6 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen2 sentences2024Thus, if the supreme court were to accept Judge Furman’s invitation to reconsider the scope of Hyde, it would have an opportunity to consider whether the Colorado expressed consent statute alone can satisfy the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment in situations where a driver, like Tarr, withdraws his statutory consent. ¶ 35 Although the Supreme Court recently analyzed state expressed consent statutes, see Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___ , ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 160-61 , those decisions did not consider whether such statutes comply with the 14 con 2024The Supreme Court granted 39 certiorari on “[w]hether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2532 . ¶ 82 The plurality in Mitchell noted that while prior decisions of the Supreme Court had “referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences” on drivers who refuse to comply with blood alcohol concentration testing, these decisions “have not rested on the idea that [implied consent] laws do what their popu | 2 | 2 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2024Thus, if the supreme court were to accept Judge Furman’s invitation to reconsider the scope of Hyde, it would have an opportunity to consider whether the Colorado expressed consent statute alone can satisfy the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment in situations where a driver, like Tarr, withdraws his statutory consent. ¶ 35 Although the Supreme Court recently analyzed state expressed consent statutes, see Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___ , ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 160-61 , those decisions did not consider whether such statutes comply with the 14 con 2017Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016); see also Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (referring to a blood draw as “an invasion of bodily integrity” that “implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy’” (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985))). ¶18 A warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Navdeep S. Brargreen2 sentences2024See State v. Brar, 2017 WI 73, ¶ 23 , 898 N.W.2d 499, 507 (“[L]est there be any doubt, consent by conduct or implication is constitutionally sufficient consent under the Fourth Amendment.”); Bobeck v. Idaho Transp. 2024See State v. Brar, 2017 WI 73, ¶ 23 , 898 N.W.2d 499, 507 (“[L]est there be any doubt, consent by conduct or implication is constitutionally sufficient consent under the Fourth Amendment.”); Bobeck v. Idaho Transp. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rycegreen1 sentence2024Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939 , 946 (Nev. 2014) (noting that it could find “no jurisdiction that has upheld an implied consent statute that allows an officer to use force to obtain a blood sample upon the driver’s refusal to submit to a test”); see State v. Ryce, 368 P.3d 342, 369 (Kan. 2016) (“It would be inconsistent with Fourth Amendment principles to conclude consent remained voluntary if a suspect clearly and unequivocally revoked consent.”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Schaufelegreen2 sentences2017People v. Schaufele, 2014 CO 43, ¶ 19 , 325 P.3d 1060, 1064 (plurality opinion) (quoting McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 ). 8 ¶19 The subject’s voluntarily given consent is one such exception. 2017People v. Schaufele, 2014 CO 43, ¶ 19 , 325 P.3d 1060, 1064 (plurality opinion) (quoting McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 ). 8 ¶19 The subject’s voluntarily given consent is one such exception. | 1 | 1 |
Winston v. Leegreen2 sentences2017Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2173 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016); see also Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1558 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (referring to a blood draw as “an invasion of bodily integrity” that “implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy” (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 , 105 S.Ct. 1611 , 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985))). ¶ 18 A warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 2017Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016); see also Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (referring to a blood draw as “an invasion of bodily integrity” that “implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy’” (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985))). ¶18 A warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Reynoldsgreen1 sentence1991People v. Reynolds, 672 P.2d 529, 532 (Colo.1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Antonio Aviles v. State
green
1 sentence2024Aviles v. Texas, 571 U.S. 1119 (2014) (mem.). ¶ 38 On remand, the state court concluded that, following the logic of McNeely, the mandatory blood draw and implied consent statutes “were not substitutes for a warrant or legal exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” Aviles v. State, 443 S.W.3d 291 , 16 294 (Tex. App. 2014) (Aviles II). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Mitchell v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2024The Supreme Court granted 39 certiorari on “[w]hether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2532 . ¶ 82 The plurality in Mitchell noted that while prior decisions of the Supreme Court had “referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences” on drivers who refuse to comply with blood alcohol concentration testing, these decisions “have not rested on the idea that [implied consent] laws do what their popu 2024The Supreme Court granted 39 certiorari on “[w]hether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2532 . ¶ 82 The plurality in Mitchell noted that while prior decisions of the Supreme Court had “referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences” on drivers who refuse to comply with blood alcohol concentration testing, these decisions “have not rested on the idea that [implied consent] laws do what their popu | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Newbold v. United States
green
1 sentence2024Aviles v. Texas, 571 U.S. 1119 (2014) (mem.). ¶ 38 On remand, the state court concluded that, following the logic of McNeely, the mandatory blood draw and implied consent statutes “were not substitutes for a warrant or legal exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” Aviles v. State, 443 S.W.3d 291 , 16 294 (Tex. App. 2014) (Aviles II). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Brown
green
2 sentences2018Although the district court initially denied the motion, upon reconsideration in light of the court of appeals' opinion in People v. Brown , 2016 COA 150 , 417 P.3d 868 , it found that where Quick was merely cited, and not actually arrested, for driving with a suspended license, and where the only justification offered for seizing his car was instead the likelihood that he would continue to drive and thereby endanger public safety, the initial seizure of his car did not fall within the community caretaking exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. ¶ 2 Be 2018Although the district court initially denied the motion, upon reconsideration in light of the court of appeals' opinion in People v. Brown , 2016 COA 150 , 417 P.3d 868 , it found that where Quick was merely cited, and not actually arrested, for driving with a suspended license, and where the only justification offered for seizing his car was instead the likelihood that he would continue to drive and thereby endanger public safety, the initial seizure of his car did not fall within the community caretaking exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. ¶ 2 Be | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Hyde
green
2 sentences2017Because Simpson never revoked that consent, the blood draw was constitutional. ¶ 21 In People v. Hyde, 2017 CO 24, ¶3 , 393 P.3d 962 , which we announce today, we explain that a driver’s consent to the Expressed Consent Statute, demonstrated by driving in the state of Colorado, satisfies the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and renders a warrants less blood draw conducted under the Statute constitutional. 2017Because Simpson never revoked that consent, the blood draw was constitutional. ¶21 In People v. Hyde, 2017 CO 24, ¶ 3 , __ P.3d __, which we announce today, we explain that a driver’s consent to the Expressed Consent Statute, demonstrated by driving in the state of Colorado, satisfies the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and renders a warrantless blood draw conducted under the Statute constitutional. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Smith v. Maryland
red
2 sentences1989The applicability of the Fourth Amendment depends on “whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by governmental action.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). 1989The applicability of the Fourth Amendment depends on “whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by governmental action.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Harding
green
1 sentence1983People v. Roark, supra; People v. Harding, supra. A second exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, which the district court did not consider, is the consent doctrine. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Roark
green
1 sentence1983People v. Roark, supra; People v. Harding, supra. A second exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, which the district court did not consider, is the consent doctrine. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.