rescue doctrine in Arizona

2016We held that Orth was not responding to “emergency conditions of a fire or some similar exigency;” as such, the situation did not trigger application of “exceptional rules of law such as the rescue doctrine and the firefighter’s rule.” Id. at 292–93, ¶¶ 6, 10. 4 STEVENSON v. HARMON Decision of the Court ¶11 Stevenson, in contrast, was not performing a routine inspection, scheduled project, or quasi-administrative duty.

2008The firefighler's rule developed as an exception to the rescue doctrine: "A rescuer who could otherwise recover cannot do so if she is performing her duties as a professional firefighter.” Id. at ¶ 11 (citing Orth v. Cole, 191 Ariz. 291, 293, ¶ 9 , 955 P.2d 47, 49 (App.1998)).

2017See, e.g., George Washington Univ. v. Waas, 648 A.2d 178, 184-85 (D.C. 1994) (citing case law and jury instructions from numerous states and other legal authority recognizing a patient’s contributory negligence and duty to his or her physician in medical contexts); Richard A. Epstein, Torts § 8.2.1, at 189 (1999) (noting that duty is an element of contributory negligence). ¶ 12 Recognizing a duty of care on the part of patients is also consistent with the rescue doctrine recognized in Espinoza v. Schulenburg, 212 Ariz. 215 , 129 P.3d 937 (2006), Under the rescue doctrine, an actor who negligen

2017See, e.g., George Washington Univ. v. Waas, 648 A.2d 178, 184-85 (D.C. 1994) (citing case law and jury instructions from numerous states and other legal authority recognizing a patient’s contributory negligence and duty to his or her physician in medical contexts); Richard A. Epstein, Torts § 8.2.1, at 189 (1999) (noting that duty is an element of contributory negligence). ¶ 12 Recognizing a duty of care on the part of patients is also consistent with the rescue doctrine recognized in Espinoza v. Schulenburg, 212 Ariz. 215 , 129 P.3d 937 (2006), Under the rescue doctrine, an actor who negligen

2015Relying on the three-part test announced in People v. Riddle, 83 Cal. App. 3d 563 (Cal. App. 1978), Londo held that the rescue doctrine excepts statements from Miranda when there is “1) an urgent need, and no other course of action promises relief; 2) the possibility of saving a human life by rescuing a person in danger; and 3) rescue is the primary purpose and motive of the interrogator.” Londo, 215 Ariz. at 76, ¶ 10 .

2006People v. Riddle, 83 Cal.App.3d 563 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 170, 177 (1978).

2017See, e.g., George Washington Univ. v. Waas, 648 A.2d 178, 184-85 (D.C. 1994) (citing case law and jury instructions from numerous states and other legal authority recognizing a patient’s contributory negligence and duty to his or her physician in medical contexts); Richard A. Epstein, Torts § 8.2.1, at 189 (1999) (noting that duty is an element of contributory negligence). ¶ 12 Recognizing a duty of care on the part of patients is also consistent with the rescue doctrine recognized in Espinoza v. Schulenburg, 212 Ariz. 215 , 129 P.3d 937 (2006), Under the rescue doctrine, an actor who negligen

2017See Sears v. Morrison, 76 Cal.App.4th 677 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 532-34 (1999) (compiling cases from various jurisdictions and other authorities recognizing that rescuer may seek recovery from person negligently placing himself or herself in danger). ¶ 13 Recognizing a duty by patients to their caregivers is not, of course, the same as saying that patients will be liable for injuries incurred by a caregiver in doing his or her job or that the patient’s standard of care is the same as that of a caregiver.

2015The California Supreme Court later eliminated the third prong of the Riddle test, relying on United States Supreme Court cases to hold that “applicability of the rescue doctrine must be grounded on objective facts known to law enforcement.” People v. Davis, 208 P.3d 78, 122 (Cal. 2009). ¶27 At the time Griffith was taken into custody, the police knew that E.A. had gone missing a few days before.

2015The California Supreme Court later eliminated the third prong of the Riddle test, relying on United States Supreme Court cases to hold that “applicability of the rescue doctrine must be grounded on objective facts known to law enforcement.” People v. Davis, 208 P.3d 78, 122 (Cal. 2009). ¶27 At the time Griffith was taken into custody, the police knew that E.A. had gone missing a few days before.

2015Relying on the three-part test announced in People v. Riddle, 83 Cal. App. 3d 563 (Cal. App. 1978), Londo held that the rescue doctrine excepts statements from Miranda when there is “1) an urgent need, and no other course of action promises relief; 2) the possibility of saving a human life by rescuing a person in danger; and 3) rescue is the primary purpose and motive of the interrogator.” Londo, 215 Ariz. at 76, ¶ 10 .

