Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in New York

1984It has been held that third-party consent is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (United States v Matlock, 415 US 164, 171 ; People v Henley, 53 NY2d 403, 409 , Cooke, Ch.

1982“Third-party consent is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (People v Cosme, 48 NY2d 286 ; United States v Matlock, 415 US 164 ).

1982“Third-party consent is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (People v Cosme, 48 NY2d 286 ; United States v Matlock, 415 US 164 ).

1981Third-party consent is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (People v Cosme, 48 NY2d 286 ; United States v Matlock, 415 US 164 ).

1982This exception requires actual consent of a person having or reasonably appearing to have the requisite degree of access tó and control over the premises to be searched (People v Adams, 53 NY2d 1 ; People v Cosme, 48 NY2d 286 , supra).

1981This exception requires actual consent of a person having or reasonably appearing to have the requisite degree of access to and control over the premises to be searched (People v Adams, 53 NY2d 1 ; People v Cosme, 48 NY2d 286 , supra).

2005An exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement exists when the police receive the voluntary consent of a person possessing common authority over, or other sufficient relationship to, the premises to be inspected (see Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218 [1973]; People v Ponto, 103 AD2d 573 [1984]).

2005The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing supported the hearing court’s conclusion that the police had the consent of the defendant’s grandmother to enter her house when the defendant was arrested (see People v White, 301 AD2d 542 [2003]; People v Nelson, 292 AD2d 397 [2002]; People v Satornino, 153 AD2d 595 [1989]).

2005An exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement exists when the police receive the voluntary consent of a person possessing common authority over, or other sufficient relationship to, the premises to be inspected (see Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218 [1973]; People v Ponto, 103 AD2d 573 [1984]).

2005The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing supported the hearing court’s conclusion that the police had the consent of the defendant’s grandmother to enter her house when the defendant was arrested (see People v White, 301 AD2d 542 [2003]; People v Nelson, 292 AD2d 397 [2002]; People v Satornino, 153 AD2d 595 [1989]).

2005The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing supported the hearing court’s conclusion that the police had the consent of the defendant’s grandmother to enter her house when the defendant was arrested (see People v White, 301 AD2d 542 [2003]; People v Nelson, 292 AD2d 397 [2002]; People v Satornino, 153 AD2d 595 [1989]).

1990(People v Calhoun, 49 NY2d 398, 403 [1980]; People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173 [1976], cert denied 426 US 953 [1976].) Testimony at both the trial and hearing indicated that at about 4:30 p.m. on March 22, 1986, uniformed Police Officers James Doyle and Edward McDermott received a radio dispatch of shots fired at 450 West 163rd Street, apartment 3C.

1990(People v Calhoun, 49 NY2d 398, 403 [1980]; People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173 [1976], cert denied 426 US 953 [1976].) Testimony at both the trial and hearing indicated that at about 4:30 p.m. on March 22, 1986, uniformed Police Officers James Doyle and Edward McDermott received a radio dispatch of shots fired at 450 West 163rd Street, apartment 3C.

1990"The underlying rationale for allowing an inventory exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant rule is that police officers are not vested with discretion to determine the scope of the inventory search.” (Colorado v Bertine, 479 US 367, 376 , supra [Black-mun, J., concurring].) Here, the People failed to establish that the officer, in pulling out the rear seat of defendant’s vehicle, acted in accordance with standardized procedures for inventory searches (cf., People v Gonzalez, supra).

1984It has been held that third-party consent is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (United States v Matlock, 415 US 164, 171 ; People v Henley, 53 NY2d 403, 409 , Cooke, Ch.

1980Preliminarily, we observe that the evidence in the record fully supports the court’s conclusion that the stop was based upon specific facts which “reasonably warrant [the] intrusion” (People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413, 420 , quoting Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21 ; see Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648 ), i.e., that defendant was driving erratically and that the left taillight on his car was inoperative. 2 We turn to the issue of whether the warrantless seizure of the pipe was justified under the “plain view” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

1980Preliminarily, we observe that the evidence in the record fully supports the court’s conclusion that the stop was based upon specific facts which “reasonably warrant [the] intrusion” (People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413, 420 , quoting Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21 ; see Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648 ), i.e., that defendant was driving erratically and that the left taillight on his car was inoperative. 2 We turn to the issue of whether the warrantless seizure of the pipe was justified under the “plain view” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.