Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in Ohio

2025“An investigative stop or a Terry stop is a common exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” State v. Phillips, 2016-Ohio-7049, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2022The investigative stop exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a police officer to stop and briefly detain an individual if the officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity “may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see, also, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).

2023“Because inventory searches are administrative caretaking functions unrelated to criminal investigations, the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, including the standard of probable cause, are not implicated.” Id., citing Opperman at 370, fn. 5.

2022“Because inventory searches are administrative caretaking functions unrelated to criminal investigations, the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, including the standard of probable cause, are not Licking County, Case No. 21CA0088 8 implicated.” Mesa at 108, citing Opperman at 370, 96 S.Ct. 3092 .

2022The investigative stop exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a police officer to stop and briefly detain an individual if the officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity “may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see, also, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).

2022The investigative stop exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a police officer to stop and briefly detain an individual if the officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity “may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see, also, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).

2014Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299 (1999), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).

2003State v. Gedeon (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 617 , 618 , citing Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1 ; see, also, Maumee v. Weisner (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 295 , 296 .

2008See, also, State v. Pierce (1998), 125 Ohio App.3d 592 , 596 , 709 N.E.2d 203 . *Page 8 {¶ 25} A common exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is an investigative stop, or " Terry stop." Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 .

2008See, also, State v. Pierce (1998), 125 Ohio App.3d 592 , 596 , 709 N.E.2d 203 . *Page 8 {¶ 25} A common exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is an investigative stop, or " Terry stop." Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 .

2009See Coolidge , supra. "In order for evidence to be seized under the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement it must be shown that (1) the initial intrusion which afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing authorities." State v. Williams (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 82 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

2007Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 ; see, also, State v. Williams (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 82 , 377 N.E.2d 1013 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

2023And as discussed above, the other apparent authority for suppression is inapplicable here. {¶ 21} On remand, the trial court should also consider whether community- caretaking/emergency-aid exception applies here. {¶ 22} In State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 at syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held: The community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a law-enforcement officer with objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there is an immediate need for his or her assistance to protect life or prevent seri

2023And as discussed above, the other apparent authority for suppression is inapplicable here. {¶ 21} On remand, the trial court should also consider whether community- caretaking/emergency-aid exception applies here. {¶ 22} In State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 at syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held: The community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a law-enforcement officer with objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there is an immediate need for his or her assistance to protect life or prevent seri

2017Id. {¶ 13} Because inventory searches are administrative caretaking functions unrelated to criminal investigations, the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, including the standard of probable cause, are not implicated.

2001Since an inventory search advances administrative caretaking functions, "the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, including the standard of probable cause, are not implicated." State v. Mesa (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 105 , 109 .

2008We therefore believe that the reasonable suspicion analysis provides the proper framework for disposing of this appeal. 3 D INVESTIGATIVE STOP EXCEPTION {¶ 22} The investigative stop exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a police officer to stop and briefly detain an individual if the officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity "may be afoot." Terry , 392 U.S. at 30 ; see, also, United States v. Arvizu (2002), 534 U.S. 266 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 ; Illinois v. Wardlow (2000), 528 U.S. 119 , 123 , 1

2008We therefore believe that the reasonable suspicion analysis provides the proper framework for disposing of this appeal. 3 D INVESTIGATIVE STOP EXCEPTION {¶ 22} The investigative stop exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a police officer to stop and briefly detain an individual if the officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity "may be afoot." Terry , 392 U.S. at 30 ; see, also, United States v. Arvizu (2002), 534 U.S. 266 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 ; Illinois v. Wardlow (2000), 528 U.S. 119 , 123 , 1

2018Lake No. 2014-L-101, 2015- Ohio-4426, ¶6. {¶8} “The investigative stop exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a police officer to stop an individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that criminal behavior has occurred 3 or is imminent.” State v. Gedeon, 81 Ohio App.3d 617, 618 (11th Dist.1992), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2006"The investigative stop exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a police officer to stop an individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that criminal behavior has occurred or is imminent." State v. Gedeon (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 617 , 618 , see, also, Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1 .

