error instruction in Washington

2020Such an error is a violation of due process and harmless solely if the reviewing court is “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable jury would reach the same result absent the error.” Id. (citing State v. Easter, 130 Wn.2d 228, 242 , 922 P.2d 1285 (1996)).

2006Such an error is a violation of due process and harmless only if the reviewing court is “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable jury would reach the same result absent the error.” Id. ¶17 Under RCW 26.50.110(1), violating a restraining order is a gross misdemeanor.

2020Such an error is a violation of due process and harmless solely if the reviewing court is “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable jury would reach the same result absent the error.” Id. (citing State v. Easter, 130 Wn.2d 228, 242 , 922 P.2d 1285 (1996)).

2003Such an error is a violation of due process and harmless solely if the reviewing court is “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable jury would reach the same result absent the error.” Id. (citing State v. Easter, 130 Wn.2d 228, 242 , 922 P.2d 1285 (1996)).

2020Such an error is a violation of due process and harmless solely if the reviewing court is “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable jury would reach the same result absent the error.” Id. (citing State v. Easter, 130 Wn.2d 228, 242 , 922 P.2d 1285 (1996)).

2003Such an error is a violation of due process and harmless solely if the reviewing court is “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable jury would reach the same result absent the error.” Id. (citing State v. Easter, 130 Wn.2d 228, 242 , 922 P.2d 1285 (1996)).

2003The Supreme Court found that the court's response could have heightened the error in the instruction. [33] 115 Wash.App. 650 , 63 P.3d 192 . [34] Id., 115 Wash.App. at 652 , 63 P.3d 192 . [35] RP (11/17/98) at 1394. [36] (Emphasis added.) CP at 53. [37] The instruction given in those cases was WPIC 10.51: "A person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if, with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he or she either (1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person to commit the crime; or (2) aids or agrees to aid another person in planning

2003The Supreme Court found that the court's response could have heightened the error in the instruction. [33] 115 Wash.App. 650 , 63 P.3d 192 . [34] Id., 115 Wash.App. at 652 , 63 P.3d 192 . [35] RP (11/17/98) at 1394. [36] (Emphasis added.) CP at 53. [37] The instruction given in those cases was WPIC 10.51: "A person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if, with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he or she either (1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person to commit the crime; or (2) aids or agrees to aid another person in planning

2003The Supreme Court found that the court’s response could have heightened the error in the instruction. 115 Wn.

2003The Supreme Court found that the court's response could have heightened the error in the instruction. [33] 115 Wash.App. 650 , 63 P.3d 192 . [34] Id., 115 Wash.App. at 652 , 63 P.3d 192 . [35] RP (11/17/98) at 1394. [36] (Emphasis added.) CP at 53. [37] The instruction given in those cases was WPIC 10.51: "A person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if, with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he or she either (1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person to commit the crime; or (2) aids or agrees to aid another person in planning

2015App. 284 , 905 P .2d 673 (1995), and Warren, 165 Wn.2d at 17 , for the proposition that "[i]f a curative instruction could 16 State v Allen, No. 89917-7 have cured the error and the defense failed to request one, then reversal is not required." Resp't's Suppl.

2015App. 284 , 902 P.2d 673 (1995), and Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17 , for the proposition that “[i]f a curative instruction could have cured the error and the defense failed to request one, then reversal is not required.” Resp’t’s Suppl.

2015Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 871 .

2015Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 871 .

2008Although the trial judge endeavored to cure the error with an instruction to the jury, the impact of the instruction was, unfortunately, diluted by the trial judge's statement that "`we are playing with words here.'" Id. at 950 (quoting Report of Proceedings (Feb. 20, 2003) at 105).

2008Although the trial judge endeavored to cure the error with an instruction to the jury, the impact of the instruction was, unfortunately, diluted by the trial judge’s statement that “ ‘we are playing with words here.’ ” Id. at 41 (quoting Report of Proceedings (Feb. 20, 2003) at 105).

2007Brown, 147 Wash.2d at 338 , 58 P.3d 889 ; Cronin, 142 Wash.2d at 579 , 14 P.3d 752 . *116 ¶ 15 It is true that the error in the instruction in this case was not identical to the error in the instructions at issue in Brown and Cronin.

