn.2d 769, 784 , 954 P.2d 237 (1998)). ¶55 There are four exceptions to the public duty doctrine: (1) legislative intent, (2) failure to enforce, (3) the rescue doctrine, and (4) a special relationship. | 2 | 2015–2026 |
Beal for Martinez v. City of Seattle
green
2 sentences2026“A special relationship imposing an actionable duty to perform arises between the plaintiff and a government entity when ‘(1) there is a direct contact or privity between the public official and the injured plaintiff which sets the latter apart from the general public, and (2) there are express assurances given by a public official, which (3) gives rise to justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff.’ ” Cummins v. Lewis County, 156 Wn.2d 844, 854 , 133 P.3d 458 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Beal v. City of Seattle, 134 Wn.2d 769, 785 , 954 P.2d 237 (1998)). 2015No. 6, 144 Wn.2d 774, 785 , 30 P.3d 1261 (2001); Beal v. City of Seattle, 134 Wn.2d 769, 784 , 954 P.2d 237 (1998)). ¶55 There are four exceptions to the public duty doctrine: (1) legislative intent, (2) failure to enforce, (3) the rescue doctrine, and (4) a special relationship. | 2 | 2015–2026 |
Beltran-Serrano v. City of Tacoma
green
2 sentences2024The exceptions are “(1) legislative intent, (2) failure to enforce, (3) the rescue doctrine, and (4) a special relationship.” Id. at 549 n.7. 2023There are four exceptions to the public duty doctrine: “(1) legislative intent, (2) failure to enforce, (3) the rescue doctrine, and (4) a special relationship.” Id. | 2 | 2023–2024 |
Vergeson v. Kitsap County
green
2 sentences2014Vergeson v. Kitsap County. 145 Wn. 2010Id. at 537 . | 2 | 2010–2014 |
Indian Towing Co. v. United States
green
2 sentences2006Specifically, Chambers-Castanes claimed that “foreseeable reliance on governmental representations creates a special relationship duty.” Chambers-Castanes , Reply Br. of Appellants at 9; see also United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that the representations and foreseeable reliance on those representations created a relationship-based duty); United States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1960) (same); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 , 76 S. Ct. 122 , 100 L. 2006Specifically, Chambers-Castanes claimed that “foreseeable reliance on governmental representations creates a special relationship duty.” Chambers-Castanes , Reply Br. of Appellants at 9; see also United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that the representations and foreseeable reliance on those representations created a relationship-based duty); United States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1960) (same); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 , 76 S. Ct. 122 , 100 L. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc.
green
2 sentences2006Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 931, 943 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996). 2006Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931, 943 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 931, 943 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996). 2006Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931, 943 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Geraldine Gavagan, as Administratrix of the Estate of John Gordon Gavagan, Deceased
green
2 sentences2006Specifically, Chambers-Castanes claimed that “foreseeable reliance on governmental representations creates a special relationship duty.” Chambers-Castanes , Reply Br. of Appellants at 9; see also United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that the representations and foreseeable reliance on those representations created a relationship-based duty); United States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1960) (same); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 , 76 S. Ct. 122 , 100 L. 2006Specifically, Chambers-Castanes claimed that "foreseeable reliance on governmental representations creates a special relationship duty." Chambers-Castanes , Reply Br. of Appellants at 9; see also United States v. De Vane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir.1962) (holding that the representations and foreseeable reliance on those representations created a relationship-based duty); United States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.1960) (same); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 , 76 S.Ct. 122 , 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) (same). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006Under the rescue doctrine, both public, Brown, 86 Wn.2d at 301 , and private, Meneely, 101 Wn. 2006Under the rescue doctrine, both public, Brown, 86 Wash.2d at 301 , 545 P.2d 13 , and private, Meneely, 101 Wash.App. at 860 , 5 P.3d 49 , entities have a duty to warn those who reasonably rely on a promise to warn. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Osborn v. Mason County neutral | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Nast v. Michels green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| J & B Development Co. v. King County green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Mason v. Bitton green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Halvorson v. Dahl green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Campbell v. City of Bellevue green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp. green | 2 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Hillman green | 2 | 1996–1996 |
| Highland v. Wilsonian Investment Co. neutral | 2 | 1956–1993 |
| Donohoe v. State green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Hale v. Wellpinit School District No. 49 green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Hale v. Wellpinit School Dist. No. 49 green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Bullard v. Bailey green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Bullard v. Bailey green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Ganno v. Lanoga Corp. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Osborn v. Mason County green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Babcock v. Mason County Fire District No. 6 green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Harvey v. Snohomish County green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.