2013White v. State, 220 Ariz. 42, 44, ¶ 5 , 202 P.3d 507, 509 (App.2008). ¶ 7 “The rescue doctrine allows an injured rescuer to recover damages from the person whose negligence created the need for the rescue.” Espinoza v. Schulenburg, 212 Ariz. 215, 217, ¶ 7 , 129 P.3d 937, 939 (2006); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm § 32 (2010) (“[I]f an actor’s tortious conduct imperils another[,] the scope of the actor’s liability includes any harm to a person resulting from that person’s efforts to aid or to protect the imperiled person;.]”).

2013White v. State, 220 Ariz. 42, 44, ¶ 5 , 202 P.3d 507, 509 (App.2008). ¶ 7 “The rescue doctrine allows an injured rescuer to recover damages from the person whose negligence created the need for the rescue.” Espinoza v. Schulenburg, 212 Ariz. 215, 217, ¶ 7 , 129 P.3d 937, 939 (2006); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm § 32 (2010) (“[I]f an actor’s tortious conduct imperils another[,] the scope of the actor’s liability includes any harm to a person resulting from that person’s efforts to aid or to protect the imperiled person;.]”).

2006See Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182 , 32 N.E. 182 , 184, 186 (1892) (finding that a firefighter injured while fighting a fire was a “mere naked licensee” and therefore could recover only for willful acts of the landowner), overruled by Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960). 2 The rationale for the rule applies equally, however, outside the context of premises liability.

2006See Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182 , 32 N.E. 182 , 184, 186 (1892) (finding that a firefighter injured while fighting a fire was a “mere naked licensee” and therefore could recover only for willful acts of the landowner), overruled by Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960). 2 The rationale for the rule applies equally, however, outside the context of premises liability.

2006See Stevenson, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d at 880-81 (holding that statement by defendant that he had swallowed crack cocaine was admissible despite lack of Miranda warnings under the “rescue doctrine”); Benson v. State, 698 So.2d 333, 337-38 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (holding that “the necessity of protecting the defendant’s health must take precedence over the procedural safeguards of Miranda."); 4 contra State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 151-52 (Utah Ct.App.1997). 5 *76 ¶ 10 Under the rescue doctrine, courts apply a three prong test to determine whether the statement is excepted from Miranda , asking whether

2006Ima *217 ging, Ltd., 205 Ariz. 306, 308, ¶2 , 70 P.3d 435, 437 (2003). ¶ 7 The rescue doctrine allows an injured rescuer to recover damages from the person whose negligence created the need for rescue.

2006Ima *217 ging, Ltd., 205 Ariz. 306, 308, ¶2 , 70 P.3d 435, 437 (2003). ¶ 7 The rescue doctrine allows an injured rescuer to recover damages from the person whose negligence created the need for rescue.

2006The rescue doctrine has also been applied in the following cases: State v. Betances, 265 Conn. 493, 828 A.2d 1248, 1255-57 (2003) (extending the public safety exception to Miranda and holding defendant’s response to the question whether "he swallowed any drugs” was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings); Thomas v. State, 128 Md.App. 274 , 737 A.2d 622, 632 (Ct. Spec.App.1999) (holding that Miranda warnings were not necessary when asking if a defendant, who bit an officer, had a transmittable disease); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Minn. 1992) (adopting and applying the resc

2006The rescue doctrine has also been applied in the following cases: State v. Betances, 265 Conn. 493, 828 A.2d 1248, 1255-57 (2003) (extending the public safety exception to Miranda and holding defendant’s response to the question whether "he swallowed any drugs” was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings); Thomas v. State, 128 Md.App. 274 , 737 A.2d 622, 632 (Ct. Spec.App.1999) (holding that Miranda warnings were not necessary when asking if a defendant, who bit an officer, had a transmittable disease); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Minn. 1992) (adopting and applying the resc

2006The rescue doctrine has also been applied in the following cases: State v. Betances, 265 Conn. 493, 828 A.2d 1248, 1255-57 (2003) (extending the public safety exception to Miranda and holding defendant’s response to the question whether "he swallowed any drugs” was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings); Thomas v. State, 128 Md.App. 274 , 737 A.2d 622, 632 (Ct. Spec.App.1999) (holding that Miranda warnings were not necessary when asking if a defendant, who bit an officer, had a transmittable disease); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Minn. 1992) (adopting and applying the resc

2006See Stevenson, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d at 880-81 (holding that statement by defendant that he had swallowed crack cocaine was admissible despite lack of Miranda warnings under the “rescue doctrine”); Benson v. State, 698 So.2d 333, 337-38 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (holding that “the necessity of protecting the defendant’s health must take precedence over the procedural safeguards of Miranda."); 4 contra State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 151-52 (Utah Ct.App.1997). 5 *76 ¶ 10 Under the rescue doctrine, courts apply a three prong test to determine whether the statement is excepted from Miranda , asking whether

2006In Montoya , the Utah Court of Appeals held that the public safety exception did not apply to protect an individual defendant's personal safety. 937 P.2d at 151 .