2007Brown, 147 Wn.2d at 338 ; Cronin, 142 Wn.2d at 579 . ¶15 It is true that the error in the instruction in this case was not identical to the error in the instructions at issue in Brown and Cronin.

2007Brown, 147 Wash.2d at 338 , 58 P.3d 889 ; Cronin, 142 Wash.2d at 579 , 14 P.3d 752 . *116 ¶ 15 It is true that the error in the instruction in this case was not identical to the error in the instructions at issue in Brown and Cronin.

2002"The Legislature ... intended the culpability of an accomplice not extend beyond the crimes of which the accomplice actually has `knowledge'...." Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 511 , 14 P.3d 713 . "[The] individual must have acted with knowledge that he or she was promoting ... the crime for which that individual was eventually charged." Cronin, 142 Wash.2d at 579 , 14 P.3d 752 .

2006Such an error is a violation of due process and harmless only if the reviewing court is "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable jury would reach the same result absent the error." Id. ¶ 17 Under RCW 26.50.110(1), violating a restraining order is a gross misdemeanor.

2003Such an error is a violation of due process and harmless solely if the reviewing court is "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable jury would reach the same result absent the error." Id. (citing State v. Easter, 130 Wash.2d 228, 242 , 922 P.2d 1285 (1996)).

2005Remaining Issues ¶51 The Department argues that a number of statements made during Joyce’s closing argument were improperly made to “send a message to Olympia.” However, “[r]emarks of counsel in argument claimed to be so prejudicial as to warrant a reversal. . . must be brought to the trial court’s attention and a curative admonition or instruction requested.” Kain v. Logan, 79 Wn.2d 524, 528 , 487 P.2d 1292 (1971).

2005Remaining Issues ¶51 The Department argues that a number of statements made during Joyce’s closing argument were improperly made to “send a message to Olympia.” However, “[r]emarks of counsel in argument claimed to be so prejudicial as to warrant a reversal. . . must be brought to the trial court’s attention and a curative admonition or instruction requested.” Kain v. Logan, 79 Wn.2d 524, 528 , 487 P.2d 1292 (1971).

2004Id.

2004Id.

2002“The Legislature ... intended the culpability of an accomplice not extend beyond the crimes of which the accomplice actually has ‘knowledge’ . . . .” Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 511 . “[The] individual must have acted with knowledge that he or she was promoting . . . the crime for which that individual was eventually charged.” Cronin, 142 Wn.2d at 579 .

2002"The Legislature ... intended the culpability of an accomplice not extend beyond the crimes of which the accomplice actually has `knowledge'...." Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 511 , 14 P.3d 713 . "[The] individual must have acted with knowledge that he or she was promoting ... the crime for which that individual was eventually charged." Cronin, 142 Wash.2d at 579 , 14 P.3d 752 .

2002“The Legislature ... intended the culpability of an accomplice not extend beyond the crimes of which the accomplice actually has ‘knowledge’ . . . .” Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 511 . “[The] individual must have acted with knowledge that he or she was promoting . . . the crime for which that individual was eventually charged.” Cronin, 142 Wn.2d at 579 .

2002"The Legislature ... intended the culpability of an accomplice not extend beyond the crimes of which the accomplice actually has `knowledge'...." Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 511 , 14 P.3d 713 . "[The] individual must have acted with knowledge that he or she was promoting ... the crime for which that individual was eventually charged." Cronin, 142 Wash.2d at 579 , 14 P.3d 752 .

2002State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d 510, 518 , 610 P.2d 1322 (1980), cited with approval in State v. Wheeler, 95 Wn.2d 799, 808 , 631 P.2d 376 (1981) (inclusion of ambiguous definition of “knowledge” instruction was harmless where jury, by finding act was intentional, found, as a matter of law, that act was knowing).

2002State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d 510, 518 , 610 P.2d 1322 (1980), cited with approval in State v. Wheeler, 95 Wn.2d 799, 808 , 631 P.2d 376 (1981) (inclusion of ambiguous definition of “knowledge” instruction was harmless where jury, by finding act was intentional, found, as a matter of law, that act was knowing).

2002State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d 510, 518 , 610 P.2d 1322 (1980), cited with approval in State v. Wheeler, 95 Wn.2d 799, 808 , 631 P.2d 376 (1981) (inclusion of ambiguous definition of “knowledge” instruction was harmless where jury, by finding act was intentional, found, as a matter of law, that act was knowing).