2023Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). {¶16} “There are a number of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, including * * * the community-caretaking exception, which courts sometimes refer to as the “‘emergency-aid exception’” or “‘exigent-circumstance exception.’” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008, ¶ 15 .

2006Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 . {¶ 17} A principal exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is a search incident to a person's arrest.

2025Thus, “no Fourth Amendment rights are invoked with a consensual encounter because there is no seizure.” Strong at ¶ 16, citing Blankenship at ¶ 11. {¶22} And “[t]he ‘investigative stop’ exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a police officer to temporarily detain a person for the limited purpose of investigating suspected criminal behavior.” Strong, 2019- Ohio-2888, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87 (1991).

2020Montgomery No. 19323, 2003-Ohio-1047 , ¶ 14, quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 , 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). {¶ 20} In addition, under the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, a law-enforcement officer with objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there is an immediate need for his or her assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury may conduct a community-caretaking/emergency- aid stop.

2008Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ; see, also, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1978), 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 ; State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86 , 565 N.E.2d 1271 .

2008Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ; see, also, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1978), 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 ; State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86 , 565 N.E.2d 1271 .

2023The appellate court found Harris “can hardly claim to have a constitutionally recognized expectation of privacy in a common or public area such as the RTA parking lot” and the pills “were visible to the officers from outside [of] the vehicle.” Id. at 547 . {¶ 81} The appellate court affirmed, concluding “[h]aving observed the contraband from outside [of] the vehicle, [the] [o]fficers * * * were justified in seizing it pursuant to the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” Id. at 548 .

2023The appellate court found Harris “can hardly claim to have a constitutionally recognized expectation of privacy in a common or public area such as the RTA parking lot” and the pills “were visible to the officers from outside [of] the vehicle.” Id. at 547 . {¶ 81} The appellate court affirmed, concluding “[h]aving observed the contraband from outside [of] the vehicle, [the] [o]fficers * * * were justified in seizing it pursuant to the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” Id. at 548 .

2006State v. Howard (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 760 , 766 , citing McDonald v. United States (1948), 335 U.S. 451 ; Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752 ; Warden v. Hayden (1967), 387 U.S. 294 ; Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757 .

2005Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752 , 762-763 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 ; United States v. Robinson (1973), 414 U.S. 218 , 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (finding a search incident to arrest is a "reasonable" exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment).

2019Lucas No. L-04-1321, 2005-Ohio-4727, ¶ 20 ; see also U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). {¶ 18} The use of a drug dog to sniff the exterior of a vehicle, lawfully detained, is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

2019Lucas No. L-04-1321, 2005-Ohio-4727, ¶ 20 ; see also U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). {¶ 18} The use of a drug dog to sniff the exterior of a vehicle, lawfully detained, is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

1994See Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 ; United States v. Ross (1982), 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 ; California v. Carney (1985), 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 ; State v. Kessler (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 204 , 7 O.O.3d 375 , 373 N.E.2d 1252 ; and State v. Fadenhotz (June 13, 1991), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 60865 and 60866, unreported, 1991 WL 106055 .

1990In 1925, the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 132 , which held as follows: "If a search and seizure without warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon the belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which, by law, is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid." The Supreme Court has continued to carve exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement in the case of automobiles in Carroll and its progeny for

2025However, “[w]hile an investigative stop constitutes a seizure, it does not violate Ross App. No. 23CA3 10 the Fourth Amendment as long as the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity ‘may be afoot’ (i.e., that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.)” Id., citing State v. Abernathy, 2008-Ohio-2949, ¶ 22-24 (4th Dist.); Terry v. Ohio, 392.

2015Scioto No. 07CA3160, 2008-Ohio-2949 ¶22-24 , quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S.Ct 573 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000); State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86 , 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991); State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 654 , 645 N.E.2d 831, 833 (1994). {¶ 14} A valid investigative stop must be based upon more than a mere “hunch” that criminal activity is afoot.