7 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 1968–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Logangreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, ¶ 9 , 30 P.3d 631, 632-33 (2001) (noting appellate courts will not find reversible error where complaining party invited the error). 2016See, e.g., State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, ¶ 9 , 30 P.3d 631, 632-33 (2001) (noting appellate courts will not find reversible error where complaining party invited the error). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2014State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561 , 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). 2014State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561 , 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ontiverosgreen2 sentences2013See Ontiveros, 206 Ariz. at 543, ¶ 19 , 81 P.3d at 334 (noting State’s closing argument, which focused on intent, “did not help to alleviate the error in the instruction”). ¶ 18 Given the conflicting evidence regarding James’ mental state (providing a sufficient basis for the jury to find either intentionally or a lesser mental state of knowingly or recklessly), as well as James’ defense and the parties’ arguments, it is unknowable whether the jury found James intentionally placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury (which would properly support the conviction) or 2013See Ontiveros, 206 Ariz. at 543, ¶ 19 , 81 P.3d at 334 (noting State’s closing argument, which focused on intent, “did not help to alleviate the error in the instruction”). ¶ 18 Given the conflicting evidence regarding James’ mental state (providing a sufficient basis for the jury to find either intentionally or a lesser mental state of knowingly or recklessly), as well as James’ defense and the parties’ arguments, it is unknowable whether the jury found James intentionally placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury (which would properly support the conviction) or | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Freig v. Industrial Commission
neutral
2 sentences1975TIMELINESS A.R.S. § 23-1061 (A) requires that the claim be filed “within one year after the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued.” The hearing officer recognized that: “the time for filing begins to run when the injury becomes manifest or when the claimant knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that she sustained a compensable injury, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not place upon the employee the duty of knowing the nature of the disability or its relationship to the employment before these things are reasonably ascertainable by the medical professi 1975TIMELINESS A.R.S. § 23-1061 (A) requires that the claim be filed “within one year after the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued.” The hearing officer recognized that: “the time for filing begins to run when the injury becomes manifest or when the claimant knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that she sustained a compensable injury, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not place upon the employee the duty of knowing the nature of the disability or its relationship to the employment before these things are reasonably ascertainable by the medical professi | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Bird v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1975TIMELINESS A.R.S. § 23-1061 (A) requires that the claim be filed “within one year after the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued.” The hearing officer recognized that: “the time for filing begins to run when the injury becomes manifest or when the claimant knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that she sustained a compensable injury, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not place upon the employee the duty of knowing the nature of the disability or its relationship to the employment before these things are reasonably ascertainable by the medical professi 1975TIMELINESS A.R.S. § 23-1061 (A) requires that the claim be filed “within one year after the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued.” The hearing officer recognized that: “the time for filing begins to run when the injury becomes manifest or when the claimant knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that she sustained a compensable injury, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not place upon the employee the duty of knowing the nature of the disability or its relationship to the employment before these things are reasonably ascertainable by the medical professi | 2 | 1975–1975 |
McCormick v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1975TIMELINESS A.R.S. § 23-1061 (A) requires that the claim be filed “within one year after the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued.” The hearing officer recognized that: “the time for filing begins to run when the injury becomes manifest or when the claimant knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that she sustained a compensable injury, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not place upon the employee the duty of knowing the nature of the disability or its relationship to the employment before these things are reasonably ascertainable by the medical professi 1975TIMELINESS A.R.S. § 23-1061 (A) requires that the claim be filed “within one year after the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued.” The hearing officer recognized that: “the time for filing begins to run when the injury becomes manifest or when the claimant knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that she sustained a compensable injury, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not place upon the employee the duty of knowing the nature of the disability or its relationship to the employment before these things are reasonably ascertainable by the medical professi | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Mead v. American Smelting & Refining Company
green
2 sentences1975TIMELINESS A.R.S. § 23-1061 (A) requires that the claim be filed “within one year after the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued.” The hearing officer recognized that: “the time for filing begins to run when the injury becomes manifest or when the claimant knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that she sustained a compensable injury, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not place upon the employee the duty of knowing the nature of the disability or its relationship to the employment before these things are reasonably ascertainable by the medical professi 1975TIMELINESS A.R.S. § 23-1061 (A) requires that the claim be filed “within one year after the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued.” The hearing officer recognized that: “the time for filing begins to run when the injury becomes manifest or when the claimant knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that she sustained a compensable injury, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not place upon the employee the duty of knowing the nature of the disability or its relationship to the employment before these things are reasonably ascertainable by the medical professi | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Neder v. United States
green
2 sentences2004Neder, 527 U.S. at 11 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 . 2004Neder, 527 U.S. at 11 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Schlecht v. Schiel
green
2 sentences1968Musgrave v. Githens, 80 Ariz. 188, 192 , 294 P.2d 674 (1956); Schlecht v. Schiel, 76 Ariz. 214, 220 , 262 P.2d 252 (1953). 1968Musgrave v. Githens, 80 Ariz. 188, 192 , 294 P.2d 674 (1956); Schlecht v. Schiel, 76 Ariz. 214, 220 , 262 P.2d 252 (1953). | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Musgrave v. Githens
green
2 sentences1968Musgrave v. Githens, 80 Ariz. 188, 192 , 294 P.2d 674 (1956); Schlecht v. Schiel, 76 Ariz. 214, 220 , 262 P.2d 252 (1953). 1968Musgrave v. Githens, 80 Ariz. 188, 192 , 294 P.2d 674 (1956); Schlecht v. Schiel, 76 Ariz. 214, 220 , 262 P.2d 252 (1953). | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.