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6 Washington opinions name it 1 courts 2002–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Bartongreen1 sentence2011As such, we are bound by it.” United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011). ¶43 R.P.H. suggests that the list of “longstanding prohibitions” does not apply to his situation because he is not challenging the underlying firearm prohibition that was imposed at the time he was sentenced under former RCW 9.41.040(1), but rather the permanent bar imposed by former RCW 9.41.040(4). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Eserjose
green
2 sentences2024Majority at 13; State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 922 , 259 P.3d 172 (2011) (applying the exclusionary rule on a “but for” basis would “make it virtually impossible to rehabilitate an investigation once misconduct has occurred, granting suspected criminals a permanent immunity unless . . . other law enforcement officers initiate an independent investigation”). 2019We also agree with the lead opinion that on a practical level, "[a]n alternative 'but for' principle would make it virtually impossible to rehabilitate an investigation once misconduct has occurred, granting suspected criminals a permanent immunity unless, by chance, other law enforcement officers initiate an independent investigation." Id. at 922 . | 2 | 2019–2024 |
State v. Eserjose
green
2 sentences2024Majority at 13; State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 922 , 259 P.3d 172 (2011) (applying the exclusionary rule on a “but for” basis would “make it virtually impossible to rehabilitate an investigation once misconduct has occurred, granting suspected criminals a permanent immunity unless . . . other law enforcement officers initiate an independent investigation”). 2019We also agree with the lead opinion that on a practical level, "[a]n alternative 'but for' principle would make it virtually impossible to rehabilitate an investigation once misconduct has occurred, granting suspected criminals a permanent immunity unless, by chance, other law enforcement officers initiate an independent investigation." Id. at 922, 259 P.3d 172 . | 2 | 2019–2024 |
State v. Traub
green
2 sentences2011An alternative "but for" principle would make it virtually impossible to rehabilitate an investigation once misconduct has occurred, granting suspected criminals a permanent immunity unless, by chance, other law enforcement officers initiate an independent investigation. *181 The factors the United States Supreme Court identified in Brown are designed to aid courts in determining whether an illegal arrest was, as was said in Vangen , the "operative factor in causing or bringing the confession about." Id. 2011The factors the United States Supreme Court identified in Brown are designed to aid courts in determining whether an illegal arrest was, as was said in Vangen , the “operative factor in causing or bringing the confession about.” Id. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Washburn ex rel. Estate of Roznowski v. City of Federal Way
green
2 sentences2024Thus, we look for any unforeseen intervening circumstances that sever the chain of causation “‘between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury.’” Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d at 892 (quoting Washburn v. City of Federal Way, 178 Wn.2d 732, 761 , 310 P.3d 1275 (2013)). 2024Thus, we look for any unforeseen intervening circumstances that sever the chain of causation “‘between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury.’” Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d at 892 (quoting Washburn v. City of Federal Way, 178 Wn.2d 732, 761 , 310 P.3d 1275 (2013)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Mayfield
green
1 sentence2024Thus, we look for any unforeseen intervening circumstances that sever the chain of causation “‘between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury.’” Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d at 892 (quoting Washburn v. City of Federal Way, 178 Wn.2d 732, 761 , 310 P.3d 1275 (2013)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Wittenbarger
green
2 sentences2002Walk v. Dep't of Licensing, 95 Wash.App. 653, 657 , 976 P.2d 185 (1999). [43] Wittenbarger, 124 Wash.2d at 473 , 880 P.2d 517 ; see, e.g., WAC 448-13-080, -110, -160, and -170. [44] Under RCW 34.05.350(1)(a), the State Toxicologist found that "immediate adoption, amendment or repeal of a rule" was "necessary for the preservation of the public health, safety, or general welfare" and "that observing the time requirements of notice and opportunity to comment upon adoption of a permanent rule would be contrary to public interest." St. 2002Walk v. Dep't of Licensing, 95 Wash.App. 653, 657 , 976 P.2d 185 (1999). [43] Wittenbarger, 124 Wash.2d at 473 , 880 P.2d 517 ; see, e.g., WAC 448-13-080, -110, -160, and -170. [44] Under RCW 34.05.350(1)(a), the State Toxicologist found that "immediate adoption, amendment or repeal of a rule" was "necessary for the preservation of the public health, safety, or general welfare" and "that observing the time requirements of notice and opportunity to comment upon adoption of a permanent rule would be contrary to public interest." St. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Walk v. State, Dept. of Licensing
green
2 sentences2002Walk v. Dep't of Licensing, 95 Wash.App. 653, 657 , 976 P.2d 185 (1999). [43] Wittenbarger, 124 Wash.2d at 473 , 880 P.2d 517 ; see, e.g., WAC 448-13-080, -110, -160, and -170. [44] Under RCW 34.05.350(1)(a), the State Toxicologist found that "immediate adoption, amendment or repeal of a rule" was "necessary for the preservation of the public health, safety, or general welfare" and "that observing the time requirements of notice and opportunity to comment upon adoption of a permanent rule would be contrary to public interest." St. 2002Walk v. Dep't of Licensing, 95 Wash.App. 653, 657 , 976 P.2d 185 (1999). [43] Wittenbarger, 124 Wash.2d at 473 , 880 P.2d 517 ; see, e.g., WAC 448-13-080, -110, -160, and -170. [44] Under RCW 34.05.350(1)(a), the State Toxicologist found that "immediate adoption, amendment or repeal of a rule" was "necessary for the preservation of the public health, safety, or general welfare" and "that observing the time requirements of notice and opportunity to comment upon adoption of a permanent rule would be contrary to public interest." St. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.