Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (District of Columbia) · Go Syfert
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Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in District of Columbia

8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

CaseFollowedCited
Bernard West v. United Statesgreen
dc · 2014 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2021–2025
2 sentences

2025Thus, “[u]nder the so-called plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, ‘if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.’” (Bernard) West v. United States, 100 A.3d 1076, 1083-84 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993)).

2021See, e.g., West v. United States, 100 A.3d 1076, 1083-84 (D.C. 2014) (discussing “plain view” and “automobile” exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement).

22
Umanzor v. United Statesgreen
dc · 2002 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2014–2021
2 sentences

2021However, such observation must first square with the plain view exception, which only allows for the warrantless seizure of evidence “in plain sight” when: “(1) an officer [did] not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed; (2) the evidence’s incriminating character is immediately apparent; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself.” Porter v. United States, 37 A.3d 251, 256 (D.C. 2012) (quoting Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 998-99 (D.C. 2002)). 12 The “automobile exception to the Fourth Amendmen

2014Under the so-called plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a *1084 lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); accord Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 998-99 (D.C.2002) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)).

22
Minnesota v. Dickersongreen
scotus · 1993 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2014–2025
2 sentences

2025Thus, “[u]nder the so-called plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, ‘if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.’” (Bernard) West v. United States, 100 A.3d 1076, 1083-84 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993)).

2014Under the so-called plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a *1084 lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); accord Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 998-99 (D.C.2002) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)).

12
Alston v. United Statesgreen
dc · 1986 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021A. State Action In deciding whether a private search triggers the Fourth Amendment, we must determine “whether there was sufficient ‘governmental involvement’ in the search.” Limpuangthip, 932 A.2d at 1142 (quoting Alston v. United States, 518 A.2d 439, 441 (D.C. 1986)).

11
Porter v. United Statesgreen
dc · 2012 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021However, such observation must first square with the plain view exception, which only allows for the warrantless seizure of evidence “in plain sight” when: “(1) an officer [did] not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed; (2) the evidence’s incriminating character is immediately apparent; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself.” Porter v. United States, 37 A.3d 251, 256 (D.C. 2012) (quoting Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 998-99 (D.C. 2002)). 12 The “automobile exception to the Fourth Amendmen

11
United States v. Yonas Eshetugreen
cadc · 2017 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017The automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement “permits the warrantless search of a car [or other vehicle] that is ‘readily mobile’ so long as ‘probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.’ ” United States v. Eshetu, 863 F.3d 946, 951 (D.C.

2017The automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement ―permits the warrantless search of a car [or other vehicle] that is ‗readily mobile‘ so long as ‗probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.‘‖ United States v. Eshetu, 863 F.3d 946, 951 (D.C.

11
Pennsylvania v. Labrongreen
scotus · 1996 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Cir. 2017) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam)); United States v. Shackleford, 830 F.3d 751 , 753 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (“The. automobile exception requires probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of any crime will be found in the vehicle[.]”). 36 And, “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982);

2017Cir. 2017) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam)); United States v. Shackleford, 830 F.3d 751 , 753 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (“The. automobile exception requires probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of any crime will be found in the vehicle[.]”). 36 And, “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982);

11
United States v. Javon Shacklefordgreen
ca8 · 2016 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Cir. 2017) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam)); United States v. Shackleford, 830 F.3d 751 , 753 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (“The. automobile exception requires probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of any crime will be found in the vehicle[.]”). 36 And, “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982);

2017Cir. 2017) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam)); United States v. Shackleford, 830 F.3d 751 , 753 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (―The automobile exception requires probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of any crime will be found in the vehicle[.]‖).36 And, ―[i]f probable cause justifies the search of (…continued) U.S. at 712 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).

11
United States v. Jacobsengreen
scotus · 1984 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017Cir. 2017) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam)); United States v. Shackleford, 830 F.3d 751 , 753 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (―The automobile exception requires probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of any crime will be found in the vehicle[.]‖).36 And, ―[i]f probable cause justifies the search of (…continued) U.S. at 712 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).

