error instruction in California

1967“A party cannot complain of an instruction given at his own request or of an error in an instruction given at the instance of his adversary when he requests a substantially similar one.” (Yolo Water & Power Co. v Hudson (1920) 182 Cal. 48, 51 [ 186 P. 772 ]; Smith v. Kile (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 314 [304P.2d 1034].) Secondly, the conflict in instructions was not prejudicial.

1967“A party cannot complain of an instruction given at his own request or of an error in an instruction given at the instance of his adversary when he requests a substantially similar one.” (Yolo Water & Power Co. v Hudson (1920) 182 Cal. 48, 51 [ 186 P. 772 ]; Smith v. Kile (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 314 [304P.2d 1034].) Secondly, the conflict in instructions was not prejudicial.

2025Harmless Error Analysis Because we conclude the trial court’s error implicated federal due process, we evaluate the error under the standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 and conclude it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2024(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453 ; People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46 , 57.) We review this error under the standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .

2025Because Gutierrez’s constitutional rights were not implicated, we review the error under the standard articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson).

2024For instructional errors that do not amount to a deprivation of due process, we review the error under the standard prescribed by People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , pursuant to which we reverse only if it is reasonably probable that the appellant would have obtained a better result in the absence of the error.

1959Quoting from Jansen v. Southern Pacific Co., 112 Cal.App.2d 833 [ 247 P.2d 581 ], the court said (p. 845): “It is well established that ‘A party cannot complain of an instruction given at his own request or of an error in an instruction given at the instance of his adversary when he requests a substantially similar one.’ ” We agree with respondents that the doctrine of invited error is here applicable.

1959Quoting from Jansen v. Southern Pacific Co., 112 Cal.App.2d 833 [ 247 P.2d 581 ], the court said (p. 845): “It is well established that ‘A party cannot complain of an instruction given at his own request or of an error in an instruction given at the instance of his adversary when he requests a substantially similar one.’ ” We agree with respondents that the doctrine of invited error is here applicable.

2024(See People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164 , 1188-1190 [although prosecutor proceeded solely on theory that defendant personally committed a provocative act, with no suggestion defendant was liable because of a provocative act committed by someone else, court was unable to conclude prosecutor’s closing argument “overrode” the now- invalid jury instructions]; cf. People v. James (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1365, fn. 10 [“We do not consider comments by counsel during closing argument to determine whether the error in the instruction was cured.

2015(People v. James (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1364, fn. 10 [“We do not consider comments by counsel during closing argument to determine whether the error in the instruction was cured.”].) Third, the People argue that the evidence of lying in wait was “strong.” We cannot agree.

2020(People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1214 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948, fn. 10 ; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 326 (Roberts); People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1020 (Ainsworth).) Under that standard, we will reverse the judgment only if, after an examination of the entire cause, it is reasonably 20 probable that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error.

2020(People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1214 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948, fn. 10 ; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 326 (Roberts); People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1020 (Ainsworth).) Under that standard, we will reverse the judgment only if, after an examination of the entire cause, it is reasonably 20 probable that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error.

2020(People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1214 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948, fn. 10 ; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 326 (Roberts); People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1020 (Ainsworth).) Under that standard, we will reverse the judgment only if, after an examination of the entire cause, it is reasonably 20 probable that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error.

2020(People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1214 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948, fn. 10 ; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 326 (Roberts); People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1020 (Ainsworth).) Under that standard, we will reverse the judgment only if, after an examination of the entire cause, it is reasonably 20 probable that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error.

2020(See, e.g., Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 968 ; accord, People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 301 (Lucas), disapproved on another ground in People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1 , 53–54, fn. 19.) Because the error is a violation of state law, prejudice is determined under the Watson standard.

2020(See, e.g., Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 968 ; accord, People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 301 (Lucas), disapproved on another ground in People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1 , 53–54, fn. 19.) Because the error is a violation of state law, prejudice is determined under the Watson standard.

2020(People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1214 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948, fn. 10 ; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 326 (Roberts); People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1020 (Ainsworth).) Under that standard, we will reverse the judgment only if, after an examination of the entire cause, it is reasonably 20 probable that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error.

