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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People Ex Rel. Younger v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2020(See Younger, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at 192-193 [concluding, in dicta, that prosecutor violated California’s then-current version of advocate-witness rule, notwithstanding rule’s limitation to “trial,” by both testifying and arguing about photographic identification procedures during pretrial hearing; “the word ‘trial’ is broad enough to include a pretrial hearing at which the testimony of witnesses is taken and a contested fact 13 issue is litigated”].) Further, though the parties cite no California authority on point, and we have found none, “most courts recognize that an attorney who intends | 1 | 1 |
People v. Davisgreen1 sentence2016We have noted an unsettled state of the law on the question whether a waiver by defense counsel is effective, but stated that “[a]t a minimum, there must be some evidence that the defendant understood the right he was waiving and the consequences of doing so.” (Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 532.) In the Davis case, we found no effective waiver of the right to be present during a pretrial evidentiary hearing when “defense counsel represented to the court that counsel had discussed the hearing with defendant and that defendant would waive his presence.” (Ibid.) We commented that there was no ev | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tilburygreen2 sentences2012However, when assessing competing due process concerns, courts are not blind to the ― ‗administrative burdens‘ ‖ and ―practical difficulties‖ of demanding new procedures. ( Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th 802, 828 , quoting Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, 867 ; see, e.g., Tilbury, supra, 54 Cal.3d 56, 69 [noting state‘s due process interest ―in avoiding the cost of unnecessary jury trials‖ in hearings for 180-day outpatient placements for insanity acquittees under Pen. 2012However, when assessing competing due process concerns, courts are not blind to the ― ‗administrative burdens‘ ‖ and ―practical difficulties‖ of demanding new procedures. ( Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th 802, 828 , quoting Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, 867 ; see, e.g., Tilbury, supra, 54 Cal.3d 56, 69 [noting state‘s due process interest ―in avoiding the cost of unnecessary jury trials‖ in hearings for 180-day outpatient placements for insanity acquittees under Pen. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Rogersgreen2 sentences1995(Id. at p. 701.) Using the words of subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 1238, the court said that the order was “ ‘an order setting aside [part of] the indictment, information, or complaint.’ ” ( 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 700-701 , bracketed insertion in Jackson-, see also In re Rogers (1980) 28 Cal.3d 429, 437-438 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 222 , 619 P.2d 415 ] [order striking prior conviction]; People v. Shirley (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 424, 427-429 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 282 ] [order setting aside one count of two-count indictment].) *271 We see nothing in the language of section 800, subdivision (b)(4), in the l 1995(Id. at p. 701.) Using the words of subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 1238, the court said that the order was “ ‘an order setting aside [part of] the indictment, information, or complaint.’ ” ( 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 700-701 , bracketed insertion in Jackson-, see also In re Rogers (1980) 28 Cal.3d 429, 437-438 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 222 , 619 P.2d 415 ] [order striking prior conviction]; People v. Shirley (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 424, 427-429 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 282 ] [order setting aside one count of two-count indictment].) *271 We see nothing in the language of section 800, subdivision (b)(4), in the l | 1 | 1 |
People v. Shirleygreen2 sentences1995(Id. at p. 701.) Using the words of subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 1238, the court said that the order was “ ‘an order setting aside [part of] the indictment, information, or complaint.’ ” ( 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 700-701 , bracketed insertion in Jackson-, see also In re Rogers (1980) 28 Cal.3d 429, 437-438 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 222 , 619 P.2d 415 ] [order striking prior conviction]; People v. Shirley (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 424, 427-429 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 282 ] [order setting aside one count of two-count indictment].) *271 We see nothing in the language of section 800, subdivision (b)(4), in the l 1995(Id. at p. 701.) Using the words of subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 1238, the court said that the order was “ ‘an order setting aside [part of] the indictment, information, or complaint.’ ” ( 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 700-701 , bracketed insertion in Jackson-, see also In re Rogers (1980) 28 Cal.3d 429, 437-438 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 222 , 619 P.2d 415 ] [order striking prior conviction]; People v. Shirley (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 424, 427-429 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 282 ] [order setting aside one count of two-count indictment].) *271 We see nothing in the language of section 800, subdivision (b)(4), in the l | 1 | 1 |
