9 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Seal v. Lemmelgreen2 sentences2016Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Bradfield, 563 P.2d 939, 942 (Colo. 1977) (holding that where defendant was driving toward plaintiff in the wrong lane, plaintiff who slowed and pulled over was “not required to drive his vehicle into the ditch” and thus comparative negligence was properly withdrawn from the jury’s consideration); see also Seal, 344 P.2d at 696 (explaining that plaintiff was not obliged to reject the opportunity to ride in a sheriff’s car as a guest despite being under the general duty to act with care for his own safety and therefore the doctrine of assumption of risk did not appl 2016Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Bradfield, 193 Colo. 151 , 563 P.2d 939, 942 (1977) (holding that where defendant was driving toward plaintiff in the wrong lane, plaintiff who slowed and pulled over was "not required to drive his vehicle into the ditch" and thus comparative negligence was properly: withdrawn from the jury's consideration); see also Seal, 344 P.2d at 696 (explaining that plaintiff was not obliged to reject the opportunity to ride in a sheriffs car as a guest despite being under the general duty to act with care for his own safety and therefore the doctrine of assumption of risk di | 2 | 2 |
Perreira v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Bradfield, 563 P.2d 939, 942 (Colo. 1977) (holding that where defendant was driving toward plaintiff in the wrong lane, plaintiff who slowed and pulled over was “not required to drive his vehicle into the ditch” and thus comparative negligence was properly withdrawn from the jury’s consideration); see also Seal, 344 P.2d at 696 (explaining that plaintiff was not obliged to reject the opportunity to ride in a sheriff’s car as a guest despite being under the general duty to act with care for his own safety and therefore the doctrine of assumption of risk did not appl 2016Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Bradfield, 193 Colo. 151 , 563 P.2d 939, 942 (1977) (holding that where defendant was driving toward plaintiff in the wrong lane, plaintiff who slowed and pulled over was "not required to drive his vehicle into the ditch" and thus comparative negligence was properly: withdrawn from the jury's consideration); see also Seal, 344 P.2d at 696 (explaining that plaintiff was not obliged to reject the opportunity to ride in a sheriffs car as a guest despite being under the general duty to act with care for his own safety and therefore the doctrine of assumption of risk di | 2 | 2 |
RINGSBYT TRUCK LINES, INC. v. Bradfieldgreen2 sentences2016Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Bradfield, 563 P.2d 939, 942 (Colo. 1977) (holding that where defendant was driving toward plaintiff in the wrong lane, plaintiff who slowed and pulled over was “not required to drive his vehicle into the ditch” and thus comparative negligence was properly withdrawn from the jury’s consideration); see also Seal, 344 P.2d at 696 (explaining that plaintiff was not obliged to reject the opportunity to ride in a sheriff’s car as a guest despite being under the general duty to act with care for his own safety and therefore the doctrine of assumption of risk did not appl 2016Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Bradfield, 193 Colo. 151 , 563 P.2d 939, 942 (1977) (holding that where defendant was driving toward plaintiff in the wrong lane, plaintiff who slowed and pulled over was "not required to drive his vehicle into the ditch" and thus comparative negligence was properly: withdrawn from the jury's consideration); see also Seal, 344 P.2d at 696 (explaining that plaintiff was not obliged to reject the opportunity to ride in a sheriffs car as a guest despite being under the general duty to act with care for his own safety and therefore the doctrine of assumption of risk di | 2 | 2 |
Harris v. the Arkgreen2 sentences1993See § 13-21-111.7, 6A C.R.S. (1987); Harris v. The Ark, 810 P.2d 226 (Colo.1991). [1] I am not persuaded that a public safety worker rule should only be triggered when a public servant bearing the literal job title of either "police officer" or "fire fighter" has filed suit. 1993See § 13-21-111.7, 6A C.R.S. (1987); Harris v. The Ark, 810 P.2d 226 (Colo.1991). | 1 | 2 |
Legro v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2020See Wark, 68 P.3d at 581 (explaining that a party’s subjective knowledge of the danger is necessary for an assumption of risk instruction); see also Legro, ¶ 15, 369 P.3d at 789 (“We defer to the court’s credibility determinations . . . .”). ¶ 107 Moreover, additional evidence supported Warembourg’s subjective belief that his actions were not dangerous. | 1 | 1 |
