answer inquiry in Oregon

2002As the Supreme Court concluded in Andrews v. Tektronix, Inc., 323 Or 154, 162 , 915 P2d 972 (1996), the relevant inquiry is: “Considering all the pertinent circumstances, are the temporal, spatial, circumstantial, and causal connections between the claimant’s injury and employment sufficient to justify compensation, when sufficiency is evaluated in the light of the Act’s policy of providing financial protection to workers who are injured in the course of employment, regardless of fault?” In this case, the answer to that inquiry is affirmative.

2002As the Supreme Court concluded in Andrews v. Tektronix, Inc., 323 Or 154, 162 , 915 P2d 972 (1996), the relevant inquiry is: “Considering all the pertinent circumstances, are the temporal, spatial, circumstantial, and causal connections between the claimant’s injury and employment sufficient to justify compensation, when sufficiency is evaluated in the light of the Act’s policy of providing financial protection to workers who are injured in the course of employment, regardless of fault?” In this case, the answer to that inquiry is affirmative.

1999PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611-12 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993).

1999PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611-12 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993).

1998Under Dennison v. Doreen, 281 Or 89, 95-96 , 573 P2d 1242 (1978), a defendant can appeal from a judgment entered for want of an answer to challenge the judgment on the ground that the relief awarded on it varies from that sought in the plaintiffs complaint.

1998Under Dennison v. Doreen, 281 Or 89, 95-96 , 573 P2d 1242 (1978), a defendant can appeal from a judgment entered for want of an answer to challenge the judgment on the ground that the relief awarded on it varies from that sought in the plaintiffs complaint.

1997In Sager , the court held that an intoxicated patron was not a “third party” for purposes of ORS 30.950, because the language of the statute “logically limits relief rather than expands it.” 296 Or at 39 .

1993Where the error arises from not being able to confront and meet an adverse witness’s testimony, apparently the prejudice of that constitutional error is judged in relation to the effect of the deprivation on that one witness’s testimony, not on the overall outcome of the trial as a whole. 5 In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679-80 , 106 S Ct 1431 , 89 L Ed 2d 674 (1986), the Supreme Court lays out that principle as follows: “In this case, however, the trial court prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that Fleetwood would be biased as a result of the State’s dismissal of his pending

1993Where the error arises from not being able to confront and meet an adverse witness’s testimony, apparently the prejudice of that constitutional error is judged in relation to the effect of the deprivation on that one witness’s testimony, not on the overall outcome of the trial as a whole. 5 In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679-80 , 106 S Ct 1431 , 89 L Ed 2d 674 (1986), the Supreme Court lays out that principle as follows: “In this case, however, the trial court prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that Fleetwood would be biased as a result of the State’s dismissal of his pending

1980However, "* * * [w]e do not require that the Employment Division be sufficiently prophetic to foresee every possible policy question that can arise in all unemployment compensation cases and supply an answer by rule; unique situations will create unusual questions that necessarily will have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. * * Oliver v. Employment Division, supra, 40 Or App at 501 .

1980OAR 471-30-038(4), defining "good cause” is reasonably specific because it provides "* * * a clear direction of policy * * Sun Ray Dairy v. OLCC, 16 Or App 63, 72 , 517 P2d 289 (1973).

1980OAR 471-30-038(4), defining "good cause” is reasonably specific because it provides "* * * a clear direction of policy * * Sun Ray Dairy v. OLCC, 16 Or App 63, 72 , 517 P2d 289 (1973).

1979Ct., 280 Or 95 , 570 P2d 52 (1977), which held that the 1975 Vehicle Code did not remove the DUII offense from the constitutional and statutory protections applicable to other major traffic offenses which remained traffic crimes under the code. 280 Or at 110 .

1979Ct., 280 Or 95 , 570 P2d 52 (1977), which held that the 1975 Vehicle Code did not remove the DUII offense from the constitutional and statutory protections applicable to other major traffic offenses which remained traffic crimes under the code. 280 Or at 110 .

