answer defense in Kansas

1969In Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35 , 309 P. 2d 633 , the opinion merely repeated the foregoing holding, stating: “We held in Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823 , 18 P. 2d 199 , that neither allegations of contributory negligence nor those negativing any possible carelessness on the part of defendants are an answer or defense to an action to recover on a breach of an implied warranty.” (p. 38.) However, in Simmons the question before the court was whether negligence of a manufacturer or bottler was an issue in an action for damages for breach of implied warranty.

1969In Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35 , 309 P. 2d 633 , the opinion merely repeated the foregoing holding, stating: “We held in Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823 , 18 P. 2d 199 , that neither allegations of contributory negligence nor those negativing any possible carelessness on the part of defendants are an answer or defense to an action to recover on a breach of an implied warranty.” (p. 38.) However, in Simmons the question before the court was whether negligence of a manufacturer or bottler was an issue in an action for damages for breach of implied warranty.

2001Kansas Pipeline Partnership v. Kansas Corporation Comm’n, 24 Kan.

2000In considering this problem, our court ex *538 plained in State v. Lumley, 266 Kan. 939 , Syl. ¶ 7, 976 P.2d 486 (1999): “Where a proper question is asked, and an improper answer given, the only remedy of the aggrieved party is by motion to strike.

2000In considering this problem, our court ex *538 plained in State v. Lumley, 266 Kan. 939 , Syl. ¶ 7, 976 P.2d 486 (1999): “Where a proper question is asked, and an improper answer given, the only remedy of the aggrieved party is by motion to strike.

1997Barker teaches that the answer to our inquiry “is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.” 407 U.S. at 530-31 .

1983In State v. Green, 232 Kan. 116 , 652 P.2d 697 (1982), we stated: “Numerous decisions by this court have pointed out that where a marital homicide is involved, evidence of a discordant marital relationship, and of the defendant’s previous ill treatment of his wife, including his prior threats to kill her, is competent as bearing on the defendant’s motive and intent.

1983In State v. Green, 232 Kan. 116 , 652 P.2d 697 (1982), we stated: “Numerous decisions by this court have pointed out that where a marital homicide is involved, evidence of a discordant marital relationship, and of the defendant’s previous ill treatment of his wife, including his prior threats to kill her, is competent as bearing on the defendant’s motive and intent.

1969In Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35 , 309 P. 2d 633 , the opinion merely repeated the foregoing holding, stating: “We held in Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823 , 18 P. 2d 199 , that neither allegations of contributory negligence nor those negativing any possible carelessness on the part of defendants are an answer or defense to an action to recover on a breach of an implied warranty.” (p. 38.) However, in Simmons the question before the court was whether negligence of a manufacturer or bottler was an issue in an action for damages for breach of implied warranty.

1969In Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35 , 309 P. 2d 633 , the opinion merely repeated the foregoing holding, stating: “We held in Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823 , 18 P. 2d 199 , that neither allegations of contributory negligence nor those negativing any possible carelessness on the part of defendants are an answer or defense to an action to recover on a breach of an implied warranty.” (p. 38.) However, in Simmons the question before the court was whether negligence of a manufacturer or bottler was an issue in an action for damages for breach of implied warranty.

1969The question of contributory negligence on the part of one using a defective product was not in the case in any way. *167 In Frier v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., 173 Kan. 733 , 252 P. 2d 850 , the action was one for damages against a manufacturer and a distributor for breach of warranty.

1969The question of contributory negligence on the part of one using a defective product was not in the case in any way. *167 In Frier v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., 173 Kan. 733 , 252 P. 2d 850 , the action was one for damages against a manufacturer and a distributor for breach of warranty.

1959It is the law of this country, independent of any statute, that a defendant shall not be compelled to answer to, or defend against, a criminal charge if mentally or physically unable at the time to do so in a rational manner, when such disability has developed after the alleged commission of such crime; but, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, the duty of determining *219 •'whether or not such disability exists rests with the court whose duty it is to hear such answer or defense.” (pp. 411, 412.) For some of our decisions following the rule of the Wright case, and recognizing the mand

1959It is the law of this country, independent of any statute, that a defendant shall not be compelled to answer to, or defend against, a criminal charge if mentally or physically unable at the time to do so in a rational manner, when such disability has developed after the alleged commission of such crime; but, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, the duty of determining *219 •'whether or not such disability exists rests with the court whose duty it is to hear such answer or defense.” (pp. 411, 412.) For some of our decisions following the rule of the Wright case, and recognizing the mand

