assumption of risk doctrine in West Virginia

2001Corp., 182 W.Va. 276 , 387 S.E.2d 511 (1989), this Court had the opportunity to consider the continued vitality of the assumption of risk doctrine in light of our adoption of comparative negligence.

2001Corp., 182 W.Va. 276 , 387 S.E.2d 511 (1989), this Court had the opportunity to consider the continued vitality of the assumption of risk doctrine in light of our adoption of comparative negligence.

1993In syllabus point 8 of Kodym v. Frazier, 186 W.Va. 221 , 412 S.E.2d 219 (1991), we explained: “ ‘An erroneous instruction is presumed to be prejudicial and warrants a new trial unless it appears that the complaining party was not prejudiced by such instruction.’ Point 2, syllabus, Hallen v. Linger, 151 W.Va. 255 [ 151 S.E.2d 330 (1966) ].” Syllabus Point 5, Yates v. Mancan, 153 W.Va. 350 , 168 S.E.2d 746 (1969).

1991Our traditional formulation is found in Hollen v. Linger, 151 W.Va. 255, 263 , 151 S.E.2d 330, 335 (1966): "The doctrine of assumed or incurred risk is based upon the existence of a factual situation in which the act of the defendant alone creates the danger and causes the injury and the plaintiff voluntarily exposes himself to the danger with full knowledge and appreciation of its existence." In this case, the dangerous condition or the risk assumed was the storage of flammable material in a warehouse with an inoperable fire sprinkler system.

1993In syllabus point 8 of Kodym v. Frazier, 186 W.Va. 221 , 412 S.E.2d 219 (1991), we explained: “ ‘An erroneous instruction is presumed to be prejudicial and warrants a new trial unless it appears that the complaining party was not prejudiced by such instruction.’ Point 2, syllabus, Hallen v. Linger, 151 W.Va. 255 [ 151 S.E.2d 330 (1966) ].” Syllabus Point 5, Yates v. Mancan, 153 W.Va. 350 , 168 S.E.2d 746 (1969).

1975E.g., Yates v. Mancari, 153 W.

1989In the course of discussing the assumption of risk doctrine, we stated in note 11 of Pack, 177 W.Va. at 491 , 354 S.E.2d at 587 : “The parties do not raise and, therefore, we do not address the question of whether in view of our comparative negligence law established in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332 , 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979), there is a need to retain the doctrine of assumption of risk.

1989In the course of discussing the assumption of risk doctrine, we stated in note 11 of Pack, 177 W.Va. at 491 , 354 S.E.2d at 587 : “The parties do not raise and, therefore, we do not address the question of whether in view of our comparative negligence law established in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332 , 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979), there is a need to retain the doctrine of assumption of risk.

1993In syllabus point 8 of Kodym v. Frazier, 186 W.Va. 221 , 412 S.E.2d 219 (1991), we explained: “ ‘An erroneous instruction is presumed to be prejudicial and warrants a new trial unless it appears that the complaining party was not prejudiced by such instruction.’ Point 2, syllabus, Hallen v. Linger, 151 W.Va. 255 [ 151 S.E.2d 330 (1966) ].” Syllabus Point 5, Yates v. Mancan, 153 W.Va. 350 , 168 S.E.2d 746 (1969).

1993In syllabus point 8 of Kodym v. Frazier, 186 W.Va. 221 , 412 S.E.2d 219 (1991), we explained: “ ‘An erroneous instruction is presumed to be prejudicial and warrants a new trial unless it appears that the complaining party was not prejudiced by such instruction.’ Point 2, syllabus, Hallen v. Linger, 151 W.Va. 255 [ 151 S.E.2d 330 (1966) ].” Syllabus Point 5, Yates v. Mancan, 153 W.Va. 350 , 168 S.E.2d 746 (1969).

