answer inquiry in Washington

1942The rule applicable to the facts in this case was stated in Watkins v. Balch, 41 Wash. 310 , 83 Pac. 321 , where we said: “ ‘An oral lease, therefore, where possession of the *433 property has been taken, is not void in toto, but it may not be a lease for the term agreed upon.

1942The rule applicable to the facts in this case was stated in Watkins v. Balch, 41 Wash. 310 , 83 Pac. 321 , where we said: “ ‘An oral lease, therefore, where possession of the *433 property has been taken, is not void in toto, but it may not be a lease for the term agreed upon.

2004If the answer to this inquiry is no, then there is "no claim cognizable under § 1983." Id. at 146-47, 99 S.Ct. 2689 .

1969For the answer to the claim that the owner of the premises should not be responsible for the delinquency of his tenant see Moran v. Seattle, 179 Wash. 555 , 38 P.2d 391 (1934) and McCormacks, Inc. v. Tacoma, 170 Wash. 103 , 15 P.2d 688 (1932).

1969For the answer to the claim that the owner of the premises should not be responsible for the delinquency of his tenant see Moran v. Seattle, 179 Wash. 555 , 38 P.2d 391 (1934) and McCormacks, Inc. v. Tacoma, 170 Wash. 103 , 15 P.2d 688 (1932).

1969For the answer to the claim that the owner of the premises should not be responsible for the delinquency of his tenant see Moran v. Seattle, 179 Wash. 555 , 38 P.2d 391 (1934) and McCormacks, Inc. v. Tacoma, 170 Wash. 103 , 15 P.2d 688 (1932).

1969For the answer to the claim that the owner of the premises should not be responsible for the delinquency of his tenant see Moran v. Seattle, 179 Wash. 555 , 38 P.2d 391 (1934) and McCormacks, Inc. v. Tacoma, 170 Wash. 103 , 15 P.2d 688 (1932).

1922On July 9, 1897, this court rendered its decision in German-American Savings Bank v. Spokane, 17 Wash. 315 , 49 Pac. 542 , 38 L.

1922On July 9, 1897, this court rendered its decision in German-American Savings Bank v. Spokane, 17 Wash. 315 , 49 Pac. 542 , 38 L.

1920Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, supra. Concerning the maximum allowed of ten per cent fibre, it is obvious upon the face of the provision that the legislature considered and determined the matter according to its judgment; and for us to hold that, in doing so, it transcended its reserved powers, would constitute an unwarranted, departure from well understood principles.

1904Co., 116 Cal. 71 , 47 Pac. 872 , it was said that an order fixing a receiver’s compensation, while not nominally one from which the statute authorizes a direct appeal, yet, “Such an order, however it may be designated, is, in legal effect, ‘a final judgment upon a collateral matter arising out of "the action,’ and is ‘appealable by any party interested in the fund.’ (Grant v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. 324 , [ 39 Pac. 604 ,] and cases there cited.) The appellant has such an interest.” While one of the tests as to the finality of an order is thus stated by Spelling, “An important, and, in fact, t

1904Co., 116 Cal. 71 , 47 Pac. 872 , it was said that an order fixing a receiver’s compensation, while not nominally one from which the statute authorizes a direct appeal, yet, “Such an order, however it may be designated, is, in legal effect, ‘a final judgment upon a collateral matter arising out of "the action,’ and is ‘appealable by any party interested in the fund.’ (Grant v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. 324 , [ 39 Pac. 604 ,] and cases there cited.) The appellant has such an interest.” While one of the tests as to the finality of an order is thus stated by Spelling, “An important, and, in fact, t

1904Co., 116 Cal. 71 , 47 Pac. 872 , it was said that an order fixing a receiver’s compensation, while not nominally one from which the statute authorizes a direct appeal, yet, “Such an order, however it may be designated, is, in legal effect, ‘a final judgment upon a collateral matter arising out of "the action,’ and is ‘appealable by any party interested in the fund.’ (Grant v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. 324 , [ 39 Pac. 604 ,] and cases there cited.) The appellant has such an interest.” While one of the tests as to the finality of an order is thus stated by Spelling, “An important, and, in fact, t

1904Co., 116 Cal. 71 , 47 Pac. 872 , it was said that an order fixing a receiver’s compensation, while not nominally one from which the statute authorizes a direct appeal, yet, “Such an order, however it may be designated, is, in legal effect, ‘a final judgment upon a collateral matter arising out of "the action,’ and is ‘appealable by any party interested in the fund.’ (Grant v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. 324 , [ 39 Pac. 604 ,] and cases there cited.) The appellant has such an interest.” While one of the tests as to the finality of an order is thus stated by Spelling, “An important, and, in fact, t

1901The case of Burns v. Conner, supra, has never been considered by this court as settling this question; for in Lake v. Steinbach, 5 Wash. 659 ( 32 Pac. 767 ), which was an action upon a judgment rendered more than six years prior to the commencement of the action, the case was decided upon the ground that the defendants had been out of the state a portion of the time during which the judgment was running, and at the time said judgment was rendered, and did not return to the state under less than six years prior to the commencement of the action; “and,” remarked the court, “this refutes the idea

1901The case of Burns v. Conner, supra, has never been considered by this court as settling this question; for in Lake v. Steinbach, 5 Wash. 659 ( 32 Pac. 767 ), which was an action upon a judgment rendered more than six years prior to the commencement of the action, the case was decided upon the ground that the defendants had been out of the state a portion of the time during which the judgment was running, and at the time said judgment was rendered, and did not return to the state under less than six years prior to the commencement of the action; “and,” remarked the court, “this refutes the idea

1887In Prescott v. Trueman, 4 Mass. 627 , an action brought upon a covenant that certain land was free from encumbrances, Chief Justice Parsons defines an encumbrance to be “every right to or interest in the land granted, to the diminution of the value of the land, but consistent with the passing of a fee of it”; and he illustrates by instancing “an easement” and “a claim of dower.” This definition is drawn from older cases and writers on the law of real property, and is of general acceptation.