67 California opinions name it 2 courts 1881–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Desny v. Wildergreen2 sentences2022(See Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [“[t]his court, of course, is not bound to accept concessions of parties as establishing the law applicable to a case”]; Tun v. Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 309, 327 [“[q]uite simply, we are not bound to follow the meaning of a statute (or the law) conceded by a party”]; Bell v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 438, 449 [“the Bells’ counsel’s erroneous concession cannot and should not prevent this court from applying sound legal principles to the objective facts disclosed by the record”]; Pease v. Brown (1960 1960Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 155 Cal.App.2d *699 192, 200 [ 318 P.2d 84 ], becomes pertinent: “If it be said that the views herein expressed depart from the theory upon which the ease was tried the answer is that the rule confining the parties upon appeal to the theory pursued below does not apply to a question which is one of law only (Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [ 303 P.2d 738 ]), and that an appellate court is never bound by concessions of counsel as to the applicable law (Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [ 299 P.2d 257 ]) or by the interpretation of documents made by the tri | 5 | 5 |
Estate of Plattgreen2 sentences1960Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 155 Cal.App.2d *699 192, 200 [ 318 P.2d 84 ], becomes pertinent: “If it be said that the views herein expressed depart from the theory upon which the ease was tried the answer is that the rule confining the parties upon appeal to the theory pursued below does not apply to a question which is one of law only (Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [ 303 P.2d 738 ]), and that an appellate court is never bound by concessions of counsel as to the applicable law (Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [ 299 P.2d 257 ]) or by the interpretation of documents made by the tri 1960Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 155 Cal.App.2d *699 192, 200 [ 318 P.2d 84 ], becomes pertinent: “If it be said that the views herein expressed depart from the theory upon which the ease was tried the answer is that the rule confining the parties upon appeal to the theory pursued below does not apply to a question which is one of law only (Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [ 303 P.2d 738 ]), and that an appellate court is never bound by concessions of counsel as to the applicable law (Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [ 299 P.2d 257 ]) or by the interpretation of documents made by the tri | 4 | 4 |
Panopulos v. Maderisgreen2 sentences1960Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 155 Cal.App.2d *699 192, 200 [ 318 P.2d 84 ], becomes pertinent: “If it be said that the views herein expressed depart from the theory upon which the ease was tried the answer is that the rule confining the parties upon appeal to the theory pursued below does not apply to a question which is one of law only (Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [ 303 P.2d 738 ]), and that an appellate court is never bound by concessions of counsel as to the applicable law (Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [ 299 P.2d 257 ]) or by the interpretation of documents made by the tri 1960Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 155 Cal.App.2d *699 192, 200 [ 318 P.2d 84 ], becomes pertinent: “If it be said that the views herein expressed depart from the theory upon which the ease was tried the answer is that the rule confining the parties upon appeal to the theory pursued below does not apply to a question which is one of law only (Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [ 303 P.2d 738 ]), and that an appellate court is never bound by concessions of counsel as to the applicable law (Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [ 299 P.2d 257 ]) or by the interpretation of documents made by the tri | 4 | 4 |
CPS v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co.green2 sentences2024Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198 [under Code of Civil Procedure section 431.70 a defendant may “assert the setoff defensively to defeat the plaintiff’s claim in whole or in part”]; Morris Cerullo World Evangelism v. Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1149 , 1159 [“The right to a setoff is based on the equitable principle that when parties in litigation hold cross-demands for money, one demand should be applied against the other and the plaintiff may recover the balance due, if any.”]; see also Nymark v. Heart Fed. 2022Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189 , 197–198; see Morris Cerullo World Evangelism v. Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1149 , 1159 [section 431.70 codifies the “affirmative defense of setoff ”]; Wm. | 2 | 5 |
Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Management Agencygreen2 sentences2025(Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 830, fn. 23; Griffith, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 601 [there may be more than one method of apportioning costs of service under Proposition 218].) 103 sued and has a “cross-demand[] for money” against the plaintiff to “assert in the answer the defense of payment.” ’ ” (Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. at p. 828.) Coziahr rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “the right to offset applies when the parties have ‘mutual debts and credits’ and ‘may assert cross-demands for money,’ summarizing offset principles from Granberry and elsewhere.” (Coziahr, s 2025(Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 830, fn. 23; Griffith, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 601 [there may be more than one method of apportioning costs of service under Proposition 218].) 103 sued and has a “cross-demand[] for money” against the plaintiff to “assert in the answer the defense of payment.” ’ ” (Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. at p. 828.) Coziahr rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “the right to offset applies when the parties have ‘mutual debts and credits’ and ‘may assert cross-demands for money,’ summarizing offset principles from Granberry and elsewhere.” (Coziahr, s | 2 | 2 |
American Automobile Insurance v. Seaboard Surety Co.green2 sentences1960Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 155 Cal.App.2d 192, at 200 [ 318 P.2d 84 ], the applicable rule was stated as follows: “If it be said that the views herein expressed depart from the theory upon which the case was tried the answer is that the rule confining the parties upon appeal to the theory pursued below does not apply to a question which is one of law only (Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [ 303 P.2d 738 ]), and that an appellate court is never bound by concessions of counsel as to the applicable law (Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [ 299 P.2d 257 ] ) or by the interpretation of do 1960Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 155 Cal.App.2d 192, 200 [ 318 P.2d 84 ], this court said: “If it be said that the views herein expressed depart from the theory upon which the ease was tried the answer is that the rule confining the parties upon appeal to the theory pursued below does not apply to a question which is one of law only (Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [ 303 P.2d 738 ]), and that an appellate court is never bound by concessions of counsel as to the applicable law (Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [ 299 P.2d 257 ]) or by the interpretation of documents made by the trial cour | 2 | 2 |
Granberry v. Islay Investmentsgreen2 sentences2025(Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 830, fn. 23; Griffith, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 601 [there may be more than one method of apportioning costs of service under Proposition 218].) 103 sued and has a “cross-demand[] for money” against the plaintiff to “assert in the answer the defense of payment.” ’ ” (Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. at p. 828.) Coziahr rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “the right to offset applies when the parties have ‘mutual debts and credits’ and ‘may assert cross-demands for money,’ summarizing offset principles from Granberry and elsewhere.” (Coziahr, s 2025(Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 830, fn. 23; Griffith, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 601 [there may be more than one method of apportioning costs of service under Proposition 218].) 103 sued and has a “cross-demand[] for money” against the plaintiff to “assert in the answer the defense of payment.” ’ ” (Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. at p. 828.) Coziahr rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “the right to offset applies when the parties have ‘mutual debts and credits’ and ‘may assert cross-demands for money,’ summarizing offset principles from Granberry and elsewhere.” (Coziahr, s | 1 | 6 |
Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bankgreen2 sentences1998Because we conclude the set-off was improper under section 580b, we need not consider the application of section 580d. [4] A court has the power, independent of any statute, to set off one judgment against another. ( Haskins v. Jordan (1898) 123 Cal. 157, 160 , 55 P. 786 .) That power rests upon the court's general jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ) Further, a court may proceed on a motion to set off judgments. ( Coonan v. Loewenthal (1905) 147 Cal. 218, 221 , 81 P. 527 .) [5] Section 431.70 provides: "Where cross-demands for money have existed between persons at any point in time when neither demand was 1998Because we conclude the set-off was improper under section 580b, we need not consider the application of section 580d. [4] A court has the power, independent of any statute, to set off one judgment against another. ( Haskins v. Jordan (1898) 123 Cal. 157, 160 , 55 P. 786 .) That power rests upon the court's general jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ) Further, a court may proceed on a motion to set off judgments. ( Coonan v. Loewenthal (1905) 147 Cal. 218, 221 , 81 P. 527 .) [5] Section 431.70 provides: "Where cross-demands for money have existed between persons at any point in time when neither demand was | 1 | 2 |
Hauger v. Gatesgreen2 sentences1998Because we conclude the set-off was improper under section 580b, we need not consider the application of section 580d. [4] A court has the power, independent of any statute, to set off one judgment against another. ( Haskins v. Jordan (1898) 123 Cal. 157, 160 , 55 P. 786 .) That power rests upon the court's general jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ) Further, a court may proceed on a motion to set off judgments. ( Coonan v. Loewenthal (1905) 147 Cal. 218, 221 , 81 P. 527 .) [5] Section 431.70 provides: "Where cross-demands for money have existed between persons at any point in time when neither demand was 1998Because we conclude the set-off was improper under section 580b, we need not consider the application of section 580d. [4] A court has the power, independent of any statute, to set off one judgment against another. ( Haskins v. Jordan (1898) 123 Cal. 157, 160 , 55 P. 786 .) That power rests upon the court's general jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ) Further, a court may proceed on a motion to set off judgments. ( Coonan v. Loewenthal (1905) 147 Cal. 218, 221 , 81 P. 527 .) [5] Section 431.70 provides: "Where cross-demands for money have existed between persons at any point in time when neither demand was | 1 | 2 |
