error instruction in Arkansas

1994Harlan v. Curbo, Guardian, 250 Ark. 610 , 446 S.W.2d 459 (1971).

1994Harlan v. Curbo, Guardian, 250 Ark. 610 , 446 S.W.2d 459 (1971).

1970Inc. v. Garrison, 248 Ark. 948 , 454 S. W. 2d 644 , wherein we held that a party should not be confronted with the dilemma of seeking favorable instructions at the cost of waiving his objection to an error when that error was the very cause compelling that party to request such an instruction.

1970Inc. v. Garrison, 248 Ark. 948 , 454 S. W. 2d 644 , wherein we held that a party should not be confronted with the dilemma of seeking favorable instructions at the cost of waiving his objection to an error when that error was the very cause compelling that party to request such an instruction.

1963Rutledge v. State, 222 Ark. 504 , 262 S. W. 2d 650 .

1963Rutledge v. State, 222 Ark. 504 , 262 S. W. 2d 650 .

1940Co. v. Rogers, 93 Ark. 564 , 126 S. W. 375, 1199 , was approved as follows: “An instruction which ignores a material issue in the case about which the evidence is conflicting and allows the jury to find a verdict without considering that issue, is misleading and prejudicial, even though another instruction which correctly presents that issue is found in other parts of the charge.” We conclude, therefore, that the error in instruction numbered 1, in failing to submit the question whether the driver of the car was negligent, and, if so, the effect thereof if a common enterprise existed, is not c

1940Co. v. Rogers, 93 Ark. 564 , 126 S. W. 375, 1199 , was approved as follows: “An instruction which ignores a material issue in the case about which the evidence is conflicting and allows the jury to find a verdict without considering that issue, is misleading and prejudicial, even though another instruction which correctly presents that issue is found in other parts of the charge.” We conclude, therefore, that the error in instruction numbered 1, in failing to submit the question whether the driver of the car was negligent, and, if so, the effect thereof if a common enterprise existed, is not c

1935Supporting our view as to the error in the instruction given, the case of State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561 , is in point.

1934We think we can cure the error in instruction No. 7, heretofore discussed, by limiting recovery for probable pecuniary contributions to such as might have been made during minority and limit them to $2,500 under the rule stated in Morel v. Lee, 182 Ark. 985 , 33 S. W. (2d) 1110 .

1934We think we can cure the error in instruction No. 7, heretofore discussed, by limiting recovery for probable pecuniary contributions to such as might have been made during minority and limit them to $2,500 under the rule stated in Morel v. Lee, 182 Ark. 985 , 33 S. W. (2d) 1110 .

1931The court gave, over the objection of appellant, an instruction on the possession of recently stolen property, reading as follows: “You are instructed that the possession' of property recently stolen, without reasonable explanation of that possession, is evidence which goes to you for your consideration under all the circumstances of the case, to be weighed as tending to show the guilt of the one in whose hands such property is found, but such evidence alone does not imperatively impose upon you the duty of convicting, even though it be not rebutted. ’ ’ This appears to be a substantial copy o

1931The court gave, over the objection of appellant, an instruction on the possession of recently stolen property, reading as follows: “You are instructed that the possession' of property recently stolen, without reasonable explanation of that possession, is evidence which goes to you for your consideration under all the circumstances of the case, to be weighed as tending to show the guilt of the one in whose hands such property is found, but such evidence alone does not imperatively impose upon you the duty of convicting, even though it be not rebutted. ’ ’ This appears to be a substantial copy o

1904The appellant objects to instruction No. 10, because he says “it does not submit to the jury whether it appeared to the defendant that deceased was making an attack upon him,” etc.; and he cites Smith v. State, 59 Ark. 132 , which is to the effect that, to justify a killing in self-defense, it is not essential that it should appear to the jury to have been necessary; it is sufficient if defendant honestly believed, without fault or carelessness on his part, that the danger was so urgent and pressing that the killing was necessary to save his own life or to prevent great bodily injury.

1904The-jury are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses from the manner of testifying, their means of observation, and their general conduct on the stand; and if they should believe that any of the witnesses have sworn falsely to any material fact in the case, they are at liberty to disregard the whole statement of the witness so testifying.” In the case of Bloom v. State, 68 Ark. 336 , this court said of a similar instruction: “The instruction is erroneous and prejudicial, according to the decision in Frazier v. State, 56 Ark. 244 , which holds that, before you can disregard the testimony

1892Linen Co. v. Hough, 91 Ill., 63 ; Vanslyck v. Mills, 34 Ia., 375 .

1892The court should, harmonize the instructions, else they are calculated to confuse and mislead the jury.” Sackett’s Instructions to Juries,, sec. 28, p. 25; Quinn v. Donovan, 85 Ill., 194 . “ The giving of a correct instruction upon a point in the case will not obviate an error in an instruction on the other side, when they are entirely variant, and there is nothing to show the jury which to adopt.” Sackett’s Instructions to Juries, supra; Ill.

1892Linen Co. v. Hough, 91 Ill., 63 ; Vanslyck v. Mills, 34 Ia., 375 .