assumption of risk doctrine in Indiana

2011As to public policy, the Bowman court emphasized the desirability of “affording enhanced protection against liability to co-participants in sports events” who “are not in a position, practically speaking, to protect themselves from claims.” Id. at 992 (quoting Mark v. Moser, 746 N.E.2d 410, 421 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001), trans. not sought).

2010Specifically, the statute abolished the fellow servant rule, rejected the doctrine of contributory negli-genee in favor of that of comparative negligence, and prohibited employers from exempting themselves from FELA through contract; a 1989 amendment abolished the assumption of risk defense. 512 U.S. at 542-43 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 (citing 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 , 53-55).

2010Specifically, the statute abolished the fellow servant rule, rejected the doctrine of contributory negli-genee in favor of that of comparative negligence, and prohibited employers from exempting themselves from FELA through contract; a 1989 amendment abolished the assumption of risk defense. 512 U.S. at 542-43 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 (citing 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 , 53-55).

2006Relying on the assumption of risk doctrine, the defendant driving range owner contended he was not liable “for damages sustained by participants or spectators by reason of injuries which are reasonably incidental to the particular athletic events.” Id. at 602 , 106 N.E.2d at 244 .

2006Relying on the assumption of risk doctrine, the defendant driving range owner contended he was not liable “for damages sustained by participants or spectators by reason of injuries which are reasonably incidental to the particular athletic events.” Id. at 602 , 106 N.E.2d at 244 .

2001See Knight, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d at 711 ; Turcotte, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 , 502 N.E.2d at 970 .

2001See Knight, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d at 711 ; Turcotte, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 , 502 N.E.2d at 970 .

1965In Valentine Co. v. Sloan (1913), 53 Ind. App. 69, 72 , 101 N. E. 102 , our Supreme Court held in substance as follows: the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply in the case of a person injured by reason of the unevenness of the steps in an aisle of an opera house, where it appears in the evidence without contradiction that the injured' party had never been in the building before and had no knowledge of the condition of the Steps and was unable to see the condition of the steps.

1965In Valentine Co. v. Sloan (1913), 53 Ind. App. 69, 72 , 101 N. E. 102 , our Supreme Court held in substance as follows: the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply in the case of a person injured by reason of the unevenness of the steps in an aisle of an opera house, where it appears in the evidence without contradiction that the injured' party had never been in the building before and had no knowledge of the condition of the Steps and was unable to see the condition of the steps.

1963Co. v. Pinchin, 112 Ind. 592 ; City of Plymouth v. Milner, 117 Ind. 324 .’ ‘Then again, at page 333, the Court said: ‘Whether anything is said of the dangerous character of the employment, or of the defective and dangerous appliances or not, if the dangers and defects are of such character that they are equally known to or open to the observation of both employer and employee, it can well and justly be said that they stand on a common footing.’ ‘Hence, if there was an employee-employer relationship existing in the instant case, the doctrine of assumption of risk would apply and would defeat th

1963Co. v. Pinchin, 112 Ind. 592 ; City of Plymouth v. Milner, 117 Ind. 324 .' `Then again, at page 333, the Court said: `Whether anything is said of the dangerous character of the employment, or of the defective and dangerous appliances or not, if the dangers and defects are of such character that they are equally known to or open to the observation of both employer and employee, it can well and justly be said that they stand on a common footing.' `Hence, if there was an employee-employer relationship existing in the instant case, the doctrine of assumption of risk would apply and would defeat th

1963Co. v. Pinchin, 112 Ind. 592 ; City of Plymouth v. Milner, 117 Ind. 324 .’ ‘Then again, at page 333, the Court said: ‘Whether anything is said of the dangerous character of the employment, or of the defective and dangerous appliances or not, if the dangers and defects are of such character that they are equally known to or open to the observation of both employer and employee, it can well and justly be said that they stand on a common footing.’ ‘Hence, if there was an employee-employer relationship existing in the instant case, the doctrine of assumption of risk would apply and would defeat th

1963Co. v. Pinchin, 112 Ind. 592 ; City of Plymouth v. Milner, 117 Ind. 324 .' `Then again, at page 333, the Court said: `Whether anything is said of the dangerous character of the employment, or of the defective and dangerous appliances or not, if the dangers and defects are of such character that they are equally known to or open to the observation of both employer and employee, it can well and justly be said that they stand on a common footing.' `Hence, if there was an employee-employer relationship existing in the instant case, the doctrine of assumption of risk would apply and would defeat th

1943In the case of The Pittsburgh, etc., Co. v. Hoffman (1914), 57 Ind. App. 431, 439 , 107 N. E. 315, 318 , the court differentiates between “assumed” risk, “incurred” risk and contributory negligence and says: “Where one-voluntarily and knowingly places himself in a certain environment, or undertakes to use a certain instrumentality, and as a consequence receives an injury, his right to recover therefor may be defeated by the doctrine of the assumption of risk, where the contractual relation exists, or by the doctrine of incurred risk where the relation is noncontractual, even though he may have

1943In the case of The Pittsburgh, etc., Co. v. Hoffman (1914), 57 Ind. App. 431, 439 , 107 N. E. 315, 318 , the court differentiates between “assumed” risk, “incurred” risk and contributory negligence and says: “Where one-voluntarily and knowingly places himself in a certain environment, or undertakes to use a certain instrumentality, and as a consequence receives an injury, his right to recover therefor may be defeated by the doctrine of the assumption of risk, where the contractual relation exists, or by the doctrine of incurred risk where the relation is noncontractual, even though he may have

1939As was said in the case of Krack v. Wolf (1872), 39 Ind. 88 , 90: “It would hardly conduce to the fair and proper administration of justice to allow a party to take his chances for a verdict, and then, if he was unsuccessful, to claim there should be a new trial because the court had not instructed the jury, when he neither asked it nor excepted to its not having been done.” Where the court fails to give instructions relevant and proper for consideration by the jury under issues submitted for trial, such omission on the part of the court must be called to its attention before the jury retires

1918Inland Steel Co. v. King (1916), 184 Ind. 294 , 110 N. E. 62 .

1918Inland Steel Co. v. King (1916), 184 Ind. 294 , 110 N. E. 62 .

1915United States Cement Co. v. Cooper (1909), 172 Ind. 599 , 88 N. E. 69 ; Montieth v. Kokomo, etc., Co. (1902), 159 Ind. 149 , 64 N. E. 610 , 58 L.

1915United States Cement Co. v. Cooper (1909), 172 Ind. 599 , 88 N. E. 69 ; Montieth v. Kokomo, etc., Co. (1902), 159 Ind. 149 , 64 N. E. 610 , 58 L.

1915United States Cement Co. v. Cooper (1909), 172 Ind. 599 , 88 N. E. 69 ; Montieth v. Kokomo, etc., Co. (1902), 159 Ind. 149 , 64 N. E. 610 , 58 L.

1915United States Cement Co. v. Cooper (1909), 172 Ind. 599 , 88 N. E. 69 ; Montieth v. Kokomo, etc., Co. (1902), 159 Ind. 149 , 64 N. E. 610 , 58 L.

1908Bessler v. Laughlin (1907), 168 Ind. 38 ; Chamberlain v. Waymire (1904), 32 Ind. App. 442 .

1908Bessler v. Laughlin (1907), 168 Ind. 38 ; Chamberlain v. Waymire (1904), 32 Ind. App. 442 .

1901The decision in the case of Diamond Plate Glass Co. v. DeHority, 143 Ind. 381 ; certainly goes' to the 'extreme length of the doctrine of the assumption of risk by the servant, but we do not regard it as of controlling weight in the present inquiry.