Keith G. v. Suzanne H.green1 sentence2026(See Keith G. v. Suzanne H. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 853, 860 [“A setoff . . . is not a claim for relief”].) “The general rule is that a setoff must rest on a claim enforceable in its own right.” (R. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fleminggreen1 sentence2026(People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 802 ; see People v. Doane, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 983; People v. Fleming (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 754, 766 [“a trial court’s response to a jury question can be erroneous even if it does not technically misstate the law”]; People v. Gavin (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 408 , 417–418 [“[t]he court’s failure to 26 clear up the jury’s confusion . . . was fundamentally unfair to the defendant”].) In short, the trial court’s answer was error. | 1 | 1 |
Pease v. Browngreen1 sentence2022(See Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [“[t]his court, of course, is not bound to accept concessions of parties as establishing the law applicable to a case”]; Tun v. Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 309, 327 [“[q]uite simply, we are not bound to follow the meaning of a statute (or the law) conceded by a party”]; Bell v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 438, 449 [“the Bells’ counsel’s erroneous concession cannot and should not prevent this court from applying sound legal principles to the objective facts disclosed by the record”]; Pease v. Brown (1960 | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Tri-City Hospital Districtgreen1 sentence2022(See Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [“[t]his court, of course, is not bound to accept concessions of parties as establishing the law applicable to a case”]; Tun v. Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 309, 327 [“[q]uite simply, we are not bound to follow the meaning of a statute (or the law) conceded by a party”]; Bell v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 438, 449 [“the Bells’ counsel’s erroneous concession cannot and should not prevent this court from applying sound legal principles to the objective facts disclosed by the record”]; Pease v. Brown (1960 | 1 | 1 |
Sunrise Produce Co. v. Malovichgreen1 sentence2022(Jones v. Mortimer (1946), 28 Cal.2d 627, 633 ; Sunrise Produce Co. v. Malovich (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 520, 523 [applying previous version of section 431.70].) Section 431.70 provides that where cross-demands for money exist between plaintiff and defendant, defendant “may assert in the answer the defense of payment.”9 In general, a setoff prevents the superfluous 9 Code of Civil Procedure section 431.70 provides: “Where cross-demands for money have existed between persons at any point in time when neither demand was barred by the statute of limitations, and an action is thereafter commenced by | 1 | 1 |
Tun v. Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc.green1 sentence2022(See Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [“[t]his court, of course, is not bound to accept concessions of parties as establishing the law applicable to a case”]; Tun v. Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 309, 327 [“[q]uite simply, we are not bound to follow the meaning of a statute (or the law) conceded by a party”]; Bell v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 438, 449 [“the Bells’ counsel’s erroneous concession cannot and should not prevent this court from applying sound legal principles to the objective facts disclosed by the record”]; Pease v. Brown (1960 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Medinagreen1 sentence2021(See People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 922 (Medina) [former gang member testified that “a gang member’s query ‘where are you from?’ means ‘what gang are you from?’ and is a verbal challenge, which (depending on the response) could lead to a physical altercation and even death”].) When Christie answered that he was from a rival gang, appellant started the fight by throwing the first punch. | 1 | 1 |
Gomez v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2020However, we agree with the People that the answer to that inquiry is yes.3 3 The fact we previously summarily denied Law’s habeas petition arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the special circumstances finding under Banks and Clark is irrelevant. “[T]he summary denial of a habeas corpus petition does not establish law of the case and does not have a res judicata effect in future proceedings.” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 293, 305, fn. 6 .) 12 Whether there is sufficient evidence that Law was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to hu | 1 | 1 |
| State Water Resources Control Board Casesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Board of Supervisorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernard, Weiss & Karma Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Silberg v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. County of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| DeRosa v. Transamerica Title Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| MacIsaac v. Pozzogreen | 1 | 1 |