People v. Morrisred2 sentences1991Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 [ 54 App.D.C. 46 , 34 A.L.R. 145 ]; see generally People v. Morris, ante, 152, at p. 206 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 807 P.2d 949 ].) At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the prosecution presented five witnesses in support of the evidence. 1991Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 [ 54 App.D.C. 46 , 34 A.L.R. 145 ]; see generally People v. Morris, ante, 152, at p. 206 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 807 P.2d 949 ].) At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the prosecution presented five witnesses in support of the evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Frye v. United Statesred2 sentences1991Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 [ 54 App.D.C. 46 , 34 A.L.R. 145 ]; see generally People v. Morris, ante, 152, at p. 206 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 807 P.2d 949 ].) At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the prosecution presented five witnesses in support of the evidence. 1991Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 [ 54 App.D.C. 46 , 34 A.L.R. 145 ]; see generally People v. Morris, ante, 152, at p. 206 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 807 P.2d 949 ].) At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the prosecution presented five witnesses in support of the evidence. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ramseygreen2 sentences1989(People v. Ramsey (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 671, 678 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; Wilder v. Superior Court (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 90, 94 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 494 ].) To eliminate the “duplicate litigation of issues and repeat testimony with the attendant result of consumption of precious court time” built into the de novo process provided in subdivision (i) (People v. Ramsey, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 671, 678 ), the Legislature amended section 1538.5, subdivision *1191 (i), effective January 1, 1987, to provide that if no suppression motion is made in the municipal court, defendant has the right to fully litigate 1989(People v. Ramsey (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 671, 678 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; Wilder v. Superior Court (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 90, 94 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 494 ].) To eliminate the “duplicate litigation of issues and repeat testimony with the attendant result of consumption of precious court time” built into the de novo process provided in subdivision (i) (People v. Ramsey, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 671, 678 ), the Legislature amended section 1538.5, subdivision *1191 (i), effective January 1, 1987, to provide that if no suppression motion is made in the municipal court, defendant has the right to fully litigate | 1 | 1 |
Wilder v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1989(People v. Ramsey (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 671, 678 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; Wilder v. Superior Court (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 90, 94 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 494 ].) To eliminate the “duplicate litigation of issues and repeat testimony with the attendant result of consumption of precious court time” built into the de novo process provided in subdivision (i) (People v. Ramsey, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 671, 678 ), the Legislature amended section 1538.5, subdivision *1191 (i), effective January 1, 1987, to provide that if no suppression motion is made in the municipal court, defendant has the right to fully litigate 1989(People v. Ramsey (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 671, 678 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; Wilder v. Superior Court (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 90, 94 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 494 ].) To eliminate the “duplicate litigation of issues and repeat testimony with the attendant result of consumption of precious court time” built into the de novo process provided in subdivision (i) (People v. Ramsey, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 671, 678 ), the Legislature amended section 1538.5, subdivision *1191 (i), effective January 1, 1987, to provide that if no suppression motion is made in the municipal court, defendant has the right to fully litigate | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lyle v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2025Conduct, rule 3.7, fn. omitted.) Even if the client provides informed written consent, the trial court retains discretion to disqualify “a lawyer who seeks to both testify and serve as an advocate, to protect the trier of fact from being misled or the opposing party from being prejudiced.”6 (Id., com. 3, citing Lyle v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 470 .) Thus, the court may “disqualify a likely advocate-witness as counsel, notwithstanding client consent, where there is ‘a convincing demonstration of detriment to the opponent or injury to the integrity of the judicial process.’” (Doe, s | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Beeler
red
1 sentence2012Also, in his previous employment as a coroner for Orange County, Dr. Bolduc had resigned ―under a cloud.‖2 As a result of these incidents, Dr. Lawrence said, some newspaper articles asserted that Dr. Bolduc was 1 At trial, Dr. Lawrence testified to being a pathologist for the San Joaquin County coroner‘s office and owning Forensic Consultants Medical Group, which provides pathologists, including Dr. Bolduc, to act as coroners in several counties and also offers private consultation. 2 In People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953 , an Orange County capital murder case, Dr. Bolduc performed an autop | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Allen
green