2020(People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1214 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948, fn. 10 ; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 326 (Roberts); People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1020 (Ainsworth).) Under that standard, we will reverse the judgment only if, after an examination of the entire cause, it is reasonably 20 probable that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error.

2020(See, e.g., Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 968 ; accord, People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 301 (Lucas), disapproved on another ground in People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1 , 53–54, fn. 19.) Because the error is a violation of state law, prejudice is determined under the Watson standard.

2020(See, e.g., Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 968 ; accord, People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 301 (Lucas), disapproved on another ground in People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1 , 53–54, fn. 19.) Because the error is a violation of state law, prejudice is determined under the Watson standard.

2016She relies on the well-established rule that “a motion to 10 exclude impeachment evidence is not reviewable on appeal if the defendant subsequently declines to testify. [Citations.]” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 731 (Ledesma); see also Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 384–385.) Typically, a defendant must testify to preserve an impeachment issue for review because (1) the error analysis is speculative without his or her testimony, due to the possibility that (a) the trial court may have changed its ruling in response to the actual content of defendant’s testimony, or (b) the prose

2014The People rely on the rule that “a motion to exclude impeachment evidence is not reviewable on appeal if the defendant subsequently declines to testify. [Citations.]” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 731 (Ledesma); see also People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 384-385 (Collins).) A defendant is typically required to testify to preserve an impeachment issue for review because (1) the error analysis would be speculative without the defendant’s testimony, due to the possibility that (a) the trial court may have changed its ruling in response to the actual content of the defendant’s t

2016She relies on the well-established rule that “a motion to 10 exclude impeachment evidence is not reviewable on appeal if the defendant subsequently declines to testify. [Citations.]” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 731 (Ledesma); see also Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 384–385.) Typically, a defendant must testify to preserve an impeachment issue for review because (1) the error analysis is speculative without his or her testimony, due to the possibility that (a) the trial court may have changed its ruling in response to the actual content of defendant’s testimony, or (b) the prose

2016She relies on the well-established rule that “a motion to 10 exclude impeachment evidence is not reviewable on appeal if the defendant subsequently declines to testify. [Citations.]” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 731 (Ledesma); see also Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 384–385.) Typically, a defendant must testify to preserve an impeachment issue for review because (1) the error analysis is speculative without his or her testimony, due to the possibility that (a) the trial court may have changed its ruling in response to the actual content of defendant’s testimony, or (b) the prose

2015As previously stated, in order to prove that the error was in violation of the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause, appellants must demonstrate that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced “a significantly different impression of [the witness’s] credibility.” (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680 (Van Arsdall.) The jurors already knew that Prado and Montejano had the opportunity to conspire to come up with consistent stories and that they had been arrested for Sanchez’s murder.

2014As previously stated, in order to prove that the error was in violation of the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause, defendant must demonstrate that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced “a significantly different impression of [the witness’s] credibility.” (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680 [ 89 L.Ed.2d 674 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 ].) The jurors here already knew that Massingale (1) had been arrested for the Jacobs murders, (2) had been held in custody for several years, and (3) had confessed in detail to the Jacobs homicides.

2010In other cases, we have recognized that improperly omitting an element from the jury can ‘easily be analogized to improperly instructing the jury on an element of the offense, an error which is subject to harmless-error analysis.’ Johnson[ v. United States (1997) 520 U.S. 461 ,] 469 [ 137 L.Ed.2d 718 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 ] (citations omitted); see also California v. Roy, (1996) 519 U.S. 2, 5 [ 136 L.Ed.2d 266 , 117 S.Ct. 337 ] (per curiam) (‘The specific error at issue here—an error in the instruction that defined the crime—is ... as easily characterized as a “misdescription of an element” of the

