rescue doctrine in Colorado

2020In 9 Barnes v. Geiger, 446 N.E.2d 78, 82 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983), the plaintiff died of a cerebral vascular hemorrhage a day after running to the scene of a car crash, which she mistakenly believed involved her child.

2019Barnes v. Geiger, 446 N.E.2d 78, 82 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (discussing the “common thread” of active, physical intervention in cases recognizing the rescue doctrine); see also Hassanein v. Avianca Airlines, 872 F. Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying New York law); Lambert v. Parrish, 492 N.E.2d 289, 291 (Ind. 1986) (“We hold that a rescuer must in fact attempt to rescue someone.

2023See Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437 ; see also Govich v. N. Am.

2020Id. at 438 . ¶15 In Colorado, neither this court nor the court of appeals has opined on the rescue doctrine at length since Wagner, but both courts have provided guidance on it.

2020Similarly, in Connelly v. Redman Development Corp., 533 P.2d 53 , 54–55 (Colo. App. 1975), the court of appeals concluded that the plaintiff, who slipped when investigating a baby’s cry, could not qualify as a rescuer because there was no evidence that the baby was in imminent peril. ¶16 Other jurisdictions, building on the foundation laid in Wagner, have defined and developed the rescue doctrine to a greater extent than Colorado courts.

2020For example, a baby’s cry alone is not evidence of imminent peril, see Connelly, 533 P.2d at 55 ; neither is a car crash alone evidence that the crash’s victim is in imminent peril when that victim is engaging in casual conversation, see Maloney, 241 P.2d at 867 .

2020In Maloney v. Jussel, 241 P.2d 862, 863 (Colo. 1952), two cars collided, causing one of the car’s passengers to be thrown from the front seat to the floor of the car.

2020For example, a baby’s cry alone is not evidence of imminent peril, see Connelly, 533 P.2d at 55 ; neither is a car crash alone evidence that the crash’s victim is in imminent peril when that victim is engaging in casual conversation, see Maloney, 241 P.2d at 867 .

2020Based on this test, the plaintiff did not qualify as a rescuer because “[h]is only attempt was to reach the 10 scene of the accident,” and “[h]e exerted no physical activity to facilitate the rescue of his wife from the consequences of the allegedly tortious acts of [the driver].” Id. ¶18 As intimated in these cases and in Wagner, the primary purpose of the rescue doctrine is to legally account for the human instinct to help those in distress.

2019Barnes v. Geiger, 446 N.E.2d 78, 82 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (discussing the “common thread” of active, physical intervention in cases recognizing the rescue doctrine); see also Hassanein v. Avianca Airlines, 872 F. Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying New York law); Lambert v. Parrish, 492 N.E.2d 289, 291 (Ind. 1986) (“We hold that a rescuer must in fact attempt to rescue someone.

2025That makes this case much different from those cases where officers, “having just arrived on the scene, had a legitimate” and immediate concern that there could be unknown “armed suspects or injured victims in the vicinity.” Id. at ¶ 57; see also United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 961 (10th Cir. 1987) (public safety exception applied to on-the-scene questioning about the possibility of injured or armed person). ¶ 23 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court erred by admitting Pinheiro’s statements to Detective Valenzuela under the public safety exception.3 3 For the first tim

2023It seems that most jurisdictions view the rescue doctrine as establishing the duty a defendant owes to a rescuer, independent of the duty owed to the rescuee. 13 See Govich, 814 P.2d at 101 ; see also Dillard v. Pittway Corp., 719 So. 2d 188, 193 (Ala. 1998) (“[I]t is always foreseeable that someone may attempt to rescue a person who has been placed in a dangerous position and that the rescuer may incur injuries in doing so.

2023Sys., Inc., 814 P.2d 94, 99 (N.M. 1991) (recognizing the rescue doctrine’s long- standing dual purpose of establishing a causal link between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury and of eliminating the absolute defense of contributory negligence). ¶26 Many jurisdictions and treatises have discussed the rescue doctrine at length, but we have rarely addressed it in Colorado.

2023It seems that most jurisdictions view the rescue doctrine as establishing the duty a defendant owes to a rescuer, independent of the duty owed to the rescuee. 13 See Govich, 814 P.2d at 101 ; see also Dillard v. Pittway Corp., 719 So. 2d 188, 193 (Ala. 1998) (“[I]t is always foreseeable that someone may attempt to rescue a person who has been placed in a dangerous position and that the rescuer may incur injuries in doing so.

2023See Snellenberger v. Rodriguez, 760 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Tex. 1988) (concluding that the rescuer’s harm was not a foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligence, so the defendant wasn’t the proximate cause of that harm). ¶28 By emphasizing the specific facts and circumstances of each situation, our long-standing foreseeability jurisprudence adequately addresses the scope of liability under the rescue doctrine.

2019Barnes v. Geiger, 446 N.E.2d 78, 82 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (discussing the “common thread” of active, physical intervention in cases recognizing the rescue doctrine); see also Hassanein v. Avianca Airlines, 872 F. Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying New York law); Lambert v. Parrish, 492 N.E.2d 289, 291 (Ind. 1986) (“We hold that a rescuer must in fact attempt to rescue someone.

2019Barnes v. Geiger, 446 N.E.2d 78, 82 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (discussing the “common thread” of active, physical intervention in cases recognizing the rescue doctrine); see also Hassanein v. Avianca Airlines, 872 F. Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying New York law); Lambert v. Parrish, 492 N.E.2d 289, 291 (Ind. 1986) (“We hold that a rescuer must in fact attempt to rescue someone.

2019A rescuer is one who actually undertakes physical activity in a reasonable and prudent attempt to rescue.”); Stevenson v. Delahaye, 310 So. 2d 651, 653-54 (La.

1983See Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124 , 133 n. 5, 411 A.2d 415 , 421 n. 5 (1980).

1983See Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124 , 133 n. 5, 411 A.2d 415 , 421 n. 5 (1980).