rescue doctrine in Texas

2025See Snellenberger v. Rodriguez, 760 S.W.2d 237, 237 (Tex. 1988) (acknowledging the rescue doctrine but noting that the “doctrine came into being before the adoption of comparative negligence in order to relieve the all or nothing effects of contributory negligence”).

2009In his sole Texas case to support his contention, Jacobson directs us to Snellenberger v. Rodriguez , in which the El Paso court of appeals determined that there was no recovery under the rescue doctrine for a widow whose police-officer husband responded to a traffic accident and died of a heart attack while controlling the crowd. 711 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986) aff’d , 760 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. 1988).

1988As stated in Longacre v. Reddick, 215 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1948, mand. overr.), The underlying basis of the rescue doctrine is that the defendant negligently created a situation which provoked the rescue effort, and that the rescuer's resulting injury was something that could reasonably have been foreseen by the negligent defendant, and was the natural and probable result of such negligence.

1988As stated in Longacre v. Reddick, 215 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1948, mand. overr.), The underlying basis of the rescue doctrine is that the defendant negligently created a situation which provoked the rescue effort, and that the rescuer’s resulting injury was something that could reasonably have been foreseen by the negligent defendant, and was the natural and probable result of such negligence.

2009In his sole Texas case to support his contention, Jacobson directs us to Snellenberger v. Rodriguez , in which the El Paso court of appeals determined that there was no recovery under the rescue doctrine for a widow whose police-officer husband responded to a traffic accident and died of a heart attack while controlling the crowd. 711 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986) aff’d , 760 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. 1988).

1988The court of appeals held that the rescue doctrine was not raised under the facts of this case because "no perilous situation existed to invite rescue." 711 S.W.2d at 139 .

1986The rescue doctrine is set forth in Kelley v. Alexander, 392 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Civ.App.— San Antonio 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.): The basis of this rule is that the defendant negligently created a situation that provoked the rescue effort and the rescuer’s resulting injury was something that could reasonably have been foreseen by the negligent defendant and was a natural and probable result of such negligence.

1986As said in Kelley v. Alexander, supra, “[tjhere is no basis for the ‘rescue doctrine’ where no one is in imminent danger and the circumstances afford no reasonable basis for believing otherwise.” The facts of this case differ from those in which recovery has been allowed under the rescue doctrine.

2021See Pifer v. Muse, 984 S.W.2d 739 , 742–43 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.); Boss v. Prince’s Drive–Ins, 401 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ.

1998See, e.g., Boss v. Prince’s Drive-Ins, 401 S.W.2d 140 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Kelley v. Alexander, 392 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1965, writ refd n.r.e.); Walker Hauling Co. v. Johnson, 110 Ga.App. 620 , 139 S.E.2d 496 (Ga.Ct.App.1964); Schmartz v. Harger, 22 Conn.Supp. 308 , 171 A.2d 89 (Conn.1961); 65 C.J.S.

2021See Pifer v. Muse, 984 S.W.2d 739 , 742–43 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.); Boss v. Prince’s Drive–Ins, 401 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ.

2016See In re Moody Nat’l Kirby Houston S, LLC, 412 S.W.3d 570, 571 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, orig. proceeding) (“Mandamus has been recognized as an appropriate remedy when interlocutory issues have arisen concerning the issuance of notices of lis pendens.”).

2009Daigle v. Phillips Petroleum Co. , 893 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ dism’d by agr.).

2009The supreme court has stated, and this court has recognized, that the purpose of the rescue doctrine is to “support[] the heroic acts of individuals who rush into danger to rescue others from imminent peril.” Snellenberger. v. Rodriguez , 760 S.W.2d 237, 237 (Tex. 1988); Daigle , 893 S.W.2d at 122–23.

2009Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).

1996To hold an actor liable for its negligent actions, a plaintiff must show that the *397 harm was foreseeable. 5 See El Chico Corp. v. Pooh, 732 S.W.2d 306, 313-14 (Tex.1987) (“Foreseeability, the second element of proximate cause, means the actor as a person of ordinary intelligence should have anticipated the dangers his negligent act creates for others.”).

1996Cf. Hennessy, 725 S.W.2d at 510 (refusing to apply Bell to a case involving similar facts but in which rescue was involved).

1987Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 575-76 (Tex.1985) (heavy traffic on highway was considered in determining whether plaintiff’s conduct was concurring proximate cause of accident).