1959It is the law of this country, independent of any statute, that a defendant shall not be compelled to answer to, or defend against, a criminal charge if mentally or physically unable at the time to do so in a rational manner, when such disability has developed after the alleged commission of such crime; but, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, the duty of determining *219 •'whether or not such disability exists rests with the court whose duty it is to hear such answer or defense.” (pp. 411, 412.) For some of our decisions following the rule of the Wright case, and recognizing the mand

1959It is the law of this country, independent of any statute, that a defendant shall not be compelled to answer to, or defend against, a criminal charge if mentally or physically unable at the time to do so in a rational manner, when such disability has developed after the alleged commission of such crime; but, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, the duty of determining *219 •'whether or not such disability exists rests with the court whose duty it is to hear such answer or defense.” (pp. 411, 412.) For some of our decisions following the rule of the Wright case, and recognizing the mand

1957It was held in Tank Co. v. Oil Co., 108 Kan. 690 , 196 Pac. 1111 , that negligence of the manufacturer is not an issue and it is no defense to a breach of an implied warranty that the tank company used reasonable care in selecting material for the tank and in constructing it.

1957It was held in Tank Co. v. Oil Co., 108 Kan. 690 , 196 Pac. 1111 , that negligence of the manufacturer is not an issue and it is no defense to a breach of an implied warranty that the tank company used reasonable care in selecting material for the tank and in constructing it.

1957The answer to this claim is to be found at page 30 of the opinion in In re Estate of Ellis, 168 Kan. 11, 30 , 210 P. 2d 417 , where, in rejecting a similar contention, it is said that under our code of civil procedure in actions for the recovery of money only or for the recovery of specific real or personal property, costs are allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party, but in other cases the court may apportion the costs as in its discretion it may think right and equitable.

1957The answer to this claim is to be found at page 30 of the opinion in In re Estate of Ellis, 168 Kan. 11, 30 , 210 P. 2d 417 , where, in rejecting a similar contention, it is said that under our code of civil procedure in actions for the recovery of money only or for the recovery of specific real or personal property, costs are allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party, but in other cases the court may apportion the costs as in its discretion it may think right and equitable.

1947(Miller v. Whistler, 153 Kan. 329 , 110 P. 2d 744 ; In re Estate of Reed, 157 Kan. 602 , 142 P. 2d 824 ; Funkhouser Equipment Co. v. Carroll, 161 Kan. 428 , 168 P. 2d 918 .) Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, as previously shown, challenged, among other things, the sufficiency of the answer to state a defense.

1947(Miller v. Whistler, 153 Kan. 329 , 110 P. 2d 744 ; In re Estate of Reed, 157 Kan. 602 , 142 P. 2d 824 ; Funkhouser Equipment Co. v. Carroll, 161 Kan. 428 , 168 P. 2d 918 .) Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, as previously shown, challenged, among other things, the sufficiency of the answer to state a defense.

1947(Miller v. Whistler, 153 Kan. 329 , 110 P. 2d 744 ; In re Estate of Reed, 157 Kan. 602 , 142 P. 2d 824 ; Funkhouser Equipment Co. v. Carroll, 161 Kan. 428 , 168 P. 2d 918 .) Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, as previously shown, challenged, among other things, the sufficiency of the answer to state a defense.

1947(Miller v. Whistler, 153 Kan. 329 , 110 P. 2d 744 ; In re Estate of Reed, 157 Kan. 602 , 142 P. 2d 824 ; Funkhouser Equipment Co. v. Carroll, 161 Kan. 428 , 168 P. 2d 918 .) Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, as previously shown, challenged, among other things, the sufficiency of the answer to state a defense.

1947(Miller v. Whistler, 153 Kan. 329 , 110 P. 2d 744 ; In re Estate of Reed, 157 Kan. 602 , 142 P. 2d 824 ; Funkhouser Equipment Co. v. Carroll, 161 Kan. 428 , 168 P. 2d 918 .) Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, as previously shown, challenged, among other things, the sufficiency of the answer to state a defense.

1947(Miller v. Whistler, 153 Kan. 329 , 110 P. 2d 744 ; In re Estate of Reed, 157 Kan. 602 , 142 P. 2d 824 ; Funkhouser Equipment Co. v. Carroll, 161 Kan. 428 , 168 P. 2d 918 .) Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, as previously shown, challenged, among other things, the sufficiency of the answer to state a defense.