Wark v. McClellangreen2 sentences2020See Wark, 68 P.3d at 581 (explaining that a court may instruct the jury on the assumption of risk defense if the facts of the case support giving the instruction). 52 ¶ 106 Contrary to Excel’s contention, the record evidence does not indicate that Warembourg knew of the danger or consented to it. 2020See Wark, 68 P.3d at 581 (explaining that a party’s subjective knowledge of the danger is necessary for an assumption of risk instruction); see also Legro, ¶ 15, 369 P.3d at 789 (“We defer to the court’s credibility determinations . . . .”). ¶ 107 Moreover, additional evidence supported Warembourg’s subjective belief that his actions were not dangerous. | 1 | 1 |
Christensen v. Hoovergreen1 sentence1988See Christensen v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525 (Colo.1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Kreuser
green
2 sentences1978In Brown v. Kreuser, Colo.App., 560 P.2d 105 , this court upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the definition and effect of the assumption of risk defense in a comparative negligence case. 1977In Brown v. Kreuser, Colo.App., 560 P.2d 105 (1977), we held that an instruction concerning assumption of risk should not be given in cases tried under comparative negligence principles. | 2 | 1977–1978 |
Mullin v. Babcock
neutral
2 sentences1992See Harris v. The Ark, supra (assumption of risk instruction proper when plaintiff knew alternate routes were available but decided to take an icy and snow-covered walkway on which he slipped and fell); Mullin v. Babcock, 167 Colo. 369 , 447 P.2d 697 (1968) (assumption of risk instruction proper when plaintiff was injured after repeated warnings of danger); Pletchas v. Von Poppenheim, 148 Colo. 127 , 365 P.2d 261 (1961) (assumption of risk instruction proper when plaintiff became a passenger in automobile driven by defendant whom plaintiff knew had been drinking). 1992See Harris v. The Ark, supra (assumption of risk instruction proper when plaintiff knew alternate routes were available but decided to take an icy and snow-covered walkway on which he slipped and fell); Mullin v. Babcock, 167 Colo. 369 , 447 P.2d 697 (1968) (assumption of risk instruction proper when plaintiff was injured after repeated warnings of danger); Pletchas v. Von Poppenheim, 148 Colo. 127 , 365 P.2d 261 (1961) (assumption of risk instruction proper when plaintiff became a passenger in automobile driven by defendant whom plaintiff knew had been drinking). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Pletchas v. Von Poppenheim
green
2 sentences1992See Harris v. The Ark, supra (assumption of risk instruction proper when plaintiff knew alternate routes were available but decided to take an icy and snow-covered walkway on which he slipped and fell); Mullin v. Babcock, 167 Colo. 369 , 447 P.2d 697 (1968) (assumption of risk instruction proper when plaintiff was injured after repeated warnings of danger); Pletchas v. Von Poppenheim, 148 Colo. 127 , 365 P.2d 261 (1961) (assumption of risk instruction proper when plaintiff became a passenger in automobile driven by defendant whom plaintiff knew had been drinking). 1992See Harris v. The Ark, supra (assumption of risk instruction proper when plaintiff knew alternate routes were available but decided to take an icy and snow-covered walkway on which he slipped and fell); Mullin v. Babcock, 167 Colo. 369 , 447 P.2d 697 (1968) (assumption of risk instruction proper when plaintiff was injured after repeated warnings of danger); Pletchas v. Von Poppenheim, 148 Colo. 127 , 365 P.2d 261 (1961) (assumption of risk instruction proper when plaintiff became a passenger in automobile driven by defendant whom plaintiff knew had been drinking). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Jacobsen v. McGinness
neutral
2 sentences1959The plaintiff, under the circumstances, was within his rights in choosing to ride with the deputy sheriff, who in the course of the trip was required to respond to an emergency call. *392 To say that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in such circumstances, is to say that he should have rejected the opportunity for transportation back to Golden, or as said in Jacobsen v. McGinness (1957), 135 Colo. 357 , 311 P. (2d) 696 : “To say that in such circumstances Jacobsen was contributorily negligent would be to say that he should not have been on that road at that time in the morning, or better 1959The plaintiff, under the circumstances, was within his rights in choosing to ride with the deputy sheriff, who in the course of the trip was required to respond to an emergency call. *392 To say that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in such circumstances, is to say that he should have rejected the opportunity for transportation back to Golden, or as said in Jacobsen v. McGinness (1957), 135 Colo. 357 , 311 P. (2d) 696 : “To say that in such circumstances Jacobsen was contributorily negligent would be to say that he should not have been on that road at that time in the morning, or better | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.