55 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smithers v. Center Point Properties Corp.green2 sentences2001The only Illinois case we have located discussing the assumption of risk doctrine as it relates to the deliberate encounter exception is Smithers v. Center Point Properties Corp. , 318 Ill. 2001App. 3d 430, 441-42 , 741 N.E.2d 1152, 1160-61 (2000); there, the court held that the deliberate encounter exception did not abrogate the fireman's rule, a specie of the assumption of risk doctrine, although it could be argued that the fireman's rule presents a specialized case. | 4 | 5 |
Gray v. Pflanzgreen2 sentences2010Both of these instrumentalities were entirely under the control of defendant and it was his negligence *** which resulted in the injuries sustained”); see also Gray, 341 Ill. 2010Both of these instrumentalities were entirely under the control of defendant and it was his negligence *** which resulted in the injuries sustained”); see also Gray, 341 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
Rick E. Clark, & Cross-Appellee v. Burlington Northern, Inc., a Corporation, & Cross-Appellantgreen2 sentences2002See Clark v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 1984); Heater, 497 F.2d at 1249 (found no case in which the giving of the instruction in an FELA case was alone held to be reversible error). 2002See Clark v. Burlington Northern, Inc. , 726 F.2d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 1984); Heater , 497 F.2d at 1249 (found no case in which the giving of the instruction in an FELA case was alone held to be reversible error). | 2 | 3 |
Vanderlei v. Heidemangreen2 sentences2023“The doctrine has been applied to persons who by reason of being professionals are held to bear the risks of their profession.” Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. 2023“The doctrine has been applied to persons who by reason of being professionals are held to bear the risks of their profession.” Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
VanPlew v. Ricciogreen2 sentences2023As stated above, the Act defines “owner” as “any person having a right of property in an animal, or who keeps or harbors an animal, or who has it in his care, or acts as its custodian, or who knowingly permits a dog to remain on any premises occupied by him or her.” 510 ILCS 5/2.16 (West 2020). “[W]here a person voluntarily accepts responsibility for controlling or caring for a dog or other animal, that person is an ‘owner’ within the meaning of the Act and is precluded from recovery under the Act.” VanPlew v. Riccio, 317 Ill. 2023As stated above, the Act defines “owner” as “any person having a right of property in an animal, or who keeps or harbors an animal, or who has it in his care, or acts as its custodian, or who knowingly permits a dog to remain on any premises occupied by him or her.” 510 ILCS 5/2.16 (West 2020). “[W]here a person voluntarily accepts responsibility for controlling or caring for a dog or other animal, that person is an ‘owner’ within the meaning of the Act and is precluded from recovery under the Act.” VanPlew v. Riccio, 317 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Harris v. Walkergreen2 sentences2023In Harris v. Walker, our supreme court explained that “the legislature intended only to provide coverage under the statute for plaintiffs who, by virtue of their relationship to the owner of the dog or other animal or the lack of any such relationship, may not have any way of knowing or avoiding the risk that the animal poses to them.” Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 547 (1988). 2023In Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 547 (1988), our supreme court explained that “the legislature intended only to provide coverage under the statute for plaintiffs who, by virtue of their relationship to the owner of the dog or other animal or the lack of any such relationship, may not have any way of knowing or avoiding the risk that the animal poses to them.” The plaintiff in Harris was excluded from the Act’s coverage because he had rented the horse from the defendant’s stable and claimed to fully understand and accept the risks of horseback riding. | 2 | 2 |
Herendeen v. Hamiltongreen2 sentences2010App. 3d at 433 (noting that the risks assumed under the primary assumption of risk doctrine “are not those created by [the] defendant’s negligence but rather those created by the nature of the activity itself’); see also Herendeen v. Hamilton, 317 Ill. 2010App. 3d at 433 (noting that the risks assumed under the primary assumption of risk doctrine “are not those created by [the] defendant’s negligence but rather those created by the nature of the activity itself”); see also Herendeen v. Hamilton, 317 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Knight v. Jewettgreen2 sentences2006See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 308 , 834 P.2d 696, 703 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 9 (1992) (“those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk— the category of assumption of risk that the legal commentators generally refer to as ‘primary assumption of risk’ ”); Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 104 , 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539 (1988) (implied assumption of risk is “only another way of stating that the defendant’s duty of care has been reduced in pr 2006See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 308 , 834 P.2d 696, 703 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 9 (1992) (“those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk— the category of assumption of risk that the legal commentators generally refer to as ‘primary assumption of risk’ ”); Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 104 , 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539 (1988) (implied assumption of risk is “only another way of stating that the defendant’s duty of care has been reduced in pr | 2 | 2 |
