permanent bar in California

2023(Los Angeles Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary Workers & Bartenders v. Stan’s Drive-Ins, Inc. (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 89, 94 .) In support of his argument that the 2014 Judgment contains a permanent bar, Hindley contends the judgment confirmed an award—the 2014 Arbitration Award—which by its terms indicates Arbitrator Block was very concerned about the potential future conflicts of interest that could stem from Epstein both holding an ownership interest in the Property (including via Sametc) and being a partner in SEZA with duties to Hindley, even if 30 Hindley was a non-client, because he

2023(Los Angeles Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary Workers & Bartenders v. Stan’s Drive-Ins, Inc. (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 89, 94 .) In support of his argument that the 2014 Judgment contains a permanent bar, Hindley contends the judgment confirmed an award—the 2014 Arbitration Award—which by its terms indicates Arbitrator Block was very concerned about the potential future conflicts of interest that could stem from Epstein both holding an ownership interest in the Property (including via Sametc) and being a partner in SEZA with duties to Hindley, even if 30 Hindley was a non-client, because he

2023“The same rules apply in ascertaining the meaning of a court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning of any other writing. [Citation.] ‘The interpretation of the effect of a judgment is a question of law within the ambit of the appellate court.’ ” (Mendly v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1205 .) Generally, “[t]he language of a [writing] is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.” (Civ.

2023“The same rules apply in ascertaining the meaning of a court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning of any other writing. [Citation.] ‘The interpretation of the effect of a judgment is a question of law within the ambit of the appellate court.’ ” (Mendly v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1205 .) Generally, “[t]he language of a [writing] is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.” (Civ.

1998(See Webster's New Collegiate Dict. (9th ed. 1987) p. 1152.) While in legal terminology a statute generally means a state or federal law and an ordinance is used to specifically refer to a municipal or county law, a court must apply the `usual and ordinary' meaning of words, rather than a technical construction." ( Id ., at p. 580.) In California Aviation Council v. City of Ceres (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1384 , 1391 , the court observed that the term "ordinance" could be considered a "statute": "`Ordinance' is defined as follows: `A rule established by authority; a permanent rule of action; a law

1998(See Webster's New Collegiate Dict. (9th ed. 1987) p. 1152.) While in legal terminology a statute generally means a state or federal law and an ordinance is used to specifically refer to a municipal or county law, a court must apply the 'usual and ordinary' meaning of words, rather than a technical construction." (Id., at p. 580.) In California Aviation Council v. City of Ceres (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1391 , the court observed that the term "ordinance" could be considered a "statute": "'Ordinance' is defined as follows: 'A rule established by authority; a permanent rule of action; a law or

1979As the United States Supreme Court said in Michigan v. Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. 96 , at page 102 [ 46 L.Ed.2d 313 at page 320], “. . . a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irra *717 tional obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests.” A blanket proscription of any renewed questioning under any circumstances would lead to

1979As the United States Supreme Court said in Michigan v. Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. 96 , at page 102 [ 46 L.Ed.2d 313 at page 320], “. . . a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irra *717 tional obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests.” A blanket proscription of any renewed questioning under any circumstances would lead to

1972In so far as the language of the findings may be construed as holding that there had been a permanent waiver, the findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence.” ( 92 Cal.App. at p. 645 .

1972In so far as the language of the findings may be construed as holding that there had been a permanent waiver, the findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence.” ( 92 Cal.App. at p. 645 .

1960(See Department of Water & Power v. Inyo Chemical Co., 16 Cal.2d 744 [ 108 P.2d 410 ].) But we are referred to no *66 case in which it is suggested that where a matter is of local concern only, the authorities may administer such matters in an arbitrary and capricious manner.