rescue doctrine in New York

2021To obtain partial summary judgment, a plaintiff does not have to demonstrate the absence of his own comparative fault ( see Rodriguez v City of New York , 31 NY3d 312, 323 [2018]).

2021To obtain partial summary judgment, a plaintiff does not have to demonstrate the absence of his own comparative fault ( see Rodriguez v City of New York , 31 NY3d 312, 323 [2018]).

2023By protecting all workers placed at risk by noncompliance with the Industrial Code, including workers who seek to rescue their coworkers, the Labor Law's central purpose is thus advanced. [FN2] While we find that the rescue doctrine can apply to claims under Labor Law § 241(6), it is for the finder of fact to determine whether plaintiff's rescue attempt in this case was a "reasonable course of conduct at the time" ( Provenzo , 23 NY2d at 260 ).

2011Although the rescue doctrine requires “more than a mere suspicion of danger” (Provenzo v Sam, 23 NY2d 256, 261 [1968]; see Snyder v Kramer, 94 AD2d 860 [1983], affd for the reasons stated 61 NY2d 961 [1984]), the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s perception of danger and the rescue effort itself is “generally a question for the trier of fact” (Gifford v Haller, 273 AD2d 751, 753 [2000]; see Wagner v International Ry.

2011In addition, although plaintiff’s rescue attempts appear to have been wholly ineffective, the rescue doctrine is not -3- 1098 CA 11-00627 rendered inapplicable by “the futility of the plaintiff’s sacrifice” (Wagner, 232 NY at 181 ).

2011In addition, although plaintiff’s rescue attempts appear to have been wholly ineffective, the rescue doctrine is not rendered inapplicable by “the futility of the plaintiffs sacrifice” (Wagner, 232 NY at 181 ).

2011Although the rescue doctrine requires “more than a mere suspicion of danger” (Provenzo v Sam, 23 NY2d 256, 261 ; see Snyder v Kramer, 94 AD2d 860 , affd for the reasons stated 61 NY2d 961 ), the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s perception of danger and the rescue effort itself is “generally a question for the trier of fact” (Gifford v Haller, 273 AD2d 751, 753 ; see Wagner v International Ry.

2011Although the rescue doctrine requires “more than a mere suspicion of danger” (Provenzo v Sam, 23 NY2d 256, 261 [1968]; see Snyder v Kramer, 94 AD2d 860 [1983], affd for the reasons stated 61 NY2d 961 [1984]), the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s perception of danger and the rescue effort itself is “generally a question for the trier of fact” (Gifford v Haller, 273 AD2d 751, 753 [2000]; see Wagner v International Ry.

2011Although the rescue doctrine requires “more than a mere suspicion of danger” (Provenzo v Sam, 23 NY2d 256, 261 ; see Snyder v Kramer, 94 AD2d 860 , affd for the reasons stated 61 NY2d 961 ), the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s perception of danger and the rescue effort itself is “generally a question for the trier of fact” (Gifford v Haller, 273 AD2d 751, 753 ; see Wagner v International Ry.

2011Although the rescue doctrine requires “more than a mere suspicion of danger” (Provenzo v Sam, 23 NY2d 256, 261 [1968]; see Snyder v Kramer, 94 AD2d 860 [1983], affd for the reasons stated 61 NY2d 961 [1984]), the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s perception of danger and the rescue effort itself is “generally a question for the trier of fact” (Gifford v Haller, 273 AD2d 751, 753 [2000]; see Wagner v International Ry.

2011Although the rescue doctrine requires “more than a mere suspicion of danger” (Provenzo v Sam, 23 NY2d 256, 261 ; see Snyder v Kramer, 94 AD2d 860 , affd for the reasons stated 61 NY2d 961 ), the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s perception of danger and the rescue effort itself is “generally a question for the trier of fact” (Gifford v Haller, 273 AD2d 751, 753 ; see Wagner v International Ry.

2011Although the rescue doctrine requires “more than a mere suspicion of danger” (Provenzo v Sam, 23 NY2d 256, 261 [1968]; see Snyder v Kramer, 94 AD2d 860 [1983], affd for the reasons stated 61 NY2d 961 [1984]), the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s perception of danger and the rescue effort itself is “generally a question for the trier of fact” (Gifford v Haller, 273 AD2d 751, 753 [2000]; see Wagner v International Ry.