2010In other cases, we have recognized that improperly omitting an element from the jury can ‘easily be analogized to improperly instructing the jury on an element of the offense, an error which is subject to harmless-error analysis.’ Johnson[ v. United States (1997) 520 U.S. 461 ,] 469 [ 137 L.Ed.2d 718 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 ] (citations omitted); see also California v. Roy, (1996) 519 U.S. 2, 5 [ 136 L.Ed.2d 266 , 117 S.Ct. 337 ] (per curiam) (‘The specific error at issue here—an error in the instruction that defined the crime—is ... as easily characterized as a “misdescription of an element” of the

1985Such error does not impel a reversal, however, unless it is affirmatively shown that the error has prejudiced the defendant [citations omitted], and that there is a reasonable probability that, absent the error complained of, a verdict more favorable to defendant would have been reached.” (People v. Nunez (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 655, 662 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 707 ]; accord People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 681-684 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ].) On appeal a jury’s guilty verdict will be overturned because of an error in instruction of the jury if and only if it “affirmatively appears that th

1985Such error does not impel a reversal, however, unless it is affirmatively shown that the error has prejudiced the defendant [citations omitted], and that there is a reasonable probability that, absent the error complained of, a verdict more favorable to defendant would have been reached.” (People v. Nunez (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 655, 662 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 707 ]; accord People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 681-684 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ].) On appeal a jury’s guilty verdict will be overturned because of an error in instruction of the jury if and only if it “affirmatively appears that th

1985Such error does not impel a reversal, however, unless it is affirmatively shown that the error has prejudiced the defendant [citations omitted], and that there is a reasonable probability that, absent the error complained of, a verdict more favorable to defendant would have been reached.” (People v. Nunez (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 655, 662 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 707 ]; accord People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 681-684 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ].) On appeal a jury’s guilty verdict will be overturned because of an error in instruction of the jury if and only if it “affirmatively appears that th

1985Such error does not impel a reversal, however, unless it is affirmatively shown that the error has prejudiced the defendant [citations omitted], and that there is a reasonable probability that, absent the error complained of, a verdict more favorable to defendant would have been reached.” (People v. Nunez (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 655, 662 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 707 ]; accord People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 681-684 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ].) On appeal a jury’s guilty verdict will be overturned because of an error in instruction of the jury if and only if it “affirmatively appears that th

1960“It is well established that a party cannot complain of an error in an instruction given at the request of his adversary when one requested by him also contains the same error. ” (Zuckerman v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London (1954), 42 Cal.2d 460, 470 [ 267 P.2d 777 ].) Appellant seizes upon the instruction on contributory negligence as a further and ancillary argument in that a request of the jury for reinstruetion upon that issue resulted in some further difficulty.

1960“It is well established that a party cannot complain of an error in an instruction given at the request of his adversary when one requested by him also contains the same error. ” (Zuckerman v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London (1954), 42 Cal.2d 460, 470 [ 267 P.2d 777 ].) Appellant seizes upon the instruction on contributory negligence as a further and ancillary argument in that a request of the jury for reinstruetion upon that issue resulted in some further difficulty.

1955Co., 112 Cal.App.2d 833, 845 [ 247 P.2d 581 ] : “It is well established that ‘A party cannot complain of an instruction given at his own request or of an error in an instruction given at the instance of his adversary when he requests a substantially similar one.’ [Citing cases.]” Accord: George v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.App.2d 311, 319 [ 124 P.2d 872 ] ; Miller v. Dollar Steamship Lines, Inc., 19 Cal.App.2d 206, 211 [ 64 P.2d 1163 ] ; Newman v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 120 Cal.App.2d 685, 697 [ 262 P.2d 95 ] ; Bates v. Newman, 121 Cal.App.2d 800, 808 [ 264 P.2d 197 ] ; 4 Cal.Jur.2d, § 5

1955Co., 112 Cal.App.2d 833, 845 [ 247 P.2d 581 ] : “It is well established that ‘A party cannot complain of an instruction given at his own request or of an error in an instruction given at the instance of his adversary when he requests a substantially similar one.’ [Citing cases.]” Accord: George v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.App.2d 311, 319 [ 124 P.2d 872 ] ; Miller v. Dollar Steamship Lines, Inc., 19 Cal.App.2d 206, 211 [ 64 P.2d 1163 ] ; Newman v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 120 Cal.App.2d 685, 697 [ 262 P.2d 95 ] ; Bates v. Newman, 121 Cal.App.2d 800, 808 [ 264 P.2d 197 ] ; 4 Cal.Jur.2d, § 5