Ordway v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2006See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 308 , 834 P.2d 696, 703 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 9 (1992) (“those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk— the category of assumption of risk that the legal commentators generally refer to as ‘primary assumption of risk’ ”); Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 104 , 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539 (1988) (implied assumption of risk is “only another way of stating that the defendant’s duty of care has been reduced in pr 2006See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 308 , 834 P.2d 696, 703 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 9 (1992) (“those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk— the category of assumption of risk that the legal commentators generally refer to as ‘primary assumption of risk’ ”); Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 104 , 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539 (1988) (implied assumption of risk is “only another way of stating that the defendant’s duty of care has been reduced in pr | 2 | 2 |
O'Neill v. Danielsgreen2 sentences2006See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 308 , 834 P.2d 696, 703 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 9 (1992) (“those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk— the category of assumption of risk that the legal commentators generally refer to as ‘primary assumption of risk’ ”); Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 104 , 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539 (1988) (implied assumption of risk is “only another way of stating that the defendant’s duty of care has been reduced in pr 2006See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 308 , 834 P.2d 696, 703 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 9 (1992) (“those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk— the category of assumption of risk that the legal commentators generally refer to as ‘primary assumption of risk’ ”); Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 104 , 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539 (1988) (implied assumption of risk is “only another way of stating that the defendant’s duty of care has been reduced in pr | 2 | 2 |
Francis v. Heater v. The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Companygreen2 sentences2002See Clark v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 1984); Heater, 497 F.2d at 1249 (found no case in which the giving of the instruction in an FELA case was alone held to be reversible error). 2002See Clark v. Burlington Northern, Inc. , 726 F.2d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 1984); Heater , 497 F.2d at 1249 (found no case in which the giving of the instruction in an FELA case was alone held to be reversible error). | 2 | 2 |
Boland v. Kawasaki Motors Manufacturing Corp.green2 sentences2001According to Frank, none of the evidence at trial supported issuing this instruction. "[I]n Illinois, 'all that is required to justify the giving of an instruction is that there be some evidence in the record to justify the theory of the instruction.'" Boland v. Kawasaki Motors Manufacturing Corp. , 309 Ill. 2001According to Frank, none of the evidence at trial supported issuing this instruction. “[I]n Illinois ‘[a]ll that is required to justify the giving of an instruction is that there be some evidence in the record to justify the theory of the instruction.’ ” Boland v. Kawasaki Motors Manufacturing Corp., USA, 309 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
Carl v. Resnickgreen1 sentence2023See id. -8- No. 1-22-0464 ¶ 25 We begin with a discussion of the evolution of the assumption of risk doctrine in relation to the Animal Control Act. | 1 | 1 |
| Nancy E. Elder and Joseph C. Elder v. Crawley Book MacHinery Company, a Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Conrad v. Springfield Consolidated Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1968Co., 240 Ill 12, 88 NE 180 , wherein it stated at page 17: “Appellant’s contention that appellee must be held, as a matter of law, to have assumed the risk cannot be sustained, since the doctrine of the assumption of risk is only applicable to cases arising between master and servant. 1968Co., 240 Ill 12, 88 NE 180 (1909) it was said: “. . . the doctrine of the assumption of risk is only applicable to cases arising between master and servant.” These pronouncements fixed the law in Illinois and they have been echoed down to the present day. | 5 | 1947–1968 |
Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall
green
2 sentences2021For example, Congress “abolished the fellow servant rule, rejected the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of that of comparative negligence, and prohibited employers from exempting themselves from FELA through contract; a 1939 amendment abolished the assumption of risk defense.” Id. at 542-43 . ¶ 17 B. 2020For example, Congress “abolished the fellow servant -4- rule, rejected the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of that of comparative negligence, and prohibited employers from exempting themselves from FELA through contract; a 1939 amendment abolished the assumption of risk defense.” Id. at 542-43 . ¶ 17 B. | 3 | 2019–2021 |
B. Shoninger Co. v. Mann
green
2 sentences1955Schoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill. 242 .’ See also O’Rourke v. Sproul, 241 Ill. 576 ; Mueller v. Phelps, 252 Ill. 630 ; Chicago and Eastern Ill R. 1947Schoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill. 242 .”' See also O’Rourke v. Sproul, 241 Ill. 576 ; Mueller v. Phelps, 252 Ill. 630 ; Chicago and Eastern Ill. | 3 | 1909–1955 |
Schultz v. NORTHEAST ILL. REGIONAL COMMUTER RAILROAD CORP.