11
Horton v. Californiagreen
scotus · 1990 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Under the so-called plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a *1084 lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); accord Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 998-99 (D.C.2002) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)).

2014Under the so-called plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a *1084 lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); accord Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 998-99 (D.C.2002) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)).

11
Holston v. United Statesgreen
dc · 1993 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014Holston v. United States, 633 A.2d 378, 385 (D.C.1993) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)).

11
United States v. Chadwickred
scotus · 1977 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981See United States v. Chadwick, supra : Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest. [ Id. 433 U.S. at 15 , 97 S.Ct. at 2485 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).] In this instance, even if we assume the existence of probable cause, there is considerable authority, Arkansas v. Sanders, supra

1981See United States v. Chadwick, supra : Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest. [ Id. 433 U.S. at 15 , 97 S.Ct. at 2485 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).] In this instance, even if we assume the existence of probable cause, there is considerable authority, Arkansas v. Sanders, supra

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Limpuangthip v. United States green
dc · 2007
1 sentence

2021A. State Action In deciding whether a private search triggers the Fourth Amendment, we must determine “whether there was sufficient ‘governmental involvement’ in the search.” Limpuangthip, 932 A.2d at 1142 (quoting Alston v. United States, 518 A.2d 439, 441 (D.C. 1986)).

12021–2021
United States v. Ross green
scotus · 1982
2 sentences

2017Cir. 2017) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam)); United States v. Shackleford, 830 F.3d 751 , 753 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (“The. automobile exception requires probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of any crime will be found in the vehicle[.]”). 36 And, “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982);

2017Cir. 2017) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam)); United States v. Shackleford, 830 F.3d 751 , 753 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (“The. automobile exception requires probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of any crime will be found in the vehicle[.]”). 36 And, “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982);

12017–2017
Kentucky v. King green
scotus · 2011
2 sentences

2015One well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement “applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v. King, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

2015One well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement “applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v. King, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

12015–2015
Carroll v. United States green
scotus · 1925
2 sentences

2014Holston v. United States, 633 A.2d 378, 385 (D.C.1993) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)).

2014Holston v. United States, 633 A.2d 378, 385 (D.C.1993) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)).

12014–2014
Sabbath v. United States green
scotus · 1968
2 sentences

1983Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 , 591 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. 1755 , 1759 n. 8, 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968). .

1983Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 , 591 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. 1755 , 1759 n. 8, 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968). .

11983–1983
Harris v. United States green
scotus · 1968
2 sentences

1981Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968). 6 .

1981Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968). 6 .

11981–1981

Where else courts name it

OH 276 (1976–2025) TX 99 (1982–2026) ID 33 (1982–2026) TN 27 (1981–2026) MO 24 (1970–2025) CA 24 (1974–2024) WA 22 (1975–2022) PA 19 (1973–2025) VA 19 (1982–2026) IN 18 (1981–2025) MD 16 (1984–2022) IL 16 (1979–2025) WI 15 (1993–2024) NJ 13 (1978–2024) FL 12 (1979–2025) MI 11 (1974–2024) NY 10 (1980–2021) MS 10 (1981–2015) IA 10 (1978–2021) MN 9 (1986–2025) AZ 8 (1978–2026) DC 8 (1981–2025) AL 7 (1979–1994) OR 7 (1982–2016) UT 7 (1985–2024) CO 6 (1983–2024) SC 6 (1980–2020) OK 5 (1990–2016) ND 4 (2008–2017) NC 4 (2015–2018) WY 4 (1983–2001) SD 4 (1978–2014) MA 4 (1982–1999) CT 4 (1980–2017) KS 3 (2020–2024) HI 3 (1981–2015) RI 3 (1978–2014) NV 3 (1981–2022) MT 3 (1982–2021) NM 2 (1994–2004) ME 2 (2009–2010) LA 2 (1986–1987) WV 2 (1989–2023)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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