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11 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1978–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sandlin v. CR. JUST. STANDARDS & TR. COM'Ngreen1 sentence2014Section 626.207(3) provides that “[a]n applicant who commits a felony of the first degree; a capital felony; a felony involving money laundering, fraud, or embezzlement; or a felony directly related to the financial services business is permanently barred from applying for a license under this part.” Similarly, the statute at issue in Sandlin barred from certification as a law enforcement officer any person who had been convicted of any felony or a misdemeanor involving perjury or a false statement. 531 So.2d at 1344. | 1 | 1 |
Nicholson v. Stategreen1 sentence2008Rather than apply the rule's plain language, the majority reasons that "it doesn't much matter that a sexual predator designation is not a sentence or punishment" because "our criminal trial courts make the designation at (or shortly after) sentencing on the qualifying offense(s)." Majority op. at 496 (quoting Nicholson v. State, 846 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Partlowgreen1 sentence2008Admin. 2.140(d) (permitting changes in court rules on an emergency basis), 2.140(f) (providing for requests for consideration by rules committees); E.T. v. State, 957 So.2d 559, 559-60 (Fla.2007) (discharging jurisdiction as moot, but noting that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in termination cases would be referred to rules committees); State v. Hickson, 630 So.2d 172 , 176 n. 10 (Fla.1993) (adopting a rule on a temporary emergency basis and requesting the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee to propose a permanent rule); see also Partlow, 840 So.2d at 1044-45 (Cantero, J. | 1 | 1 |
ET v. Stategreen1 sentence2008Admin. 2.140(d) (permitting changes in court rules on an emergency basis), 2.140(f) (providing for requests for consideration by rules committees); E.T. v. State, 957 So.2d 559, 559-60 (Fla.2007) (discharging jurisdiction as moot, but noting that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in termination cases would be referred to rules committees); State v. Hickson, 630 So.2d 172 , 176 n. 10 (Fla.1993) (adopting a rule on a temporary emergency basis and requesting the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee to propose a permanent rule); see also Partlow, 840 So.2d at 1044-45 (Cantero, J. | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Mosleygreen2 sentences2007See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102 , 96 S.Ct. 321 ("[A] blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests."). 2007See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102 , 96 S.Ct. 321 ("[A] blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests."). | 1 | 1 |
Dillbeck v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Until a permanent rule is adopted, the interim procedure set out in Dillbeck v. State, 643 So.2d 1027, 1031 (Fla.1994), should continue to be followed. 1995Until a permanent rule is adopted, the interim procedure set out in Dillbeck v. State, 643 So.2d 1027, 1031 (Fla.1994), should continue to be followed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Trease v. State
green
1 sentence2018"In James , 974 So.2d 365 [ (Fla. 2008) ], this Court did not allow the reappointment of counsel to resume postconviction proceedings after a prior waiver of postconviction counsel and proceedings." Trease , 41 So.3d at 125 -26 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
James v. State
green
1 sentence2018"In James , 974 So.2d 365 [ (Fla. 2008) ], this Court did not allow the reappointment of counsel to resume postconviction proceedings after a prior waiver of postconviction counsel and proceedings." Trease , 41 So.3d at 125 -26 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
West Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. See
green
1 sentence2016The Attorney General reasoned in part that “ordinance” “has been generally defined as a ‘rule established by authority; a permanent rule of action,’ or as ‘an authoritative decree or direction .... a public enactment, rule, or .law.’ ” ; Id. (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule Industries
green
1 sentence2012Maule, 68 So.2d at 183 (quoting Herbert Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims, Classified and Illustrated, 118 (Herbert F. Manisty & Herbert Chitty eds., 7th ed. 1900)). . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
McCoy v. State
green
1 sentence2011Id. at 649 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Hickson
green
1 sentence2008Admin. 2.140(d) (permitting changes in court rules on an emergency basis), 2.140(f) (providing for requests for consideration by rules committees); E.T. v. State, 957 So.2d 559, 559-60 (Fla.2007) (discharging jurisdiction as moot, but noting that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in termination cases would be referred to rules committees); State v. Hickson, 630 So.2d 172 , 176 n. 10 (Fla.1993) (adopting a rule on a temporary emergency basis and requesting the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee to propose a permanent rule); see also Partlow, 840 So.2d at 1044-45 (Cantero, J. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Professional Firefighters v. DEPT. OF HEALTH
green
1 sentence1990Id. *159 Emergency Rule 10CER89-3 amends Florida Administrative Code Rules 10C-1.080(10) and (11) to change the dates of entitlement and first benefit payment to the date of authorization or the 30th day from the date of application, whichever is earlier. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Seminole Tribe Of Florida v. Butterworth
green
1 sentence1988Municipal Corporations s. 411, stating: A resolution has also been distinguished from an ordinance in that an ordinance is a continuing regulation, a permanent rule of conduct or government, while a resolution ordinarily is an act of a special or temporary character, not prescribing a permanent rule of government, but is merely declaratory of the will or opinion of a municipal corporation in a given matter, and in the nature of a ministerial or administrative act, and is not a law. 2 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982). 3 107 S.Ct. 1083 (1987). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
red
1 sentence1988Municipal Corporations s. 411, stating: A resolution has also been distinguished from an ordinance in that an ordinance is a continuing regulation, a permanent rule of conduct or government, while a resolution ordinarily is an act of a special or temporary character, not prescribing a permanent rule of government, but is merely declaratory of the will or opinion of a municipal corporation in a given matter, and in the nature of a ministerial or administrative act, and is not a law. 2 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982). 3 107 S.Ct. 1083 (1987). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry, Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation v. Sullivan
green
1 sentence1988Municipal Corporations s. 411, stating: A resolution has also been distinguished from an ordinance in that an ordinance is a continuing regulation, a permanent rule of conduct or government, while a resolution ordinarily is an act of a special or temporary character, not prescribing a permanent rule of government, but is merely declaratory of the will or opinion of a municipal corporation in a given matter, and in the nature of a ministerial or administrative act, and is not a law. 2 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982). 3 107 S.Ct. 1083 (1987). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State, Dept. of Adm., Etc. v. State, Dept. of Adm., Etc.
green
1 sentence1978State of Florida, Department of Administration, Division of Personnel v. State of Florida, Department of Administration, Division of Administrative Hearings, 326 So.2d 187 (1st DCA 1976), and cases cited therein. "[2] Moreover, the separation of powers provision of the Florida Constitution, Article II, Section 3, stands as a permanent bar to administrative determination of fourteenth amendment problems. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.