green
2 sentences2018“A faulty jury instruction does not require reversal unless the error results in serious prejudice to the party’s right to a fair trial. [Citation.] In determining whether a party has been prejudiced, we consider whether the instructions, taken as a whole, were sufficiently clear so as not to mislead the jury.” Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2014 IL App (1st) 121593, ¶ 87 . ¶ 41 In Schultz, our supreme court discussed the use of an assumption of risk instruction in an FELA case, explaining: “There is some overlap between the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory neglig 2018However, the supreme court noted that the Schultz defendant did not identify any “case in which the giving of an assumption of risk instruction in an FELA case was held to be reversible error.” Id. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Doe v. The University of Chicago Medical Center
neutral
2 sentences2018“A faulty jury instruction does not require reversal unless the error results in serious prejudice to the party’s right to a fair trial. [Citation.] In determining whether a party has been prejudiced, we consider whether the instructions, taken as a whole, were sufficiently clear so as not to mislead the jury.” Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2014 IL App (1st) 121593, ¶ 87 . ¶ 41 In Schultz, our supreme court discussed the use of an assumption of risk instruction in an FELA case, explaining: “There is some overlap between the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory neglig 2017“A faulty jury instruction does not require reversal unless the error results in serious prejudice to the - 13 - 1-16-1384 party’s right to a fair trial. [Citation.] In determining whether a party has been prejudiced, we consider whether the instructions, taken as a whole, were sufficiently clear so as not to mislead the jury.” Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2014 IL App (1st) 121593, ¶ 87 . ¶ 41 In Schultz, our supreme court discussed the use of an assumption of risk instruction in an FELA case, explaining: “There is some overlap between the doctrines of assumption of risk and co | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Wilms v. Jess
green
2 sentences2016First, Union Pacific points out that in Wilms, 94 Ill. at 469 , the supreme court recognized “contributive negligence” as a defense in an action for mine subsidence. 2015First, Union Pacific points out that in Wilms, 94 Ill. at 469 , the supreme court recognized "contributive negligence" as a defense in an action for mine subsidence. - 59 - Second, Union Pacific reasons that because comparative fault is a defense to strict product liability (see Coney v. J.L.G. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Gallagher v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2010Gallagher, 93 Ohio App. 3d at 463 , 638 N.E.2d at 1091 . 2010Gallagher, 93 Ohio App. 3d at 463 , 638 N.E.2d at 1091 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Snyder v. Curran Township
green
2 sentences2000Snyder v. Curran Township, 281 Ill. 2000Snyder v. Curran Township , 281 Ill. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co.
green
2 sentences1991(Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 418 , 261 N.E.2d 395 .) The assumption of risk test is subjective in the sense that evidence of plaintiff’s knowledge, understanding and appreciation of the danger must be assessed, rather than that of a reasonably prudent person. 1974In Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 45 Ill.2d 418 , 261 N.E.2d 305 , the earliest case in which the supreme court has considered the culpable conduct of the plaintiff which may be a basis of the assumption of risk defense, the court appears to consider the principle described in comment n to section 402A of the Restatement of Torts as embodying the general principle applicable to his defense. | 2 | 1974–1991 |
King v. American Food Equipment Co.
green
2 sentences1991(King v. American Food Equipment Co. (1987), 160 Ill. 1989Industries, Inc. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 104, 119 , 454 N.E.2d 197 .) The assumption of risk test is fundamentally subjective “in the sense that it is his knowledge, understanding and appreciation of the danger which must be assessed, rather than that of the reasonably prudent person” (King v. American Food Equipment Co. (1987), 160 Ill. | 2 | 1989–1991 |
Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern Railroad
green
2 sentences1987Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 , 229 N.E.2d 504 .) We find that the trial court properly directed a verdict for plaintiff on the assumption of risk defense in that there was no evidence that King deliberately proceeded in disregard of a known dangerous condition. 1987Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 , 229 N.E.2d 504 .) We find that the trial court properly directed a verdict for plaintiff on the assumption of risk defense in that there was no evidence that King deliberately proceeded in disregard of a known dangerous condition. | 2 | 1970–1987 |
Hensley v. Hensley
green
2 sentences1968Co., 240 Ill 12, 88 NE 180 (1909), the court held at page 17: “Appellant’s contention that appellee must be held, as a matter of law, to have assumed the risk cannot be sustained, since the doctrine of the assumption of risk is only applicable to cases arising between master and servant. . . .” In Hensley v. Hensley, 62 Ill App2d 252, 210 NE2d 568 (1965), the court said at page 259: “In support of his position that the doctrine has been applied in cases not involving the master servant relationship, he cites Brownback v. Thomas, 101 Ill App 81, and Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill App 1967Davis v. Springfield Lodge No. 158, Benev. and Protective Order of Elks, 24 Ill App2d 102, 164 NE2d 243 (1960), Hensley v. Hensley, 62 Ill App2d 252, 210 NE2d 568 (1965). | 2 | 1967–1968 |
Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co.