1956The answer to that inquiry must be found in ORS 138.230, which says: “After hearing the appeal, the court shall give judgment, without regard to the decision of ques tions which were in the discretion of the court below or to technical errors, defects or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Analysis set forth in preceding paragraphs shows that the ruling which is challenged by assignment of error number three, and which we held is erroneous, was not within “the discretion of the court below.” Accordingly, reversal cannot be withheld upon the phase of OES 138.2

1956The answer to that inquiry must be found in ORS 138.230, which says: “After hearing the appeal, the court shall give judgment, without regard to the decision of ques tions which were in the discretion of the court below or to technical errors, defects or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Analysis set forth in preceding paragraphs shows that the ruling which is challenged by assignment of error number three, and which we held is erroneous, was not within “the discretion of the court below.” Accordingly, reversal cannot be withheld upon the phase of OES 138.2

1955This court in interpreting the statute stated the rule in Wheeler v. Lack, 37 Or 238, 247 , 61 P 849 , as follows: “* * * when a complete determination of the controversy cannot be had without the presence of other parties, it is the imperative duty of the court to direct that they be brought in; and this although the defect of parties appears upon the face of the complaint, and the defendants fail to demur or raise the objection in their answer. * * *” Therefore, whenever it appears that necessary and indispensable parties are lacldng so that the controversy between the parties cannot be had

1955This court in interpreting the statute stated the rule in Wheeler v. Lack, 37 Or 238, 247 , 61 P 849 , as follows: “* * * when a complete determination of the controversy cannot be had without the presence of other parties, it is the imperative duty of the court to direct that they be brought in; and this although the defect of parties appears upon the face of the complaint, and the defendants fail to demur or raise the objection in their answer. * * *” Therefore, whenever it appears that necessary and indispensable parties are lacldng so that the controversy between the parties cannot be had

1951Plaintiff - appellant’s brief says: “The plaintiff has noted the court’s opinion in the case of Clark v. Douglas County in 183 Or. 417 , dealing with similar phraseology in the foreclosure list as published in the proceeding under attack in that case.” The plaintiff does not question the soundness of the ruling in the Clark decision ( 183 Or. 417 , 193 P. 2d 538 ).

1951Plaintiff - appellant’s brief says: “The plaintiff has noted the court’s opinion in the case of Clark v. Douglas County in 183 Or. 417 , dealing with similar phraseology in the foreclosure list as published in the proceeding under attack in that case.” The plaintiff does not question the soundness of the ruling in the Clark decision ( 183 Or. 417 , 193 P. 2d 538 ).

1931Upon this question counsel for defendant contends that plaintiffs cannot assert an adverse possession after the decree of March 18, 1918, without bringing express notice to the defendant that they were claiming adversely; that without such notice the length of time intervening between the decree and the institution of the present suit would give them no better right than they previously possessed, citing Root v. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 401 ( 14 S. Ct. 136 , 37 L.

1931Upon this question counsel for defendant contends that plaintiffs cannot assert an adverse possession after the decree of March 18, 1918, without bringing express notice to the defendant that they were claiming adversely; that without such notice the length of time intervening between the decree and the institution of the present suit would give them no better right than they previously possessed, citing Root v. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 401 ( 14 S. Ct. 136 , 37 L.

1918It is a well-established principle of equity jurisprudence that the mortgagor may defend against the foreclosure of a purchase-money mortgage on the ground of fraudulent representations inducing the purchase and that this defense is available where the right to rescind is waived and damages are claimed by way of recoupment: Twitchell v. Bridge, 42 Vt. 68 ; McMichael v. Webster, 57 N. J.

1916An action at law is disposed of either by a judgment in favor of plaintiff or defendant or one of nonsuit: Hoover v. King, 43 Or. 281, 286 ( 72 Pac. 880 , 99 Am.

1897The answer to this inquiry must depend upon a strict construction of the provisions of the statute applicable thereto; for, as was said by Thayer, J., in Schneider v. Sears, 13 Or. 69 ( 8 Pac. 841 ), “attachment proceedings are statutory, and, unless the statute is strictly pursued, no right is acquired under them.” Counsel for appellant maintains that the sheriff, by filing the certificate of attachment in the office of the clerk of the circuit court, complied with the conditions imposed upon such officer by the statute, which abolished the office of county clerk of Multnomah County, and in s

1897The answer to this inquiry must depend upon a strict construction of the provisions of the statute applicable thereto; for, as was said by Thayer, J., in Schneider v. Sears, 13 Or. 69 ( 8 Pac. 841 ), “attachment proceedings are statutory, and, unless the statute is strictly pursued, no right is acquired under them.” Counsel for appellant maintains that the sheriff, by filing the certificate of attachment in the office of the clerk of the circuit court, complied with the conditions imposed upon such officer by the statute, which abolished the office of county clerk of Multnomah County, and in s