1993In syllabus point 8 of Kodym v. Frazier, 186 W.Va. 221 , 412 S.E.2d 219 (1991), we explained: “ ‘An erroneous instruction is presumed to be prejudicial and warrants a new trial unless it appears that the complaining party was not prejudiced by such instruction.’ Point 2, syllabus, Hallen v. Linger, 151 W.Va. 255 [ 151 S.E.2d 330 (1966) ].” Syllabus Point 5, Yates v. Mancan, 153 W.Va. 350 , 168 S.E.2d 746 (1969).

1991In an analogous case, Skarpness v. Port of Seattle, 52 Wash.2d 490 , 326 P.2d 747 (1958), the plaintiffs rented a shed from the Port of Seattle and stored fishing gear in it.

1991In an analogous case, Skarpness v. Port of Seattle, 52 Wash.2d 490 , 326 P.2d 747 (1958), the plaintiffs rented a shed from the Port of Seattle and stored fishing gear in it.

1991In Golden ‘B’ Products, Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co., 58 Or.App. 555 , 649 P.2d 813 , modified on other grounds, 60 Or.App. 39 , 652 P.2d 832 (1982), the plaintiff sought to avoid an assumption of risk defense by arguing it was not aware of the specific defect in the equipment that caused the fire.

1991In Golden ‘B’ Products, Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co., 58 Or.App. 555 , 649 P.2d 813 , modified on other grounds, 60 Or.App. 39 , 652 P.2d 832 (1982), the plaintiff sought to avoid an assumption of risk defense by arguing it was not aware of the specific defect in the equipment that caused the fire.

1991App. 39 , 652 P.2d 832 (1982), the plaintiff sought to avoid an assumption of risk defense by arguing it was not aware of the specific defect in the equipment that caused the fire.

1991In Golden ‘B’ Products, Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co., 58 Or.App. 555 , 649 P.2d 813 , modified on other grounds, 60 Or.App. 39 , 652 P.2d 832 (1982), the plaintiff sought to avoid an assumption of risk defense by arguing it was not aware of the specific defect in the equipment that caused the fire.

1989This same defense was at issue in Ventura v. Winegardner, 178 W.Va. 82 , 357 S.E.2d 764 (1987), where a motel guest was engaged in horseplay at night and, while running in an unlit area, fell over a bank, injuring herself.

1989This same defense was at issue in Ventura v. Winegardner, 178 W.Va. 82 , 357 S.E.2d 764 (1987), where a motel guest was engaged in horseplay at night and, while running in an unlit area, fell over a bank, injuring herself.

1989McAllister v. Weirton Hospital Co., 173 W.Va. 75, 81 , 312 S.E.2d 738, 744 (1983) (citations omitted).’ Syl. pt. 2, Brammer v. Taylor, 175 W.Va. 728 , 338 S.E.2d 207 (1985).” In light of the foregoing, we hold that the trial court erred by directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

1989McAllister v. Weirton Hospital Co., 173 W.Va. 75, 81 , 312 S.E.2d 738, 744 (1983) (citations omitted).’ Syl. pt. 2, Brammer v. Taylor, 175 W.Va. 728 , 338 S.E.2d 207 (1985).” In light of the foregoing, we hold that the trial court erred by directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

1989In the course of discussing the assumption of risk doctrine, we stated in note 11 of Pack, 177 W.Va. at 491 , 354 S.E.2d at 587 : “The parties do not raise and, therefore, we do not address the question of whether in view of our comparative negligence law established in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332 , 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979), there is a need to retain the doctrine of assumption of risk.

1989In the course of discussing the assumption of risk doctrine, we stated in note 11 of Pack, 177 W.Va. at 491 , 354 S.E.2d at 587 : “The parties do not raise and, therefore, we do not address the question of whether in view of our comparative negligence law established in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332 , 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979), there is a need to retain the doctrine of assumption of risk.

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986Failure to use due care under the circumstances constitutes the element of contributory negligence.” See also Cross v. Noland, 156 W.Va. 1 , 190 S.E.2d 18 (1972); Wright v. Valan, 130 W.Va. 466 , 43 S.E.2d 364 (1947); Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W.Va. 215 , 193 S.E. 57 (1937). 11 .The parties do not raise and, therefore, we do not address the question of whether in view of our comparative negligence law established in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332 , 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979), there is a need to retain the doctrine of assumption of risk.