green
2 sentences1968Co., 240 Ill 12, 88 NE 180 (1909), the court held at page 17: “Appellant’s contention that appellee must be held, as a matter of law, to have assumed the risk cannot be sustained, since the doctrine of the assumption of risk is only applicable to cases arising between master and servant. . . .” In Hensley v. Hensley, 62 Ill App2d 252, 210 NE2d 568 (1965), the court said at page 259: “In support of his position that the doctrine has been applied in cases not involving the master servant relationship, he cites Brownback v. Thomas, 101 Ill App 81, and Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill App 1968In Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill App 225, 14 NE2d 879 , the plaintiff sought recovery from the operator of a public fee golf course in Chicago. | 2 | 1968–1968 |
Davis v. Springfield Lodge No. 158
green
2 sentences1967Davis v. Springfield Lodge No. 158, Benev. and Protective Order of Elks, 24 Ill App2d 102, 164 NE2d 243 (1960), Hensley v. Hensley, 62 Ill App2d 252, 210 NE2d 568 (1965). 1965Shoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill 242.” The most recent case on this subject is Davis v. Springfield Lodge No. 158, 24 Ill App2d 102, 164 NE2d 243 , wherein the court said at 110: “It is further contended by defendant that since plaintiff had been a member of defendant lodge for 16 or 17 years, he must be held to have assumed whatever risks were involved in entering the unlighted therapy room. | 2 | 1965–1967 |
O'Rourke v. Sproul
green
2 sentences1955Schoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill. 242 .’ See also O’Rourke v. Sproul, 241 Ill. 576 ; Mueller v. Phelps, 252 Ill. 630 ; Chicago and Eastern Ill R. 1947Schoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill. 242 .”' See also O’Rourke v. Sproul, 241 Ill. 576 ; Mueller v. Phelps, 252 Ill. 630 ; Chicago and Eastern Ill. | 2 | 1947–1955 |
Mueller v. Phelps
green
2 sentences1955Schoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill. 242 .’ See also O’Rourke v. Sproul, 241 Ill. 576 ; Mueller v. Phelps, 252 Ill. 630 ; Chicago and Eastern Ill R. 1947Schoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill. 242 .”' See also O’Rourke v. Sproul, 241 Ill. 576 ; Mueller v. Phelps, 252 Ill. 630 ; Chicago and Eastern Ill. | 2 | 1947–1955 |
Soto v. Gaytan
green
2 sentences2007Trial Court Errors Defendants last contend that they were denied a fair trial when the trial court erroneously allowed the testimony of: (a) Ken Yotz, plaintiffs' safety expert, that Steve worked for Rainbow on the day of the accident; (b) John Adams, defendants' workers' compensation attorney, that Steve was not an employee of United; and (c) plaintiffs that United's workers' compensation coverage was suspended by USLIC because of Jim's misrepresentations. *646 A. Testimony of Ken Yotz Defendants contend that unfair prejudice resulted from Yotz's testimony that Steve worked for Rainbow, not U 2007Trial Court Errors Defendants last contend that they were denied a fair trial when the trial court erroneously allowed the testimony of: (a) Ken Yotz, plaintiffs' safety expert, that Steve worked for Rainbow on the day of the accident; (b) John Adams, defendants' workers' compensation attorney, that Steve was not an employee of United; and (c) plaintiffs that United's workers' compensation coverage was suspended by USLIC because of Jim's misrepresentations. *646 A. Testimony of Ken Yotz Defendants contend that unfair prejudice resulted from Yotz's testimony that Steve worked for Rainbow, not U | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Buell green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Stanley F. Taylor v. Burlington Northern Railroad Company green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| In Re Estate of Loesch green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| MATTER OF ITT AVIS, INC. v. Tuttle neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Coney v. J. L. G. Industries, Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Thomas v. Kaiser Agricultural Chemicals green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Lundy v. Whiting Corp. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Yakstis v. William J. Diestelhorst Co. neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Leavitt v. Gillaspie green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Fore v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Barrett v. Fritz green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Crouch green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Interstate Printing Co. v. Callahan green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| O'NEILL v. Montalbano neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| McConville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Cleary v. Eckart green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Gooder v. State green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Sommerfield v. Flury green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Poneitowcki v. Harres green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Felgner v. Anderson green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Feigenbaum v. Brink green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Gilmore v. Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.