2023In Del Vecchio v State of New York ( 246 AD2d 498 [2d Dept 1998]), the Second Department foreclosed application of the rescue doctrine to a Section 240(1) claim, asserting that doing so would expand the owner's liability beyond the statute's intended scope ( id. at 500 ).

2023In Del Vecchio v State of New York ( 246 AD2d 498 [2d Dept 1998]), the Second Department foreclosed application of the rescue doctrine to a Section 240(1) claim, asserting that doing so would expand the owner's liability beyond the statute's intended scope ( id. at 500 ).

2011Even assuming, arguendo, that the rescue doctrine is inapplicable where the liability to the rescued person is predicated upon an alleged violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) rather than negligence (see Del Vecchio v State of New York, 246 AD2d 498 , 499- 500; cf. McCoy v American Suzuki Motor Corp., 136 Wash 2d 350, 356, 961 P2d 952, 956 ), we conclude that plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded their case as one predicated upon defendants’ negligence, and defendants failed to establish their lack of negligence as a matter of law (see generally Niagara Frontier Transp.

2011Even assuming, arguendo, that the rescue doctrine is inapplicable where the liability to the rescued person is predicated upon an alleged violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) rather than negligence (see Del Vecchio v State of New York, 246 AD2d 498, 499-500 [1998]; cf. McCoy v American Suzuki Motor Corp., 136 Wash 2d 350, 356, 961 P2d 952, 956 [1998]), we conclude that plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded their case as one predicated upon defendants’ negligence, and defendants failed to establish their lack of negligence as a matter of law (see generally Niagara Frontier Transp.

2011The evidence submitted by defendants in support of their motions failed to establish that plaintiff’s rescue efforts were unreasonable as a matter of law or that plaintiff’s actions were “so rash under the circumstances as to constitute an intervening and superseding cause” of his alleged injuries (Rodriguez v Property for People, 291 AD2d 220, 221 ).

2011The evidence submitted by defendants in support of their motions failed to establish that plaintiffs rescue efforts were unreasonable as a matter of law or that plaintiffs actions were “so rash under the circumstances as to constitute an intervening and superseding cause” of his alleged injuries (Rodriguez v Property for People, 291 AD2d 220, 221 [2002]).

2011Auth. v City of Buffalo Sewer Auth., 1 AD3d 893, 895 ).

2011Auth. v City of Buffalo Sewer Auth., 1 AD3d 893, 895 [2003]).

2023The rescue doctrine has continued to be deployed after New York State adopted a comparative negligence regime in personal injury cases ( see CPLR 1411 [codifying comparative negligence in New York in 1975]; Calderon v Cruzate , 175 AD3d 644 , 647-648 [2d Dept 2019]; Velazquez , 65 AD3d at 982-983 ; Butler , 261 AD2d at 856 ).

2023Corp. , [*3] 65 AD3d 981, 982-983 [1st Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2019For the rescue doctrine to apply, "it is sufficient that [the] plaintiff held a reasonable belief of imminent peril of serious injury to another, and it matters not that the peril feared did not materialize" ( O'Connor v Syracuse Univ ., 66 AD3d 1187, 1191 [3d Dept 2009], lv dismissed 14 NY3d 766 [2010]).

2002Laliberte v Gilmore, 1995 WL 319550 , 1995 US Dist LEXIS 7149 [ND Ill 995] [armed abductor kidnapped baby]); Benson v State (698 So 2d 333 [Fla App 1997] [defendant swallowed crack cocaine and faced a life-threatening emergency]); Thomas v State (128 Md App 274, 737 A2d 622 , supra); State v Provost ( 490 NW2d 93 [Minn 1992], cert denied 507 US 929 [1993] [defendant told police that he burned his wife and that she was somewhere, in rough, winter conditions, in a wildlife refuge]); and State v Kunkel ( 137 Wis 2d 172, 181 , 404 NW2d 69, 73 , review denied 138 Wis 2d 531 , 412 NW2d 893 , cert de

1982Plaintiff contends, however, that the rescue doctrine serves to establish the requisite foreseeability between the doctor’s negligence in treatment of his father and injury to himself as the rescuer (see Prosser, Torts [4th ed], § 44, p 277; see, also, Gibney v State of New York, 137 NY 1, 6 ; Eckert v Long Is.