| MacIsaac & Menke Co. v. Cardox Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Drullinger v. Erskinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Corrigangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pachecogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weil v. Barthelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ball v. Rawlesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Raggio v. Southern Pacific Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pauline v. Fitzpatrick
green
2 sentences1960Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 155 Cal.App.2d *699 192, 200 [ 318 P.2d 84 ], becomes pertinent: “If it be said that the views herein expressed depart from the theory upon which the ease was tried the answer is that the rule confining the parties upon appeal to the theory pursued below does not apply to a question which is one of law only (Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [ 303 P.2d 738 ]), and that an appellate court is never bound by concessions of counsel as to the applicable law (Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [ 299 P.2d 257 ]) or by the interpretation of documents made by the tri 1960Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 155 Cal.App.2d 192, 200 [ 318 P.2d 84 ], this court said: “If it be said that the views herein expressed depart from the theory upon which the ease was tried the answer is that the rule confining the parties upon appeal to the theory pursued below does not apply to a question which is one of law only (Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [ 303 P.2d 738 ]), and that an appellate court is never bound by concessions of counsel as to the applicable law (Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [ 299 P.2d 257 ]) or by the interpretation of documents made by the trial cour | 3 | 1960–1960 |
In re Tyrone A. Miller On Habeas Corpus
green
2 sentences2020“A [d]efendant’s claim that the evidence presented against him failed to support [a] robbery-murder special circumstance [finding made prior to Banks and Clark] . . . is not a ‘routine’ claim of insufficient evidence.” (In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 979-980 .) The “claim does not require resolution of disputed facts; the facts are a given.” (Id. at p. 980.) Section 190.2 sets forth the special circumstances under which murderers and accomplices can by punished by death or life without possibility of parole. 2020“A [d]efendant’s claim that the evidence presented against him failed to support [a] robbery-murder special circumstance [finding made prior to Banks and Clark] . . . is not a ‘routine’ claim of insufficient evidence.” (In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 979-980 .) The “claim does not require resolution of disputed facts; the facts are a given.” (Id. at p. 980.) Section 190.2 sets forth the special circumstances under which murderers and accomplices can by punished by death or life without possibility of parole. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2013(See generally, Potvin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 1060 .) The answer to this claim, however, is that substantial evidence shows Dr. Roger received a fair procedure, even if it wasn’t the precise procedure specified in CorVel’s contract. 2013(See generally, Potvin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 1060 .) The answer to this claim, however, is that substantial evidence shows Dr. Roger received a fair procedure, even if it wasn’t the precise procedure specified in CorVel’s contract. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
O'Hare v. Industrial Accident Commission
green
2 sentences1953In O’Hare v. Industrial Acc. Com., 44 Cal.App.2d 629 [ 112 P.2d 915 ], it was held that while the filing of an answer to a claim before the commission “is desirable” (p. 634) it is not mandatory. 1953In O’Hare v. Industrial Acc. Com., 44 Cal.App.2d 629 [ 112 P.2d 915 ], it was held that while the filing of an answer to a claim before the commission “is desirable” (p. 634) it is not mandatory. | 2 | 1953–1953 |
People v. Gavin
green
1 sentence2026(People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 802 ; see People v. Doane, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 983; People v. Fleming (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 754, 766 [“a trial court’s response to a jury question can be erroneous even if it does not technically misstate the law”]; People v. Gavin (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 408 , 417–418 [“[t]he court’s failure to 26 clear up the jury’s confusion . . . was fundamentally unfair to the defendant”].) In short, the trial court’s answer was error. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Dykes
green
1 sentence2026(People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 802 ; see People v. Doane, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 983; People v. Fleming (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 754, 766 [“a trial court’s response to a jury question can be erroneous even if it does not technically misstate the law”]; People v. Gavin (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 408 , 417–418 [“[t]he court’s failure to 26 clear up the jury’s confusion . . . was fundamentally unfair to the defendant”].) In short, the trial court’s answer was error. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Jones v. Mortimer
green
