Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in Oregon

1986By adopting such a position, we align ourselves with the traditional federal “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement as set forth in the seminal case of Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132 , 45 S Ct 280 , 69 L Ed 543 (1925), and its progeny.

1986By adopting such a position, we align ourselves with the traditional federal “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement as set forth in the seminal case of Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132 , 45 S Ct 280 , 69 L Ed 543 (1925), and its progeny.

2016Bates tells us that our task on review of the trial court’s determination that the patdown was authorized by the officer-safety exception to the warrant requirement is to consider individually the specific facts that the state proved were known to Gutierrez at the time of the patdown, and to determine whether “any of the circumstances confronted by the officer either individually or collectively justify a reasonable suspicion that the defendant posed an immediate threat to” Gutierrez or others. 304 Or at 525 .

2011See, e.g., State v. Schultz, 170 Wash 2d 746, 248 P3d 484, 488 (Wash 2011) (emergency aid as exception to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 7, of the Washington Constitution); and State v. Ford, 188 Vt 17, 998 A2d 684, 688-89 (Vt 010) (exception to Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution). 5 In our view, it does not matter whether the need to render immediate aid is triggered by a human source or a condition idiopathic to the person needing aid. 6 The elements of an emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement were first set out by the United States Supreme Co

2011See, e.g., State v. Schultz, 170 Wash 2d 746, 248 P3d 484, 488 (Wash 2011) (emergency aid as exception to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 7, of the Washington Constitution); and State v. Ford, 188 Vt 17, 998 A2d 684, 688-89 (Vt 010) (exception to Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution). 5 In our view, it does not matter whether the need to render immediate aid is triggered by a human source or a condition idiopathic to the person needing aid. 6 The elements of an emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement were first set out by the United States Supreme Co

1989See Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730, 737-39 , 103 S Ct 1535 , 75 L Ed 2d 502 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 464-65 , 91 S Ct 2022 , 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971); State v. Keller, 265 Or 622, 625 , 510 P2d 568 (1973).

1989See Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730, 737-39 , 103 S Ct 1535 , 75 L Ed 2d 502 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 464-65 , 91 S Ct 2022 , 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971); State v. Keller, 265 Or 622, 625 , 510 P2d 568 (1973).

1989See Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730, 737-39 , 103 S Ct 1535 , 75 L Ed 2d 502 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 464-65 , 91 S Ct 2022 , 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971); State v. Keller, 265 Or 622, 625 , 510 P2d 568 (1973).

1989See Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730, 737-39 , 103 S Ct 1535 , 75 L Ed 2d 502 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 464-65 , 91 S Ct 2022 , 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971); State v. Keller, 265 Or 622, 625 , 510 P2d 568 (1973).

1986On the need for certainty, see Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 Colum L Rev 1023, 1026-27 (1974). [2] Justice Marshall, dissenting in United States v. Ross, 456 US 798, 827 , 102 S Ct 2157, 2174 , 72 L Ed 2d 572, 595 (1982), stated: "The majority today not only repeals all realistic limits on warrantless automobile searches, it repeals the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement itself. * * *" [1] The state conceded in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals that there was no "exigency." [2] One of the officers who participated in the search testified that the officers "were searchin

1986On the need for certainty, see Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 Colum L Rev 1023, 1026-27 (1974). [2] Justice Marshall, dissenting in United States v. Ross, 456 US 798, 827 , 102 S Ct 2157, 2174 , 72 L Ed 2d 572, 595 (1982), stated: "The majority today not only repeals all realistic limits on warrantless automobile searches, it repeals the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement itself. * * *" [1] The state conceded in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals that there was no "exigency." [2] One of the officers who participated in the search testified that the officers "were searchin

1986On the need for certainty, see Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 Colum L Rev 1023, 1026-27 (1974). [2] Justice Marshall, dissenting in United States v. Ross, 456 US 798, 827 , 102 S Ct 2157, 2174 , 72 L Ed 2d 572, 595 (1982), stated: "The majority today not only repeals all realistic limits on warrantless automobile searches, it repeals the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement itself. * * *" [1] The state conceded in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals that there was no "exigency." [2] One of the officers who participated in the search testified that the officers "were searchin

1986On the need for certainty, see Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 Colum L Rev 1023, 1026-27 (1974). [2] Justice Marshall, dissenting in United States v. Ross, 456 US 798, 827 , 102 S Ct 2157, 2174 , 72 L Ed 2d 572, 595 (1982), stated: "The majority today not only repeals all realistic limits on warrantless automobile searches, it repeals the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement itself. * * *" [1] The state conceded in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals that there was no "exigency." [2] One of the officers who participated in the search testified that the officers "were searchin

1982The state argues that a purse is an item “immediately associated with the person of an arrestee” and may be validly searched at the time of arrest or booking under the rule announced in State v. Florance, supra, which adopted the federal standard enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson, 414 US 218 , 94 S Ct 467 , 38 LEd 2d 427 (1973).

1982The state argues that a purse is an item “immediately associated with the person of an arrestee” and may be validly searched at the time of arrest or booking under the rule announced in State v. Florance, supra, which adopted the federal standard enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson, 414 US 218 , 94 S Ct 467 , 38 LEd 2d 427 (1973).

1982We held that the search could not be justified as an inventory search, per Keller, nor under the “automobile exception” to the fourth amendment warrant requirement formulated in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 US 42 , 90 S Ct 1975 , 26 LEd 2d 419 (1970) and Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132 , 45 S Ct 280 , 69 LEd 543 (1925).

1982We held that the search could not be justified as an inventory search, per Keller, nor under the “automobile exception” to the fourth amendment warrant requirement formulated in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 US 42 , 90 S Ct 1975 , 26 LEd 2d 419 (1970) and Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132 , 45 S Ct 280 , 69 LEd 543 (1925).