1986Failure to use due care under the circumstances constitutes the element of contributory negligence.” See also Cross v. Noland, 156 W.Va. 1 , 190 S.E.2d 18 (1972); Wright v. Valan, 130 W.Va. 466 , 43 S.E.2d 364 (1947); Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W.Va. 215 , 193 S.E. 57 (1937). 11 .The parties do not raise and, therefore, we do not address the question of whether in view of our comparative negligence law established in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332 , 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979), there is a need to retain the doctrine of assumption of risk.

1986Failure to use due care under the circumstances constitutes the element of contributory negligence.” See also Cross v. Noland, 156 W.Va. 1 , 190 S.E.2d 18 (1972); Wright v. Valan, 130 W.Va. 466 , 43 S.E.2d 364 (1947); Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W.Va. 215 , 193 S.E. 57 (1937). 11 .The parties do not raise and, therefore, we do not address the question of whether in view of our comparative negligence law established in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332 , 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979), there is a need to retain the doctrine of assumption of risk.

1986Failure to use due care under the circumstances constitutes the element of contributory negligence.” See also Cross v. Noland, 156 W.Va. 1 , 190 S.E.2d 18 (1972); Wright v. Valan, 130 W.Va. 466 , 43 S.E.2d 364 (1947); Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W.Va. 215 , 193 S.E. 57 (1937). 11 .The parties do not raise and, therefore, we do not address the question of whether in view of our comparative negligence law established in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332 , 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979), there is a need to retain the doctrine of assumption of risk.

1986Failure to use due care under the circumstances constitutes the element of contributory negligence.” See also Cross v. Noland, 156 W.Va. 1 , 190 S.E.2d 18 (1972); Wright v. Valan, 130 W.Va. 466 , 43 S.E.2d 364 (1947); Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W.Va. 215 , 193 S.E. 57 (1937). 11 .The parties do not raise and, therefore, we do not address the question of whether in view of our comparative negligence law established in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332 , 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979), there is a need to retain the doctrine of assumption of risk.

1986Failure to use due care under the circumstances constitutes the element of contributory negligence.” See also Cross v. Noland, 156 W.Va. 1 , 190 S.E.2d 18 (1972); Wright v. Valan, 130 W.Va. 466 , 43 S.E.2d 364 (1947); Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W.Va. 215 , 193 S.E. 57 (1937). 11 .The parties do not raise and, therefore, we do not address the question of whether in view of our comparative negligence law established in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332 , 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979), there is a need to retain the doctrine of assumption of risk.

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1986See, e.g., Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal.App.3d 361 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 566 (1972); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal.App.2d 16 , 324 P.2d 657 (Cal.App.1958); Martin v. George Hy-man Construction Co., 395 A.2d 63 (D.C.1978); Lindsey v. Dean Evans Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432 , 297 N.E.2d 8 (1973); Panta- *492 leo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116 , 245 N.E.2d 618 (1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 1 , 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont.1980); Heath v. Soloff Construction, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 507 , 487 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1985)

1972The doctrine of assumption of risk, as defined in the Hunn case, “rests on two premises: first, that the *7 nature and extent of the risk are fully appreciated; and second, that it is voluntarily incurred.” As expressed in Korzun v. Shahan, 151 W.Va. 243 , 151 S.E.2d 287 : “Assumption of risk is available as a defense only where one places himself in a posture of known danger with an appreciation of such danger.” See 57 Am.

1972The doctrine of assumption of risk, as defined in the Hunn case, “rests on two premises: first, that the *7 nature and extent of the risk are fully appreciated; and second, that it is voluntarily incurred.” As expressed in Korzun v. Shahan, 151 W.Va. 243 , 151 S.E.2d 287 : “Assumption of risk is available as a defense only where one places himself in a posture of known danger with an appreciation of such danger.” See 57 Am.