1942(McKnight v. Building Co., 96 Kan. 118 , 150 Pac. 542 .) The gist of appellant’s contention is that the release of one joint tort-feasor constitutes a release of all joint tort-feasors, and that the record disclosed there was such a release.

1942(McKnight v. Building Co., 96 Kan. 118 , 150 Pac. 542 .) The gist of appellant’s contention is that the release of one joint tort-feasor constitutes a release of all joint tort-feasors, and that the record disclosed there was such a release.

1940Cas. 1917B, 455.) The answer to the inquiry is that the provisions are of a kind familiar to legislation and often sustained, and that it is impossible for this court to say that they might not be believed to be necessary in order to accomplish the desired ends.” In the recent case of U. S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 , 82 L.

1940Cas. 1917B, 455.) The answer to the inquiry is that the provisions are of a kind familiar to legislation and often sustained, and that it is impossible for this court to say that they might not be believed to be necessary in order to accomplish the desired ends.” In the recent case of U. S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 , 82 L.

1940Similar provisions as to giving notice of defects and nonwaiver were upheld in Advance-Rumely Co. v. Stoops, 125 Kan. 16 , 262 Pac. 604 , and Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. Burnett, 126 Kan. 453 , 268 Pac. 740 .

1940Similar provisions as to giving notice of defects and nonwaiver were upheld in Advance-Rumely Co. v. Stoops, 125 Kan. 16 , 262 Pac. 604 , and Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. Burnett, 126 Kan. 453 , 268 Pac. 740 .

1940Similar provisions as to giving notice of defects and nonwaiver were upheld in Advance-Rumely Co. v. Stoops, 125 Kan. 16 , 262 Pac. 604 , and Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. Burnett, 126 Kan. 453 , 268 Pac. 740 .

1940Similar provisions as to giving notice of defects and nonwaiver were upheld in Advance-Rumely Co. v. Stoops, 125 Kan. 16 , 262 Pac. 604 , and Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. Burnett, 126 Kan. 453 , 268 Pac. 740 .

1937(Bank v. Watson, 99 Kan. 686 , 163 Pac. 637 ; Kershaw v. Cozad, 137 Kan. 128, 131 , 19 P. 2d 452 .) The result of the foregoing is, the demurrer to the petition was properly overruled, the answer stated no defense, and judgment was properly rendered on the pleadings for Pirtle, as trustee.

1937(Bank v. Watson, 99 Kan. 686 , 163 Pac. 637 ; Kershaw v. Cozad, 137 Kan. 128, 131 , 19 P. 2d 452 .) The result of the foregoing is, the demurrer to the petition was properly overruled, the answer stated no defense, and judgment was properly rendered on the pleadings for Pirtle, as trustee.

1937(Bank v. Watson, 99 Kan. 686 , 163 Pac. 637 ; Kershaw v. Cozad, 137 Kan. 128, 131 , 19 P. 2d 452 .) The result of the foregoing is, the demurrer to the petition was properly overruled, the answer stated no defense, and judgment was properly rendered on the pleadings for Pirtle, as trustee.

1937(Bank v. Watson, 99 Kan. 686 , 163 Pac. 637 ; Kershaw v. Cozad, 137 Kan. 128, 131 , 19 P. 2d 452 .) The result of the foregoing is, the demurrer to the petition was properly overruled, the answer stated no defense, and judgment was properly rendered on the pleadings for Pirtle, as trustee.

1935Albright v. Warkentin, 31 Kan. 442 , 2 Pac. 614 , is also cited as to one not being deprived on technical grounds of the privilege of making a defense.

1935Appellants also cite Cox v. Anderson, 115 Kan. 709 , 224 Pac. 908 , and the rehearing thereof in 116 Kan. 213 , 225 Pac. 1044 , in the latter of which it was stated in the opinion that the answer must state a defense to the whole or at least a part of the cause of action.

1935Appellants also cite Cox v. Anderson, 115 Kan. 709 , 224 Pac. 908 , and the rehearing thereof in 116 Kan. 213 , 225 Pac. 1044 , in the latter of which it was stated in the opinion that the answer must state a defense to the whole or at least a part of the cause of action.

1935Appellants also cite Cox v. Anderson, 115 Kan. 709 , 224 Pac. 908 , and the rehearing thereof in 116 Kan. 213 , 225 Pac. 1044 , in the latter of which it was stated in the opinion that the answer must state a defense to the whole or at least a part of the cause of action.