2015However, the error was not a violation of the federal Constitution, and was harmless under California law. “ ‘The applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial misconduct are well established. “ ‘A prosecutor’s . . . intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct “so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.” ’ ” (People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1214 ; People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820 .) Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal tri

2015However, the error was not a violation of the federal Constitution, and was harmless under California law. “ ‘The applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial misconduct are well established. “ ‘A prosecutor’s . . . intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct “so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.” ’ ” (People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1214 ; People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820 .) Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal tri

2014(See, e.g., People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 ] [“It is error to give an instruction [that], while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case.”].) “The error of instruction on an inapplicable legal theory is reviewed under the reasonable probability standard of [Watson, supra, 46 *206 Cal.2d at p. 836].” (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 681 [ 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 833 , 286 P.3d 754 ].) Here, any error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to de

2014(See, e.g., People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 ] [“It is error to give an instruction [that], while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case.”].) “The error of instruction on an inapplicable legal theory is reviewed under the reasonable probability standard of [Watson, supra, 46 *206 Cal.2d at p. 836].” (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 681 [ 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 833 , 286 P.3d 754 ].) Here, any error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to de

1959(DeMirjian v. Ideal Heating Corp., 83 Cal.App.2d 400 [ 188 P.2d 834 ].) See also Yolo Water & Power Co. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48, 51 [ 186 P. 772 ], where it was definitely said: “A party cannot complain of an instruction given at his own request or of an error in an instruction given at the instance of his adversary where he requests a substantially similar one. (14 R.C.L. 815, and cases cited.) ” To the same effect is Jentick v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 18 Cal.2d 117, 122 [ 114 P.2d 343 ]; People v. Harlan, 133 Cal. 16 [ 65 P. 9 ]; Hazelett v. Miller, 115 Cal.App.2d 801 [ 252 P.2d 997 ] ; J

1959(DeMirjian v. Ideal Heating Corp., 83 Cal.App.2d 400 [ 188 P.2d 834 ].) See also Yolo Water & Power Co. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48, 51 [ 186 P. 772 ], where it was definitely said: “A party cannot complain of an instruction given at his own request or of an error in an instruction given at the instance of his adversary where he requests a substantially similar one. (14 R.C.L. 815, and cases cited.) ” To the same effect is Jentick v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 18 Cal.2d 117, 122 [ 114 P.2d 343 ]; People v. Harlan, 133 Cal. 16 [ 65 P. 9 ]; Hazelett v. Miller, 115 Cal.App.2d 801 [ 252 P.2d 997 ] ; J

1952It is well established that “A party cannot complain of an instruction given at his own request or of an error in an instruction given at the instance of his adversary when he requests a substantially similar one.” (Yolo Water & Power Co. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48, 51 [ 186 P. 772 ].) See, also, Cedzo v. Bergen, 53 Cal.App.2d 667, 675 [128 P.2d 683]; Benton v. Douglas, 82 Cal.App.2d 784, 787 [ 187 P.2d 469 ]; Blythe v. City & County of San Francisco, 83 Cal.App.2d 125, 132 [ 188 P.2d 40 ].) The judgment and orders are affirmed.

1952It is well established that “A party cannot complain of an instruction given at his own request or of an error in an instruction given at the instance of his adversary when he requests a substantially similar one.” (Yolo Water & Power Co. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48, 51 [ 186 P. 772 ].) See, also, Cedzo v. Bergen, 53 Cal.App.2d 667, 675 [128 P.2d 683]; Benton v. Douglas, 82 Cal.App.2d 784, 787 [ 187 P.2d 469 ]; Blythe v. City & County of San Francisco, 83 Cal.App.2d 125, 132 [ 188 P.2d 40 ].) The judgment and orders are affirmed.