1 sentence2022(Jones v. Mortimer (1946), 28 Cal.2d 627, 633 ; Sunrise Produce Co. v. Malovich (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 520, 523 [applying previous version of section 431.70].) Section 431.70 provides that where cross-demands for money exist between plaintiff and defendant, defendant “may assert in the answer the defense of payment.”9 In general, a setoff prevents the superfluous 9 Code of Civil Procedure section 431.70 provides: “Where cross-demands for money have existed between persons at any point in time when neither demand was barred by the statute of limitations, and an action is thereafter commenced by | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Kurtzman
green
1 sentence2017If you cannot reach a unanimous verdict as to the greater offenses you do not proceed to the lesser included offenses and you inform the court." Wilford contends, and the People concede, that the trial court's answer was error.4 (See People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 328 .) A jury can consider greater and 4 Wilford argues his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's answer to the jury's question. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Chatman
green
1 sentence2016As a result, he might also be able to provide insight on whether witnesses whose testimony differs from his own are intentionally lying or are merely mistaken.” (Ibid.) Chatman establishes that a defendant’s answer to an inquiry about whether other witnesses were lying “could be relevant to the credibility of both the defendant and the other witnesses.” (Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 382 .) Thus, such an inquiry is sometimes permissible. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Conti v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners
green
2 sentences2015(Johnson, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 69 ; Conti, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 360 ; Vernon, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 717, 726.) As we have said, however, the record does not support the court’s finding that plaintiffs did nothing to bring the case to trial in the period from the filing of the answer to the hearing. 2015(Johnson, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 69 ; Conti, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 360 ; Vernon, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 717, 726.) As we have said, however, the record does not support the court’s finding that plaintiffs did nothing to bring the case to trial in the period from the filing of the answer to the hearing. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Vernon Fire Fighters Assn. v. City of Vernon
green
1 sentence2015(Johnson, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 69 ; Conti, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 360 ; Vernon, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 717, 726.) As we have said, however, the record does not support the court’s finding that plaintiffs did nothing to bring the case to trial in the period from the filing of the answer to the hearing. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Johnson v. City of Loma Linda
green
1 sentence2015(Johnson, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 69 ; Conti, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 360 ; Vernon, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 717, 726.) As we have said, however, the record does not support the court’s finding that plaintiffs did nothing to bring the case to trial in the period from the filing of the answer to the hearing. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Marshall v. Foote
green
1 sentence2014(Marshall v. Foote (1927) 81 Cal.App. 98, 100-103 .) Cordova does not provide any persuasive argument or authority that in using the word “may” in section 431.70, the Legislature actually meant “shall” or “must.” The cases he cites do not so hold. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Brown v. Kennard green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| In Re Heather P. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Haskins v. Jordan green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Coonan v. Loewenthal green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Lowe v. Civil Service Commission green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Gay v. Broder green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Sandstrom v. Montana green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| In Re WINSHIP green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Connecticut v. Johnson green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Worth v. Asiatic Transpacific, Inc. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Sparf v. United States green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Mason v. Ennes green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Blair neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Sharove v. Middleman green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Cornelison v. Chaney green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Ingersoll green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Weil v. Barthel neutral | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Fabbro v. Dardi & Co. green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Estate of Watkins green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Morris v. Reclamation District No. 108 green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Helvering v. Mitchell green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Solomon v. Redona green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Mitau v. Roddan green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.