2 sentences2012However, when assessing competing due process concerns, courts are not blind to the ― ‗administrative burdens‘ ‖ and ―practical difficulties‖ of demanding new procedures. ( Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th 802, 828 , quoting Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, 867 ; see, e.g., Tilbury, supra, 54 Cal.3d 56, 69 [noting state‘s due process interest ―in avoiding the cost of unnecessary jury trials‖ in hearings for 180-day outpatient placements for insanity acquittees under Pen. 2012However, when assessing competing due process concerns, courts are not blind to the ― ‗administrative burdens‘ ‖ and ―practical difficulties‖ of demanding new procedures. ( Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th 802, 828 , quoting Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, 867 ; see, e.g., Tilbury, supra, 54 Cal.3d 56, 69 [noting state‘s due process interest ―in avoiding the cost of unnecessary jury trials‖ in hearings for 180-day outpatient placements for insanity acquittees under Pen. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Moore v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2012However, when assessing competing due process concerns, courts are not blind to the ― ‗administrative burdens‘ ‖ and ―practical difficulties‖ of demanding new procedures. ( Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th 802, 828 , quoting Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, 867 ; see, e.g., Tilbury, supra, 54 Cal.3d 56, 69 [noting state‘s due process interest ―in avoiding the cost of unnecessary jury trials‖ in hearings for 180-day outpatient placements for insanity acquittees under Pen. 2012However, when assessing competing due process concerns, courts are not blind to the ― ‗administrative burdens‘ ‖ and ―practical difficulties‖ of demanding new procedures. ( Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th 802, 828 , quoting Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, 867 ; see, e.g., Tilbury, supra, 54 Cal.3d 56, 69 [noting state‘s due process interest ―in avoiding the cost of unnecessary jury trials‖ in hearings for 180-day outpatient placements for insanity acquittees under Pen. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Burke
red
2 sentences1995(People v. Burke, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 50 .) 12 Quoting from Penal Code section 1238, subdivision 1, the Supreme Court viewed the trial court’s action as “in substance ‘an order setting aside [a part of] the . . . information.’ ” ( 47 Cal.2d at p. 53 , bracketed insertion in original.) Similarly, in People v. Jackson (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 697 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 ], the Court of Appeal held that the People were entitled to appeal from a “prejeopardy” order by the trial court, made at a pretrial evidentiary hearing, which struck a prior robbery conviction on the ground of inadequate advisement 1995(People v. Burke, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 50 .) 12 Quoting from Penal Code section 1238, subdivision 1, the Supreme Court viewed the trial court’s action as “in substance ‘an order setting aside [a part of] the . . . information.’ ” ( 47 Cal.2d at p. 53 , bracketed insertion in original.) Similarly, in People v. Jackson (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 697 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 ], the Court of Appeal held that the People were entitled to appeal from a “prejeopardy” order by the trial court, made at a pretrial evidentiary hearing, which struck a prior robbery conviction on the ground of inadequate advisement | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Jackson
green
2 sentences1995(People v. Burke, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 50 .) 12 Quoting from Penal Code section 1238, subdivision 1, the Supreme Court viewed the trial court’s action as “in substance ‘an order setting aside [a part of] the . . . information.’ ” ( 47 Cal.2d at p. 53 , bracketed insertion in original.) Similarly, in People v. Jackson (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 697 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 ], the Court of Appeal held that the People were entitled to appeal from a “prejeopardy” order by the trial court, made at a pretrial evidentiary hearing, which struck a prior robbery conviction on the ground of inadequate advisement 1995(People v. Burke, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 50 .) 12 Quoting from Penal Code section 1238, subdivision 1, the Supreme Court viewed the trial court’s action as “in substance ‘an order setting aside [a part of] the . . . information.’ ” ( 47 Cal.2d at p. 53 , bracketed insertion in original.) Similarly, in People v. Jackson (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 697 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 ], the Court of Appeal held that the People were entitled to appeal from a “prejeopardy” order by the trial court, made at a pretrial evidentiary hearing, which struck a prior robbery conviction on the ground of inadequate advisement | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Hurd
green
2 sentences1982Just last year, in State v. Hurd (1981) 86 N.J. 525 [ 432 A.2d 86 ], the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a thoughtful and scholarly opinion by Justice Pashman, applied the Frye standard to posthypnosis testimony and concluded that “a rule of per se inadmissibility is unnecessarily broad and will result in the exclusion of evidence that is as trustworthy as other eyewitness testimony.” ( 432 A.2d at p. 94 .) In Hurd , a number of preeminent authorities in the field of hypnosis — including Dr. Orne — testified in person at a pretrial evidentiary hearing. 1982Just last year, in State v. Hurd (1981) 86 N.J. 525 [ 432 A.2d 86 ], the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a thoughtful and scholarly opinion by Justice Pashman, applied the Frye standard to posthypnosis testimony and concluded that “a rule of per se inadmissibility is unnecessarily broad and will result in the exclusion of evidence that is as trustworthy as other eyewitness testimony.” ( 432 A.2d at p. 94 .) In Hurd , a number of preeminent authorities in the field of hypnosis — including Dr. Orne — testified in person at a pretrial evidentiary hearing. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.