permanent rule in North Carolina

2018Nevertheless, it is "an established rule to abide by former precedents, stare decisis , where the same points come up again in litigation, as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion, as also because, the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or swerve from according to his private sentiments; he being sworn to determine, not according to his private judgment, but acc

2018Nevertheless, it is "an established rule to abide by former precedents, stare decisis , where the same points come up again in litigation, as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion, as also because, the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or swerve from according to his private sentiments; he being sworn to determine, not according to his private judgment, but acc

2021McGill v. Town of Lumberton, 218 N.C. 586, 591 (1940) (cleaned up); see also Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 712 (2001) (stating that “[a] primary goal of adjudicatory proceedings is the uniform application of law” and that, “[i]n furtherance of this objective, courts generally consider themselves bound by prior precedent, i.e., the doctrine of stare decisis” (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (stating that “[s]tare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decision

2021McGill v. Town of Lumberton, 218 N.C. 586, 591 (1940) (cleaned up); see also Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 712 (2001) (stating that “[a] primary goal of adjudicatory proceedings is the uniform application of law” and that, “[i]n furtherance of this objective, courts generally consider themselves bound by prior precedent, i.e., the doctrine of stare decisis” (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (stating that “[s]tare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decision

2021McGill v. Town of Lumberton, 218 N.C. 586, 591 (1940) (cleaned up); see also Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 712 (2001) (stating that “[a] primary goal of adjudicatory proceedings is the uniform application of law” and that, “[i]n furtherance of this objective, courts generally consider themselves bound by prior precedent, i.e., the doctrine of stare decisis” (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (stating that “[s]tare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decision

2021McGill v. Town of Lumberton, 218 N.C. 586, 591 (1940) (cleaned up); see also Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 712 (2001) (stating that “[a] primary goal of adjudicatory proceedings is the uniform application of law” and that, “[i]n furtherance of this objective, courts generally consider themselves bound by prior precedent, i.e., the doctrine of stare decisis” (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (stating that “[s]tare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decision

1984There the court reasoned that "a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests." Id. at 102 , 96 S.Ct. at 325 , 46 L.Ed.2d at 320 .

1984There the court reasoned that "a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests." Id. at 102 , 96 S.Ct. at 325 , 46 L.Ed.2d at 320 .

1996The majority in Mitchell posed the question: "Is it today a proper function of government for the State to provide a site and equip a plant for private industrial enterprise?" Mitchell, 273 N.C. at 145 , 159 S.E.2d at 751 (emphasis added).

1996The majority in Mitchell posed the question: "Is it today a proper function of government for the State to provide a site and equip a plant for private industrial enterprise?" Mitchell, 273 N.C. at 145 , 159 S.E.2d at 751 (emphasis added).

1984See Ballinger v. Dept. of Revenue, 59 N.C.