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6 Oklahoma opinions name it 1 courts 1913–1997 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Byford v. Town of Ashergreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., Byford v. Town of Asher, 874 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1994); Flanders v. Crane Co., 693 P.2d 602 (Okla.1985); Foster v. Harding, 426 P.2d 355 (Okla.1967); Joy v. Pope, 175 Okla. 540 , 53 P.2d 683 (1936). f 13 Two exceptions to Article 23, Section 6’s mandate have been recognized. 1997Byford v. Town of Asher, 874 P.2d 45 (Okla.1994). | 1 | 2 |
Cimarron Feeders, Inc. v. Tri-County Electric Coop, Inc.green1 sentence1997Cimarron Feeders v. Tri-County Electric Co-op., Inc., 818 P.2d 901, 902 (Okla.1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Thomas v. Holliday by and Through Holliday
green
1 sentence1997Thus, B.M.I. argues, the plaintiffs conduct is viewed as somewhat similar to contributory negligence, citing Thomas v. Holliday by and through Holliday, 764 P.2d 165 (Okla.1988) footnote 8. ¶8 Unlike the defense of contributory negligence, an assumption of risk defense may exist in absence of negligence on the part of the plaintiff. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Flanders v. Crane Co.
green
1 sentence1997See, e.g., Byford v. Town of Asher, 874 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1994); Flanders v. Crane Co., 693 P.2d 602 (Okla.1985); Foster v. Harding, 426 P.2d 355 (Okla.1967); Joy v. Pope, 175 Okla. 540 , 53 P.2d 683 (1936). f 13 Two exceptions to Article 23, Section 6’s mandate have been recognized. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Joy v. Pope
green
2 sentences1997See, e.g., Byford v. Town of Asher, 874 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1994); Flanders v. Crane Co., 693 P.2d 602 (Okla.1985); Foster v. Harding, 426 P.2d 355 (Okla.1967); Joy v. Pope, 175 Okla. 540 , 53 P.2d 683 (1936). f 13 Two exceptions to Article 23, Section 6’s mandate have been recognized. 1997See, e.g., Byford v. Town of Asher, 874 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1994); Flanders v. Crane Co., 693 P.2d 602 (Okla.1985); Foster v. Harding, 426 P.2d 355 (Okla.1967); Joy v. Pope, 175 Okla. 540 , 53 P.2d 683 (1936). f 13 Two exceptions to Article 23, Section 6’s mandate have been recognized. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Foster v. Harding
green
1 sentence1997See, e.g., Byford v. Town of Asher, 874 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1994); Flanders v. Crane Co., 693 P.2d 602 (Okla.1985); Foster v. Harding, 426 P.2d 355 (Okla.1967); Joy v. Pope, 175 Okla. 540 , 53 P.2d 683 (1936). f 13 Two exceptions to Article 23, Section 6’s mandate have been recognized. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Anderson v. Northwestern Electric Cooperative
green
2 sentences1994Co-op., supra , we held that the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on the assumption of risk defense was improper because reasonable minds could differ. 1994Co-op., supra, we held that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on the assumption of risk defense was improper because reasonable minds could differ. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
S. H. Kress & Co. v. Maddox
green
2 sentences1953Kress & Co. v. Maddox, 201 Okla. 190 , 203 P. 2d 706 , we pointed out that knowledge and appreciation of the danger is an essential element of the doctrine of assumption of risk; that such doctrine does not apply unless the party alleged to have assumed such risk is found to have known of, or can be charged with, knowledge of the risk. 1953Kress & Co. v. Maddox, 201 Okla. 190 , 203 P. 2d 706 , we pointed out that knowledge and appreciation of the danger is an essential element of the doctrine of assumption of risk; that such doctrine does not apply unless the party alleged to have assumed such risk is found to have known of, or can be charged with, knowledge of the risk. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Jones v. Oklahoma Planing Mill & Mfg. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1917This court in a number of cases, notably Jones v. Oklahoma Planing Mill, 47 Okla. 477 , 147 Pac. 999 , has held that the failure to complv with the above statute is negligence per se, and that the doctrine of the assumption of risk does not. apply in ease of an injury to an employe brought about by reason of such failure, and cannot even be pleaded. 1917This court in a number of cases, notably Jones v. Oklahoma Planing Mill, 47 Okla. 477 , 147 Pac. 999 , has held that the failure to complv with the above statute is negligence per se, and that the doctrine of the assumption of risk does not. apply in ease of an injury to an employe brought about by reason of such failure, and cannot even be pleaded. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. McIntire
neutral
2 sentences1913Co. v. McIntire, 29 Okla. 797 , 119 Pac. 1008 , and authorities cited above.” In the opinion it is further on said: “In this state the doctrine of assumption of risk, as to railroads, street railways, interurban railways, and mining operators, has been modified; such employees not assuming the risk incident to the negligence of his [their] fellow servants. 1913Co. v. McIntire, 29 Okla. 797 , 119 Pac. 1008 , and authorities cited above.” In the opinion it is further on said: “In this state the doctrine of assumption of risk, as to railroads, street railways, interurban railways, and mining operators, has been modified; such employees not assuming the risk incident to the negligence of his [their] fellow servants. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.