10 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ogden v. Saundersgreen2 sentences2017Thus, the “passing” of a “law” would have been understood by the framers in its most general sense to include the “enactment” of “[a] rule, particularly an established or permanent rule, prescribed by the supreme power of a state to its subjects, for regulating their actions, particularly their social actions.” Id.; see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 US 213, 347 , 6 L Ed 606 (1827) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Law has been defined by a writer, whose definitions especially have been the theme of almost universal panegyric, ‘to be a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a State.’” 2017Thus, the “passing” of a “law” would have been understood by the framers in its most general sense to include the “enactment” of “[a] rule, particularly an established or permanent rule, prescribed by the supreme power of a state to its subjects, for regulating their actions, particularly their social actions.” Id.; see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 US 213, 347 , 6 L Ed 606 (1827) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Law has been defined by a writer, whose definitions especially have been the theme of almost universal panegyric, ‘to be a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a State.’” | 1 | 1 |
Reid v. Department of Consumer & Business Servicesgreen2 sentences2017See Reid v. DCBS, 235 Or App 397, 401 , 232 P3d 994 (2010) (stating same). 2017See Reid v. DCBS, 235 Or App 397, 401 , 232 P3d 994 (2010) (stating same). | 1 | 1 |
Cascade Physical Therapy v. Hartford Casualty Insurancegreen2 sentences2013In Cascade Physical Therapy , the director had interpreted the former permanent rule to allow the insurers to apply those private fee discount contracts to payments owed by them to medical providers. 258 Or App at 616 ; see also id. at 615 n 3. 2013In Cascade Physical Therapy , the director had interpreted the former permanent rule to allow the insurers to apply those private fee discount contracts to payments owed by them to medical providers. 258 Or App at 616 ; see also id. at 615 n 3. | 1 | 1 |
Ortiz v. Adult & Family Services Divisiongreen2 sentences1983See Ortiz v. Adult & Family Services Division, 45 Or App 925 , 609 P2d 1309 (1980). 4 Petitioners argue that the permanent rule adopted March 17,1982, could not be used to cure the invalid rule and reduce or terminate their benefits as of September 1,1980. 1983See Ortiz v. Adult & Family Services Division, 45 Or App 925 , 609 P2d 1309 (1980). 4 Petitioners argue that the permanent rule adopted March 17,1982, could not be used to cure the invalid rule and reduce or terminate their benefits as of September 1,1980. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
green
2 sentences2024In any event, we note that, unlike our review of permanent rules, in the context of temporary rules, courts “review an agency’s determination ‘that its failure to act promptly will result in serious prejudice to the public interest or the interest of the parties concerned,’ ” Friends II, 366 Or at 90 (quoting ORS 183.335(5)(a)), which we have done in this case. 2024In any event, we note that, unlike our review of permanent rules, in the context of temporary rules, courts “review an agency’s determination ‘that its failure to act promptly will result in serious prejudice to the public interest or the interest of the parties concerned,’ ” Friends II, 366 Or at 90 (quoting ORS 183.335(5)(a)), which we have done in this case. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
McKnight v. Land Conservation & Development Commission
neutral
2 sentences2000Similarly, we dismissed as moot a challenge to a temporary rule that had been replaced by a permanent rule, reasoning that “[t]he rule petitioners attack is no longer in existence, and our decision would ‘merely resolve an abstract question without practical effect.’ ”McKnight v. LCDC, 69 Or App 642 , 687 P2d 170 (1984), rev den 299 Or 522 (1985). 2000Similarly, we dismissed as moot a challenge to a temporary rule that had been replaced by a permanent rule, reasoning that “[t]he rule petitioners attack is no longer in existence, and our decision would ‘merely resolve an abstract question without practical effect.’ ”McKnight v. LCDC, 69 Or App 642 , 687 P2d 170 (1984), rev den 299 Or 522 (1985). | 2 | 1985–2000 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences1979Clearly, therefore, neither this passage nor any other passage in the Miranda opinion can sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent." The court went on to add (at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326 ): "We therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his `right to cut off questioning' was `scrupulously honored.'" [3] In Brewer v. Williams, 1979Clearly, therefore, neither this passage nor any other passage in the Miranda opinion can sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent." The court went on to add (at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326 ): "We therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his `right to cut off questioning' was `scrupulously honored.'" [3] In Brewer v. Williams, | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Brewer v. Williams
green
2 sentences1979Clearly, therefore, neither this passage nor any other passage in the Miranda opinion can sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent." The court went on to add (at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326 ): "We therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his `right to cut off questioning' was `scrupulously honored.'" [3] In Brewer v. Williams, 1979Clearly, therefore, neither this passage nor any other passage in the Miranda opinion can sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent." The court went on to add (at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326 ): "We therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his `right to cut off questioning' was `scrupulously honored.'" [3] In Brewer v. Williams, | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Michigan v. Mosley
green
1 sentence1979Clearly, therefore, neither this passage nor any other passage in the Miranda opinion can sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent." The court went on to add (at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326 ): "We therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his `right to cut off questioning' was `scrupulously honored.'" [3] In Brewer v. Williams, | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Griffith v. Klamath Water Ass'n
neutral
2 sentences1957In Griffith v. Klamath Water Assn., 68 Or 402, 405 , 137 P 226 , this court said: “A by-law of a private corporation is a permanent rule of action adopted by the stockholders, in accordance with which the corporate affairs are to be conducted. 1957In Griffith v. Klamath Water Assn., 68 Or 402, 405 , 137 P 226 , this court said: “A by-law of a private corporation is a permanent rule of action adopted by the stockholders, in accordance with which the corporate affairs are to be conducted. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.