answer claim in West Virginia

1954Fleming, Adm'r, v. Holt, 12 W.Va. 143 ; Barrett v. McAllister, 33 W.

1954In the opinion in Fleming, Adm'r, v. Holt, 12 W.Va. 143 , this Court used this pertinent language: "Where an answer admits an agreement for the sale or purchase of lands, though but a parol one, the defendant must plead this statute, or the answer must claim the benefit of this statute, in order that the defendant may avail himself of it; otherwise he is taken to have admitted an agreement, which is either good under the statute, or on some other ground is binding on him.

2021Va. at 3 , 459 S.E.2d at 114 . 30 than answering the question in “‘a plain, clear manner so as to enlighten rather than confuse them.’” 62 We disagree that the circuit court’s answer was error. “[A] ‘trial court has discretion in determining how best to respond to a jury question.

2005Games-Neely, 211 W.Va. at 244-45 , 565 S.E.2d at 366-67 (internal citations omitted). [12] The decisions in Laxton, Mayhorn and Games-Neely are illustrative of this Court's longstanding position that "the legislative branch of government cannot abridge the rule-making power of this Court." In re Mann, 151 W.Va. 644, 651 , 154 S.E.2d 860, 864 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia State Bar v. Boettner, 183 W.Va. 136 , 394 S.E.2d 735 (1990).

2005Games-Neely, 211 W.Va. at 244-45 , 565 S.E.2d at 366-67 (internal citations omitted). [12] The decisions in Laxton, Mayhorn and Games-Neely are illustrative of this Court's longstanding position that "the legislative branch of government cannot abridge the rule-making power of this Court." In re Mann, 151 W.Va. 644, 651 , 154 S.E.2d 860, 864 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia State Bar v. Boettner, 183 W.Va. 136 , 394 S.E.2d 735 (1990).

1963The only cases in this state which we have been able to discover wherein a married woman instituted a proceeding under the bastardy statute are Bowen v. Parsons, 78 W.Va. 791 , 90 S.E. 336 , and Gabbart v. Mullins, 122 W.Va. 282 , 8 S.E.2d 886 , and reference to the records therein does not disclose that any questions were put to the complainants which would elicit an answer in violation of the Mansfield rule.

1963The only cases in this state which we have been able to discover wherein a married woman instituted a proceeding under the bastardy statute are Bowen v. Parsons, 78 W.Va. 791 , 90 S.E. 336 , and Gabbart v. Mullins, 122 W.Va. 282 , 8 S.E.2d 886 , and reference to the records therein does not disclose that any questions were put to the complainants which would elicit an answer in violation of the Mansfield rule.

1963The only cases in this state which we have been able to discover wherein a married woman instituted a proceeding under the bastardy statute are Bowen v. Parsons, 78 W.Va. 791 , 90 S.E. 336 , and Gabbart v. Mullins, 122 W.Va. 282 , 8 S.E.2d 886 , and reference to the records therein does not disclose that any questions were put to the complainants which would elicit an answer in violation of the Mansfield rule.

1963The only cases in this state which we have been able to discover wherein a married woman instituted a proceeding under the bastardy statute are Bowen v. Parsons, 78 W.Va. 791 , 90 S.E. 336 , and Gabbart v. Mullins, 122 W.Va. 282 , 8 S.E.2d 886 , and reference to the records therein does not disclose that any questions were put to the complainants which would elicit an answer in violation of the Mansfield rule.

1954See Spurrier v. Fitzgerald, 6 Ves. 548; Harris v. Knickerbacker, 5 Wend. [N.Y.] 638; Talbot v. Bowen, 1 A.K.Mar[sh] [Ky.] 436; and it is immaterial whether the admission be directly by the answer, or by permitting the bill to be taken for confessed, or by failure to deny the agreement alleged in the bill, which under our statute is then taken to be true; Newton v. Swazey, 8 N.H. 9 ." As the contract of sale is not void for uncertainty or unenforceable under the statute of frauds and as the benefit of that statute has been fully waived by the defendants, I would affirm the final decree of the C

1954Fleming, Adm'r, v. Holt, 12 W.Va. 143 ; Barrett v. McAllister, 33 W.

1953See Spurrier v. Fitzgerald, 6 Ves. 548; Harris v. Kinckerbocker, 5 Wend. 638 ; Talbot v. Bowen, 1 A. K.

1927Bank v. Amos, supra; Ropp v. Nadenbousch, supra. It is urged, however, by counsel for respondent, that although the special judge was wanting in authority to sit and take part in the decision of this cause, yet having done so at the solicitation of the petitioners, and in fact by agreement of all parties concerned in the case, such consent warranted the judge in acting, and constituted a waiver, and is an answer to the rule of prohibition.

1927Bank v. Amos, supra; Ropp v. Nadenbousch, supra. It is urged, however, by counsel for respondent, that although the special judge was wanting in authority to sit and take part in the decision of this cause, yet having done so at the solicitation of the petitioners, and in fact by agreement of all parties concerned in the case, such consent warranted the judge in acting, and constituted a waiver, and is an answer to the rule of prohibition.

1919A. 498 , 75 Fed. 742 , Judge Taft says; “The only way by which the sufficiency of an answer to the bill in equity can be tested is by setting the ease down for hearing upon bill and answer, the effect of which is an admission by the complainant of all the averments of fact properly pleaded in the answer and a waiver of any right to contest them by replication and proof;” citing Barry v. Albbot, 100 Mass. 396 ; There the demurrer was treated as an application to the court to set down the case on bill and answer, and upon appeal the decree was considered as if it had been entered upon that theor

1919A. 498 , 75 Fed. 742 , Judge Taft says; “The only way by which the sufficiency of an answer to the bill in equity can be tested is by setting the ease down for hearing upon bill and answer, the effect of which is an admission by the complainant of all the averments of fact properly pleaded in the answer and a waiver of any right to contest them by replication and proof;” citing Barry v. Albbot, 100 Mass. 396 ; There the demurrer was treated as an application to the court to set down the case on bill and answer, and upon appeal the decree was considered as if it had been entered upon that theor

1901The better practice is, not to make a general objection, but to make specific exceptions, as stated in Bennett v. Pierce, 45 W.