2002State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d 510, 518 , 610 P.2d 1322 (1980), cited with approval in State v. Wheeler, 95 Wn.2d 799, 808 , 631 P.2d 376 (1981) (inclusion of ambiguous definition of “knowledge” instruction was harmless where jury, by finding act was intentional, found, as a matter of law, that act was knowing).

2025“The basic premise of the invited error doctrine is that a party who sets up an error at trial cannot claim that very action as error on appeal and receive a new trial.” State v. Momah, 167 Wn.2d 140, 153 , 217 P.3d 321 (2009).

2025“The basic premise of the invited error doctrine is that a party who sets up an error at trial cannot claim that very action as error on appeal and receive a new trial.” State v. Momah, 167 Wn.2d 140, 153 , 217 P.3d 321 (2009).

2020RAP 2.5(a) provides that we “may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court,” unless the appellant can show there is an error and that error is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”1 Because Schultz did not object to the jury instructions,2 we must determine whether Schultz’s instruction claims involve a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”3 We do not “assume the alleged error is of constitutional magnitude.”4 The appellant must identify a constitutional error and show how that error affected their 1 State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 9

2020RAP 2.5(a) provides that we “may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court,” unless the appellant can show there is an error and that error is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”1 Because Schultz did not object to the jury instructions,2 we must determine whether Schultz’s instruction claims involve a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”3 We do not “assume the alleged error is of constitutional magnitude.”4 The appellant must identify a constitutional error and show how that error affected their 1 State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 9

2020RAP 2.5(a) provides that we “may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court,” unless the appellant can show there is an error and that error is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”1 Because Schultz did not object to the jury instructions,2 we must determine whether Schultz’s instruction claims involve a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”3 We do not “assume the alleged error is of constitutional magnitude.”4 The appellant must identify a constitutional error and show how that error affected their 1 State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 9

2020RAP 2.5(a) provides that we “may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court,” unless the appellant can show there is an error and that error is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”1 Because Schultz did not object to the jury instructions,2 we must determine whether Schultz’s instruction claims involve a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”3 We do not “assume the alleged error is of constitutional magnitude.”4 The appellant must identify a constitutional error and show how that error affected their 1 State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 9

2020RAP 2.5(a) provides that we “may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court,” unless the appellant can show there is an error and that error is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”1 Because Schultz did not object to the jury instructions,2 we must determine whether Schultz’s instruction claims involve a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”3 We do not “assume the alleged error is of constitutional magnitude.”4 The appellant must identify a constitutional error and show how that error affected their 1 State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 9

2020RAP 2.5(a) provides that we “may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court,” unless the appellant can show there is an error and that error is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”1 Because Schultz did not object to the jury instructions,2 we must determine whether Schultz’s instruction claims involve a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”3 We do not “assume the alleged error is of constitutional magnitude.”4 The appellant must identify a constitutional error and show how that error affected their 1 State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 9

2020RAP 2.5(a) provides that we “may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court,” unless the appellant can show there is an error and that error is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”1 Because Schultz did not object to the jury instructions,2 we must determine whether Schultz’s instruction claims involve a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”3 We do not “assume the alleged error is of constitutional magnitude.”4 The appellant must identify a constitutional error and show how that error affected their 1 State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 9

2020RAP 2.5(a) provides that we “may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court,” unless the appellant can show there is an error and that error is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”1 Because Schultz did not object to the jury instructions,2 we must determine whether Schultz’s instruction claims involve a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”3 We do not “assume the alleged error is of constitutional magnitude.”4 The appellant must identify a constitutional error and show how that error affected their 1 State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 9

2020RAP 2.5(a) provides that we “may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court,” unless the appellant can show there is an error and that error is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”1 Because Schultz did not object to the jury instructions,2 we must determine whether Schultz’s instruction claims involve a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”3 We do not “assume the alleged error is of constitutional magnitude.”4 The appellant must identify a constitutional error and show how that error affected their 1 State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 9

2020RAP 2.5(a) provides that we “may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court,” unless the appellant can show there is an error and that error is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”1 Because Schultz did not object to the jury instructions,2 we must determine whether Schultz’s instruction claims involve a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”3 We do not “assume the alleged error is of constitutional magnitude.”4 The appellant must identify a constitutional error and show how that error affected their 1 State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 9