2006The rescue doctrine has also been applied in the following cases: State v. Betances, 265 Conn. 493, 828 A.2d 1248, 1255-57 (2003) (extending the public safety exception to Miranda and holding defendant’s response to the question whether "he swallowed any drugs” was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings); Thomas v. State, 128 Md.App. 274 , 737 A.2d 622, 632 (Ct. Spec.App.1999) (holding that Miranda warnings were not necessary when asking if a defendant, who bit an officer, had a transmittable disease); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Minn. 1992) (adopting and applying the resc

2006The rescue doctrine has also been applied in the following cases: State v. Betances, 265 Conn. 493, 828 A.2d 1248, 1255-57 (2003) (extending the public safety exception to Miranda and holding defendant’s response to the question whether "he swallowed any drugs” was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings); Thomas v. State, 128 Md.App. 274 , 737 A.2d 622, 632 (Ct. Spec.App.1999) (holding that Miranda warnings were not necessary when asking if a defendant, who bit an officer, had a transmittable disease); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Minn. 1992) (adopting and applying the resc

2006The rescue doctrine has also been applied in the following cases: State v. Betances, 265 Conn. 493, 828 A.2d 1248, 1255-57 (2003) (extending the public safety exception to Miranda and holding defendant’s response to the question whether "he swallowed any drugs” was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings); Thomas v. State, 128 Md.App. 274 , 737 A.2d 622, 632 (Ct. Spec.App.1999) (holding that Miranda warnings were not necessary when asking if a defendant, who bit an officer, had a transmittable disease); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Minn. 1992) (adopting and applying the resc

2006The rescue doctrine has also been applied in the following cases: State v. Betances, 265 Conn. 493, 828 A.2d 1248, 1255-57 (2003) (extending the public safety exception to Miranda and holding defendant’s response to the question whether "he swallowed any drugs” was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings); Thomas v. State, 128 Md.App. 274 , 737 A.2d 622, 632 (Ct. Spec.App.1999) (holding that Miranda warnings were not necessary when asking if a defendant, who bit an officer, had a transmittable disease); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Minn. 1992) (adopting and applying the resc

2006See Stevenson, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d at 880-81 (holding that statement by defendant that he had swallowed crack cocaine was admissible despite lack of Miranda warnings under the “rescue doctrine”); Benson v. State, 698 So.2d 333, 337-38 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (holding that “the necessity of protecting the defendant’s health must take precedence over the procedural safeguards of Miranda."); 4 contra State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 151-52 (Utah Ct.App.1997). 5 *76 ¶ 10 Under the rescue doctrine, courts apply a three prong test to determine whether the statement is excepted from Miranda , asking whether

2006Coop. v. Verdugo, 14 Ariz.App. 141, 144 , 481 P.2d 511, 514 (1971) (discussing the rescue doctrine in the context of contributory negligence).

2006Coop. v. Verdugo, 14 Ariz.App. 141, 144 , 481 P.2d 511, 514 (1971) (discussing the rescue doctrine in the context of contributory negligence).

2006The rescue doctrine has also been applied in the following cases: State v. Betances, 265 Conn. 493, 828 A.2d 1248, 1255-57 (2003) (extending the public safety exception to Miranda and holding defendant’s response to the question whether "he swallowed any drugs” was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings); Thomas v. State, 128 Md.App. 274 , 737 A.2d 622, 632 (Ct. Spec.App.1999) (holding that Miranda warnings were not necessary when asking if a defendant, who bit an officer, had a transmittable disease); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Minn. 1992) (adopting and applying the resc

2006The rescue doctrine has also been applied in the following cases: State v. Betances, 265 Conn. 493, 828 A.2d 1248, 1255-57 (2003) (extending the public safety exception to Miranda and holding defendant’s response to the question whether "he swallowed any drugs” was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings); Thomas v. State, 128 Md.App. 274 , 737 A.2d 622, 632 (Ct. Spec.App.1999) (holding that Miranda warnings were not necessary when asking if a defendant, who bit an officer, had a transmittable disease); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Minn. 1992) (adopting and applying the resc

2006See Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182 , 32 N.E. 182 , 184, 186 (1892) (finding that a firefighter injured while fighting a fire was a “mere naked licensee” and therefore could recover only for willful acts of the landowner), overruled by Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960). 2 The rationale for the rule applies equally, however, outside the context of premises liability.

2005Heck v. Robey, 659 N.E.2d 498, 501 (Ind.1995); Dobbs, supra § 285, at 769.